



**Questioning International Relations Theories'
Ability to "Predict":
The Case of the Fall of the Soviet Union**

Suma Jack Khazmo

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قدرة نظريات العلاقات الدولية على التنبؤ: دراسة حالة انهيار الاتحاد السوفيتي

Suma Jack Khazmo

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Supervisor:

Dr. Helga Baumgarten

Readers

Dr. George Giacaman

Dr. NadimMseis

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To God and our Mother Virgin Mary, who are always with me guiding my way through life, with love. Believing in God's love to all creatures in the universe, regardless of their: species, race, color, religion and any other differences, has always helped me – and always will- to overcome all of my problems, and all of the difficulties that have ever faced me.

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Abstract

The Cold War was a geopolitical, ideological and economical struggle that emerged after the World War Two between two of the global “Superpowers” at that time: The Soviet Union and the United States of America- and their alliances- approximately in the year 1947. However, although it portrayed a historical incident; the Cold War still has a great effect on the Post-Cold War International System's Structure and its "Balance of Power", most important of which is the decline of the former Soviet Union, resulting in the transformation of the International System's power scale from a "bipolar" into a "unipolar" one.

To a degree, it was a war like all other wars. Nonetheless, it had a unique characteristic that confused the minds of both: academic intellectuals and decision makers. Though they expected this war to end, none of them expected it to end the way it did, *peacefully*. This rather embarrassing failure of *then* prominent International Relations theories to predict or -at least- recognize the possibility of such a peaceful quiet ending of the Cold War, along with the change of the International system's structure from a bipolar to a

"uni-polar" one, rises many questions regarding the credibility and the reliability of the Political Science in general, and the International Relations Theory in particular. Questions and controversy revolve –particularly- around two areas of these sciences: their research questions and their research methodologies. Thus, drawing a skeptical debate discussing whether they are to be named sciences or not.

Hence, this thesis conducts a “literature assessing” of the Cold War International Relations' literature. It analyzes that era’s prominent IR theories, mainly: Realism, Liberalism and Radicalism. This methodology is vital; for it sheds light on where those theories succeeded and where they missed in both: observing and tracking the falling -AKA power ceasing- course of the Soviet Union. Consequently, it tries to answer why these theories have - failed to "predict" the *peaceful* manner through which both the USSR disintegrated and the Cold War ended.

Moreover, in order to achieve this goal, this dissertation is divided into four major chapters. Chapter one, discusses the question (puzzle), hypothesis and methodology of this thesis. While Chapter two, evolves by exploring the definition of the term "prediction" in Social Sciences; with a focus on

"prediction" in both: Political Science and the schools of the Theory of International Relations. In addition, it reviews several academic "prediction" attempts regarding the peaceful fall of the USSR. However, chapter three is the pillar of this research; where both: a review and a critique of the Cold War literature -formed by the International Relations Theories active between 1979 and 1991- is conducted. This literature assessing mainly discusses where those theories have succeeded and where they have missed in "predicting" the *peaceful* fall of the Soviet Union. Thus, it answers the main research question put forward by this thesis which is: *why have IR theories missed to" predict" the peaceful disintegration of both: the Soviet Union and the bipolar international system; a fall that paved the road to the –also- peaceful ending of the Cold War along with the USA /USSR famous rivalry?* Therefore, to sufficiently critique the major and prominent schools of the Theory of International Relations (IR theory) in the Cold War era- mainly: Realism, Liberalism and Radicalism- this chapter is divided into three sub-sections. The first sub-section analyzes the Cold war literature in the above time frame. It further discusses the transformation paradigms and dialectics of: war, stability, transformation and peace in the International System according to Realism. Whereas, its second and third sub- sections analyze both: Liberalism's and Radicalism's cold war literature in the same time frame.

Finally, the last chapter draws discussions and conclusions that the thesis' methodology has led to.

ملخص تنفيذي

الحرب الباردة كانت عبارة عن صراعٍ جيو سياسي، أيديولوجي واقتصادي برز عقب الحرب العالمية الثانية بين قوتين دوليتين عظميين في ذلك الوقت، وهما: الاتحاد السوفيتي والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. إلى جانب حلفائهما معسكري الشرق والغرب. في العام 1947. وعلى الرغم ان هذه الحرب تمثل حادثة تاريخية، إلا أن آثارها لا زالت واضحة على بنية النظام الدولي من بعدها وعلى توازن القوى فيه. إن أهم أثر لهذه الحرب يكمن في انهيار الاتحاد السوفيتي سابقاً؛ لينتج عن ذلك تحول بنية النظام الدولي من نظام ثنائي القطبية إلى آخر أحادي القطبية.

إلى درجة ما، كانت هذه الحرب كغيرها من الحروب؛ بيد انها كانت تملك خاصية فريدة حيّرت عقول الأكاديميين والمفكرين السياسيين وصانعي القرار على حد سواء. فرغم أنهم توقعوا انتهاء هذه الحرب (كنظيراتها من الحروب)، إلا أن لا أحد منهم توقع أن تنتهي هذه -تحديداً- بشكل سلمي. إن هذا الفشل المخجل لنظريات العلاقات الدولية السائدة آنذاك، والمتمثل في إغفالها ان تأخذ على محمل الجدّ احتمالية التفكك السلمي للاتحاد السوفيتي، وما تلاه من نهاية هادئة للحرب الباردة (والتي نتج عنها تغير في بنية النظام الدولي من ثنائي إلى أحادي القطبية)، ليطرح العديد من التساؤلات حول درجة مصداقية وعلمية علم السياسة بشكل عام ونظرية العلاقات الدولية بشكل خاص. إن هذه التساؤلات والنقاشات تتمحور

تحديداً حول جزئيتين في هذه العلوم، ألا وهما: قدرتها على طرح الوافي الشامل للأسئلة البحثية، إضافة إلى مدى جدوى مناهجها البحثية – الدراسية؛ مما يدعو إلى التشكيك في جدوى تسمية هذين الحقلين بالعلوم.

ومن هنا، فإن هذه الرسالة تسعى إلى الإجابة عن هذه التساؤلات عبر القيام بتقييم تحليلي لأدبيات نظريات العلاقات الدولية التي كانت سائدة في فترة الحرب الباردة، وأهمها: الواقعية والليبرالية والراديكالية. إن هذه المنهجية حيوية كونها تلقي الضوء على نقاط ضعف وقوة هذه النظريات، وعلى المواطن التي نجحت أو فشلت فيها في ملاحظة وتتبع وتنبؤ المسار الهاديء لانهايار الاتحاد السوفيتي وانتهاء الحرب الباردة.

ولتحقيق غاية هذا البحث في الكشف عن مدى علمية نظرية العلاقات الدولية ومواطن ضعفها وقوتها في التنبؤ، تم تقسيمه إلى أربعة فصول أساسية. الفصل الأول، يطرح أسئلة البحث، وفرضياته ومنهجيته. بينما يتمحور الفصل الثاني حول استنباط وتقييم التعريفات المتعددة لمصطلح "التنبؤ" في العلوم الاجتماعية، مع تركيز حول معناه في كل من العلوم السياسية ونظرية العلاقات الدولية. ويتزامن ذلك مع عرضٍ لبعضٍ من أهم المحاولات الأكاديمية للتنبؤ بانهايار الاتحاد السوفيتي. أما الفصل الثالث من هذه الرسالة فيمثل حجر الزاوية في هذا البحث؛ إذ انه يتناول بالنقد والمراجعة نظريات العلاقات الدولية التي كانت سائدة في فترة الحرب الباردة، وتحديداً بين العامين 1979 و1991. إن هذا التقييم الأدبي النظري يناقش أين نجحت وأين فشلت هذه النظريات في تنبؤ الانهايار السلمي للاتحاد السوفيتي؛ أي الإجابة عن سؤال البحث الرئيس ألا وهو: لماذا فشلت نظريات العلاقات الدولية في تنبؤ التفكك السلمي للاتحاد السوفيتي، وما تبعه من نهاية سلمية للحرب الباردة وتحول بنية النظام الدولي من ثنائي القطبية

إلى أحادي القطبية؟ تلك التحولات التي اسدلت الستار عن الصراعِ النَّديّ الشهير بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية

والاتحاد السوفيتي. ولإنجاح هذا النقد، فقد تم تقسيم هذا الفصل إلى عدة أجزاء تخصص كل منها في نقد إحدى نظريات العلاقات الدولية التي كانت بارزة في الحرب الباردة، و مراجعة آلياتها في توقع وتفسير التغييرات الحاصلة على بنية النظام الدولي ما بين الحرب والسلام. وأخيراً، جاء الفصل الرابع ليطرح ويفسر الاستنتاجات التي أفرزتها منهجية هذه الدراسة.

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Introduction

The Cold War was a geopolitical, ideological and economical struggle that emerged after the World War Two between two of the global Superpowers at that time: The Soviet Union and the United States of America, and their alliances, approximately in the year 1947.

Nogee and Spanier (1988) wrote in their book " Peace Impossible, War Unlikely: The Cold War between the United States and The Soviet Union", that no power could have been more prepared to a rivalry with the Soviet Union than the USA, though it did not during the World War II even expect a potential post war conflict with the Soviets; that it focused most of its attention on the military defeat of Germany and Japan.

Moreover, though there was a great hostility between the two superpowers, confrontation never occurred directly between the two of them. Instead, it took the form of an arms race of nuclear and mass destructive weapons, through a network of: military alliances, espionage, proxy wars and most importantly propaganda. Hence, a great fear of starting a nuclear war intimidated the two parties of this conflict; in a manner that both sides developed a "*deterrence*

policy", in order to prevent problems from escalating beyond limited localities.¹ Therefore, no nuclear weapons were used in this war², although the relationship between these two superpowers have witnessed a series of high and low-tension periods; or in other words turbulence versus *détente*.

Nevertheless, several "*on the counter*" confrontations occurred between the two rivals outside their territories. For example: The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, tension over the Berlin blockage and the Berlin Wall. However, some major civil wars initiated by the Cold War alliances- did happen, such as: The Greek Civil War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Soviet - Afghani war, as well as conflicts in Angola, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

However, this rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States did not last forever. It ended in the fall of the Soviet Union in the 25th of December 1991; after a period of great breakdowns which historians relate to the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as a Soviet Secretary General in 1985. According to many

¹John Lewis Gaddis, *we now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 17-20.

²In terms of definition, a "Cold war" means a war that does not involve weapon use by any of its rival parties. However, the Cold war between the USA and the Soviet Union is different. It was named a "Cold War" –solely- because no nuclear weapons were used in it by any of the rival parties. Hence, though there was a huge arms race-particularly a nuclear arms race-between the two rival camps; none of these nuclear weapons were used. However, the two rivals: the USA and the Soviet Union were involved in proxy wars against each other.

historians, several dilemmas rose up to the surface in Gorbachev's leadership era. Those dilemmas created dramatic incidents that accelerated the demise of this superpower; including: The Chernobyl accidents in 1986, the Autumn of Nations (i.e. the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989), and –finally- the Soviet Coup Attempt of 1991.

From a different point of view, economists and development researchers tied the demise of the USSR to its leader's implementation of policies, such as: the glasnost and the perestroika, political and economic liberalization, building warmer trade relations with the West (USA and Western Europe), the public's reluctance towards the war in Afghanistan, the socio –political effects of the Chernobyl crisis and the massive fiscal spending on military technology- which the Soviets saw necessary in response to the NATO's increased armament in the 1980s.

Hence, Sovietologists have presumed that the Soviet political system was completely defeated in this “silent war”; in the forms of: ideological confrontation, enormous arms race and economic competition, "zero sum" foreign and security policy, in addition to the great share of national, intellectual, financial and material resources the USSR spent -during that

period- on its military sphere. This spending resulted in the building of a deformed structure of the Soviet Economy, where the military sector ruled overwhelmingly, applying

" the political psychology of the "seized tower" where all the resources should be channeled for defensive purposes without taking into consideration any normal human needs doomed this system to collapse sooner or later. But let us repeat once more, this collapse was not a result of a successful policy of the United States or other NATO countries. It was an explosion of a systemic "built in mine", nobody expected to witness so quickly".³

Moreover, although it is a historical incident; the Cold War still has a great effect on the Post Cold War International System's both: Structure and "Balance of Power"; most important of which is: the decline of the former Soviet Union. This decline resulted in the transformation of the International System's power scale from a "bipolar" system into a "unipolar" one. Accordingly, Tom Lovell stresses out that

2 Alexander Konovalov, "Creating The European Security System in a Post-Cold War Period", *NATO the Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships*, 1996, (Page numbers not available since it's an electronic copy) <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/94-96/konovalo/home.htm>

*"the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 some 70 years after its grimly riveting and highly expectant Marxist-Leninist beginning ranks alongside World War I as the two most singularly pivotal events of the Twentieth Century. In a sense, both are conjoined, with the War providing the decisive finishing blow to what remained of both the tottering indecisive Romanov dynasty and centuries of turgid, slow-to-change Russian autocracy."*⁴

However, *"the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy under Mikhail Sergeievich Gorbachev and the East-West reconciliation it brought about constitutes a formidable challenge to the international relations theory. Neither realists, liberals, institutionalists, nor peace researchers recognized beforehand the possibility of such momentous change, and they have all been struggling to find explanations consistent with their theories"*⁵.

Therefore, this –embarrassing– failure of the Theory of International Relations raises many questions regarding the reliability of Political Science in general

⁴Tom Lovell, "The Reasons of the fall of U.S.S.R. by The Fall of the Soviet Union: Whys and Wherefores". (A paper presented to the Raleigh Tavern Philosophical Society: A Personal Prologue. (Publishing date not available), accessed October 22, 2007, <http://www.raleightavern.org/lovell.htm>

⁵ R. N. Lebow and T. R. Kappen (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 28.

and this branch of that science in particular; precisely regarding its "prediction" methodologies.⁶ This aspect is important since one of the major cores of each science is its ability to "predict" changes in a certain phenomenon, or at least anticipate measurable change trends in it. That means its degree of *probability*. Thus, the more a science's methodology is able to achieve a higher degree of probability, the more this science is regarded as solid and trustworthy; particularly regarding its: core theories, core assumptions, methodologies and measuring tools. In addition, both major empirical and historical events have shown Political Science in general, and the International Relations Theory -and its schools in particular- to be missing a fundamental aspect of being a science; that is their "prediction" ability. IR theories have failed many times to "predict" certain incidents and interactions in the International System. For example, Stalin's purges and pact with Hitler and President Anwar el-Sadat's peace overture to Israel.⁷ However, as important and as valuable as it is to study this theory's failures in "predicting" these sudden changes in the course of action of these players in the international system, it is more essential to study the International Relations Theory's failure to foresee the: direction, scope, and

⁶Prominent schools of the IR theory in the Cold War clearly claimed that they are able to "predict" change in the International System in the future, as well as explain present changes in it. Further elaboration of this claim is in chapter three of this thesis.

⁷Lebow and Kappen. 1995. Ibid P: 18.

pace of change in Gorbachev's Soviet Union.⁸ A change that led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The study of this International Relations Theory's failure is crucial; since this collapse resulted in a –major change in the structure of the international system's balance of power from a "bipolar" system to a "unipolar" one.

Therefore, since many historically empirical examples prove one of the major branches of Political Science- that is the International Relations Theory- to be weak in both of: its degree of probability as well as its ability of "prediction" of future changes in given variables and / or phenomena; it is -therefore- crucial to address this important matter in an analytical Literature Assessing critique. This is exactly what this thesis tries to realize. This particular assessing is performed aiming to discover the errors in the International Relations Theories' "prediction" methodologies and tools; in an effort to give insights on how to solve this urgent dilemma. Hence, this process will help in enhancing the probability degree of the International Relations Theory. This kind of an academic study is important because the variables as well as the players in the International System are constantly changing. Thus, it is essential to adapt better methodologies to be able to better understand these changes, and to form measurable change trends that will help in "the decision making" process, so

⁸Lebow and Kappen. 1995. Ibid P: 20.

as any observers were they be: the system's different players (such as: states, organizations...etc.), policy makers, and academics could achieve more informed decisions and policies regarding different aspects and components of that system.

Hence, this thesis tries to examine the Theory of International Relations' Cold War literature; making a careful anatomy of the prominent IR theories in that era. It aspires to shed light on the causes, the reasons and the lacking of both observations and insights that led to the failure of these theories to "foresee" the USSR's peaceful disintegration in 1991. This disintegration has succeeded in staying till the present day- and after almost two decades from that fall- a highly controversial debate in the realm of Political Science in general and the IR theory's schools in particular. Nonetheless, whatever the reasons that disabled the Theory of International Relations from "predicting" the fall of the Soviet Union, the cold war era remains to be a rich era in modern history, in terms of: inter-states relations, alliances, differences, threats and a whole international system changing rivalry.



Chapter One

**The Puzzle, Hypothesis
And Methodology**

Consider this *puzzle*: although it was clear that Gorbachev's Reform Policies were insufficient- since he concentrated on financing the military sector in the Soviet Union instead of supporting the economic one, and though huge sums of money were spent on intelligence operations, and both: strategic and political research by the United States, *not a single theory relevant to the study of International Relations in the Cold War Era- specifically in its last decade - nor a single academic individual, for that matter, was able to predict the surprisingly" peaceful" fall of the Soviet Union, which consequently brought the Cold War and the rivalry between the two superpowers - at that time- the USSR and the USA to an end.*

However, they were Economists, macro-historians and Development Studies researchers like: Edward Gibbon, Carlo M. Cipolla, Mancur Olson, Paul Kennedy, Andrei Amarlik, P. Dasgupta Johan Galtung and Emmanuel Todd who have formed hypotheses –and sometimes- theories that “predicted” the collapse of the Soviet Union’s economical system; a collapse which paved the way to the Soviet Regime’s total fall in 1991. Their books can be mined for insights in de-development, and their findings can be related to general studies of factors conditioning development.¹

¹ John Galtung, *The Decline and Fall of Empires: A Theory of De-Development*, (Geneva, Switzerland: UNRISD, 1996), <http://www.transcend.org/galt.htm>

Thus, at this particular stage a couple of significant- puzzle related- questions ought to rise up: Why did IR theories, that now explain the end of the Cold War with such great clarity and detail, fail to “predict” it? Why do IR theories that offer “predictions” about the Post-Cold War international system, (i.e. Offensive Realism), continue to rely on the IR's tools and methodology which were repeatedly proven to be unaccountable, and useless due to the empirical events of the Cold War? Did the three prominent International Relations Theories during the Cold War era: Realism, Liberalism and Radicalism lack essential analytical and "prediction" tools as well as efficient methodologies that prevented them from: measuring, studying and analyzing "on ground" variables, a process that could have enabled them to "predict" the *peaceful* fall of the Soviet Union? And what forces caused the Soviet Union – the United States' most powerful rivalry- to silently "crash land", in a way that no one could have predicted? Hence, regarding the surprising international events between the years 1989 and 1991, can “prediction” in International Relations Theory be still –reasonably- believed to be possible?

A logical answer to these questions would be that the "prediction" of international incidents, such as: state actions, state strategies, and state future or fate, is tightly connected to the approach or the theory which the researcher is implementing on a specific case study or phenomena. Some approaches and theories have the ability only to study and explain recent conditions, international political environments and phenomena as they are in the present; like the Realist Theory of International Relations (Realism). Meanwhile, other theories have the ability not only to study and explain recent facts and conditions, but also to "predict" future changes that might alter them. In other words, they have the ability to "predict" the future of a certain phenomena as in natural sciences, (i.e. the relativity theory in physics).

Empirical evidence and experiment have proven that Natural Science theories have a superior ability of foreseeing and "predicting" the future than Social Science theories and Human Science theories in general, and Political science theories and International Relations Theories in particular. This is because Social Sciences depend in their analysis and methodology mainly on both qualitative and descriptive research – which means explaining and describing a certain phenomena or situation as is, without performing certain measurements nor experiments on the variables that


form it ². Natural Science Theories on the contrary, mostly use quantitative research to study a certain phenomenon, performing on the variables that construct and form them necessary mathematical or computer modeling and Quantum Physics measurements, and finally, use the results of these experiments to form their analysis and "prediction" on the basis of ***Probability***.

Now, one might argue that quantitative research and statistics can be used in Social and International Relations Studies. That is true and possible. However, Social scientists use quantitative research or quantitative results like statistics only when applicable to the phenomena or the situation they are studying. Why is it not always applicable? Well, that is mainly due to the nature of the objects of study of these Sciences, which are: the Human, the Society and the International System (the World), and the huge number of continuously altering and transforming variables that affect or construct them, that cannot be regressionally analyzed, in order to form model relationships between random variables, and determine how strong their relationship is so as to form model based predictions.³

4 Muhammad Al- Haizan, *Media Researches its basics and methods* (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: King Fahed National Library, 1998), 14.

5 William H. Crown, *Models for the Social and Behavioral Sciences: Multiple*

Meanwhile, Natural or Pure Sciences can contain the variables that affect a certain natural phenomenon in a controlled and a restricted environment; in order to study or experiment on them. These experiments enable them to "predict" the phenomena's changing trends; since studying a phenomena's variables by controlling them is the best way to achieve this. Social Sciences and IR theories on the contrast, cannot contain a social or a political phenomena's variables in a controlled experiment because the variables – as said before- are continuously changing, transforming, huge and appear unexpectedly. Thus, they are in no means to be exclusively count for in a Social Science or an IR research. Therefore, social scientists and IR theorists have no tendency in exclusively measuring the variables of a certain phenomena or a given situation and using the resulting data as a single tool in "predicting" the future of it; not because they do not want to, but simply because it is quite difficult for them to do so.



In general, it is always easier to analytically explain the past and the present than to predict the future. That fact – according to scientists like Karl Popper- is even truer when it concerns the IR theories. In his research, Popper has supported Indeterminism Theory, arguing that "prediction" of the future is totally impossible, especially when it comes to the Social Sciences. To verify his view, he used both Einstein's "Relativity Theory" and Minokowski's geometrical representation of "Space – Time", explaining that "for every observer (A) there exists an absolute past and an absolute future separated by a region of possible contemporaneity⁴. The

Possible Contemporaneity of event (A) means all events that take place exactly at the

⁴ same time as the event (A).

(absolute) past of the system is the region formed by all spatio-temporal points from which physical influences... can affect the system; its (absolute) future is the region formed by all points upon which a physical influence may be exerted by the system ".⁵ Here again, we can clearly note his emphasize over the importance of variables and the system's physical influence in forming or altering the future; meaning that "*the past cone of A is the only region about which we can have knowledge*".⁶

As a result, it is safe to *assume hypothetically* that both: International Relations and Political Science Theories, being branches of the Social Sciences, could not "predict" the Fall of the USSR; because they could not foresee a situation's or a phenomena's future but rather explain its past and analyze its present as is. This is due to several "*important constraints on the accuracy of prediction in IR provided by the complexity of the system we seek to study, the self-reflective capacity of the agents within that system,*

7 Cited by Michael McCarthy, "Prospects for predictive power: what have We Learned from the End of the Cold War? ", *The Electronic Review of World Politics*, November 2000, (no page number available since it is an electronic copy), <http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/research/erwp/mcarthy.htm>

8 McCarthy: 2000, Ibid.

9 McCarthy: 2000, Ibid.

the susceptibility of the system to non-linear effects, and the aversion of researchers to asking unusual questions".⁷ And most importantly the lack in cooperation between the schools of the Theory of International Relations and other Social Sciences, such as in fields of: Domestic and International Economics, Finance and demographics (See the third Chapter of this thesis). And even if Political and International Relations scientists may use some mathematical or logic related methodology and tools in their research (i.e. games like: chicken, stag hunt, prisoners dilemma ...etc.) from the Game Theory, they would still be unable to accurately "predict" the future of a certain international situation, nor anticipate an actor's next move or future deeds; since a basic regulation in the Game theory is: the players' ignorance of the strategies or policies of their rival(s).

From another dimension, Economic and Development Studies, being closer to the Natural Sciences by means of their ability to contain and study measurable variables of certain phenomena in their research, for example: inflation or mortality rates; are abler but not totally capable of "predicting" only aspects of a phenomena's future that are related to their field of science. Thus, when economists like Egon Neuberger, Robert Conquest, Marshall I. Goldman and Mikhail S. Bernstam claimed that they have

"predicted" the fall of the Soviet Union, it is not totally true; since they only foresaw the economic collapse of the USSR. Evermore, the majority of economics scientists (mostly western ones, including Americans) even dismissed any slight prospect of the failure of the Soviet Union; whether through war, peace or even at least economically.

For example, a Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith wrote in 1984, just seven years before the collapse of the USSR, praising the Soviet economy- with no indication of its demise- by pointing out: "That the Soviet system has made great material progress in recent years" which is "evident both from the statistics and from the general urban scene. One sees it in the appearance of solid well-being of the people on the streets. And the general aspect of restaurants, theaters and shops. Partly, the Russian system succeeds because, in contrast with the Western industrial economies, it makes full use of its manpower."⁸

⁸ Edwin Meese III, *With Reagan: the Inside Story*, (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 1992), 163-164,

http://books.google.co.il/books?id=wU4go_hAB60C&pg=PA163&lpg=PA163&dq=John+Kenneth+Galbraith+cold+war+1984&source=bl&ots=YnS60VndCp&sig=miK12W4X0uCFvkUoSUM78R4WrnY&hl=iw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result#PPR15,M1

From a similar point of view, Paul Samuelson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a Nobel laureate in economics, wrote in the 1985 edition of his widely-used textbook about the economic growth in the Soviet Union, asserting that "what counts are results, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet planning system has been a powerful engine for economic growth! The Soviet model has surely demonstrated that a command economy is capable of mobilizing resources for rapid growth."⁹ And also added:" it was a "vulgar mistake to think that most people in Eastern Europe are miserable"¹⁰

⁹ Quoted by Dinesh D'Souza, *Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader* – a prologue, (New York: Touchstone Rockefeller Center, 1999), accessed April 5, 2007, <http://www.dineshdsouza.com/books/reagan-intro.html>

¹⁰ Quoted by: Svetozar Pejovich and Enrico Colombatto, *Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance: The Case for Common Law*, (Camberley, UK: Edward Elgar publishing, 2008), 117.

Also quoted by Arnold Beichman . "Death of the Butcher". The Hoover Digest, the Hoover Institution / Stanford University. No.2, 2003, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3058571.html>

Moreover, Lester Thurow, another MIT economist and a well-known author who, as late as 1989, suggested that the Soviet economy is solid when he wrote: "Can economic command significantly accelerate the growth process? The remarkable performance of the Soviet Union suggests that it can. Today the Soviet Union is a country whose economic achievements bear comparison with those of the United States."

Hence, Edwin Meese, a former conservative political scholar insider in the Reagan's administration, stressed out after the fall of the USSR that "similar comments from other sources could be duplicated across a span of decades"...and "accordingly, the total economic collapse of Soviet communism that occurred soon after Galbraith's assertions about 'great progress' and 'solid well being' came as a jarring surprise to many. Who, it was asked, could have known the Soviet system was so weak? Who could have expected what was about to happen?"¹¹

And accordingly, when Demographic and Development Researchers such as: Johan Galtung, Emmanuel Todd and Amarlik argue that they "predicted" the demise of the Soviet Empire (as they name it), they only—as revealed from their research- have merely "predicted" a development deterioration of the Soviet Union (De-development) or in other words; deep

¹¹ Meese, 1992: Ibid. P 165.

trends of decline based on studies of development factors, such as: infrastructure and education (i.e. in the studies of Johan Galtung) and infant mortality rates (i.e. in the studies of Emmanuel Todd).

To sum up, applying my above hypotheses that the Social Sciences'- and thus the IR Theory's- inability of "prediction" is mainly due to the continuous changing nature of the variables affecting a given social or political phenomena, and using theories such as: Indeterminism, Relativity and Space – Time to help me understand why the IR theory failed to "predict" the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union, I would *hypothetically* note that - the dominating schools of the theory of international relations in the Cold War era: Realism, Liberalism , and Radicalism were unable to "predict" the fall of the USSR, for they could not "predict" the future, but only explain the present situation as is. Nevertheless, the field of Political Economy was -on the contrary- able to foresee only part of the Soviet Union's deterioration phenomena; which is the decline of its Communist Economy. This is because the Soviet Economy falls in its domain of expertise, without however being able to "predict" the total peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union as a Political entity and as a superpower.

However, it is crucial to clarify at this point, that since "prediction" is a capacious and a vague term, this thesis narrows its meaning to the act of

"declaring or indicating in advance; *especially*: foretelling on the basis of observation, experience, or scientific reason"¹² the future course of a political event and /or a future change in the international system. Nonetheless, this thesis stresses out that this foretelling is "probable" not decisive.

Probability levels of some Sciences

The Academic Field	Repeating the Experiment	Dividing work into linked categories	Observing and measuring Variables	Theory's Structure	Avoiding Contradictions
Physics-Chemistry	Too strong	Too strong	Too strong	Too strong	Too strong
Geology and Speciology	Too strong	Strong	Mild	Strong	Strong
Economics,	Strong	Strong	Mild	Mild	Mild

¹² "Prediction", The Merriam Webster's online dictionary, accessed January 7, 2009,

<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prediction>

Social Science					
Political Science	Mild	Mild	Weak	Weak	Weak
History- Philosophy	Weak	Weak	Too weak	Weak	Too weak

Probability levels of some branches of Political Science

Voting Behaviour	Strong	Strong	Mild	Strong	Mild
Parties and Pressure Groups	Mild	Mild	Weak	Mild	Weak
Political Philosophy	Weak	Weak	Too weak	Too weak	Too weak

Table #1: Scientific Probability levels of some of the sciences

*Source: Talal Dahi and others. Muqaddima fil Tahleel As-siyasi Al- Qiyasi:
An Introduction to Standard Political Analysis. (S.A.: Riyadh: King Saud
University Press, 2004).*

Moreover, proving this thesis' hypothesis would certainly demand a thorough gathering and a literature assessing of all the major IR Theory's written literature related to the topic of the Cold War, written between the beginning of the cold war era in 1947 till its end in the year 1991; that is the year of the fall of the USSR. Thus, my dissertation would be a literature assessing one, which uses a methodology of summarizing and evaluating "*existing theoretical and empirical literature on a subject*"¹³ , asking whether existing theories are valuable, and whether existing tests are persuasive and complete. But, since this period of time is rather too long, and requires lots of resources; an assessing of the Cold War literature in the last ten years before the collapse of the Soviet Union – i.e. between the years 1979 and 1991- would be quite sufficient; since no IR or Political scientist has even thought of the fall of the USSR before that time. This is because the signs of deterioration have affected the Soviet Empire's entity mostly in its last ten years of existence not earlier.

10 Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 90.

Importance of the Subject of this Thesis:

At this stage, one might be skeptical about both: the importance and the relevance of this thesis' subjects of study, (the USSR and the Cold War era which has ended almost seventeen years ago), to the present's political scene and the more urgent incidents taking place in the international system nowadays. For example, they might think a study of the American foreign policy towards the world in general and the Middle East in particular would be more convenient and essential, in a unipolar international system; where the United States owns the ultimate power amongst the other powerful states, especially after the September 11th incident, that triggered what is named " the American War against Terrorism". Meanwhile, another person might consider the study of the rapidly rising power of China and it's potential threat or rivalry towards the United States to be worthiest than this dissertation's subject; for this power seizing competition might leash a new Cold War amongst new rivals (players): China and the USA.¹⁴

However, the answer is very simple. The study of the IR Theory's failure to "predict" an important outcome of the Cold War, mainly the Soviet Union's both domestic and foreign policies outcomes, that is characterized here in

21 John Mearsheimer, "Better to be Godzilla than Bambi". *Foreign Policy*, January-February 2005, 48.

the failure of Gorbachev's (the Soviet leader's) internal and external policies -involving his country- is very important. It sheds light on the shortcomings of the: core assumptions, methodologies and tools of this theory in order to further improve them. Their improvement is essential so that they could become more "predictive"; for how could a credibility lacking IR Theory be able to sincerely and correctly explain new political strategies, actions and incidents in the international system? Political Scientists and International Relations academics have always insisted on the "predictive" ability of political science and the IR theory¹⁵. However, the clear empirical evidence of the IR theory's failure to "predict" the disintegration of the USSR, puts the IR Theory's credibility on the stake, demanding it to improve its methodologies and tools *to preserve its scientific credibility*. This is essential because the main characteristic of any science is its ability to: 1- observe a phenomenon, 2- gather information about it, 3- decide the variables that form it, 4- analyze them and then, 5- "predict" further progression and / or changing trends in this specifically studied phenomena and / or other phenomena related to it.

¹⁵ Realist, liberal and Radicalist claims of their theories' prediction ability are explained in detail in chapter 3 of this thesis.


At this point, it would be necessary to state – once again- that after the intensive assessing of the Cold War Literature, between the years 1979 and 1991, that: no Political Science academic nor an International Relations theorist has been able to "predict" the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union, although there has been a sort of debate between the Liberalists about a potential collapse of the Soviet Economy. In the following chapter of this dissertation, I felt necessary to demonstrate a summary of the reasons of the fall off the USSR as explained by the IR theory today, followed by the debate on the IR theory's "prediction" ability, along samples of the Cold War's last decade's literature; in order to observe where these theories have succeeded and where they have failed to "predict" the event of the USSR's peaceful collapse.

Chapter Two

"Prediction"

In Social Sciences:

**Focusing on "Prediction" in the
International Relations Theories**



1.1- A Social Science Definition of the Term "Prediction"

What is "prediction"? Is it an act of prophecy or an act of science? Is it important for a Scientific Theory to be predictive, or is prediction just an accessory to science? That is what this section is supposed to further clear.

Some say that "prediction" could be simply defined as "*as rigorous (often quantitative) statement forecasting what will happen under specific conditions, typically expressed in the form: if A is true, then B will also be true*"¹⁶, and that these assertions are logical consequences of scientific theories, that usually form scientific methods to test these assertions through repeatable experiments or observational studies.

Others argue that, "*One of the hallmarks of a mature discipline is its ability to make predictions that can be used to test scientific theories.*" ¹⁷

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¹⁶ Turchin, P., L. Grinin and others, *Scientific Prediction in Historical Sociology. History & Mathematics: Historical Dynamics and Development of Complex Societies*, (Moscow: KomKniga, 2007), 23.

¹⁷ Peter Turchin, *Scientific Prediction in Historical Sociology: Ibn Khaldun meets Al Saud*. Master's Thesis final draft, University of Connecticut, December 11, 2003,1, <http://www.eeb.uconn.edu/faculty/turchin/PDF/Khaldun-Saud.pdf>

Therefore, most scientists throughout history have emphasized on the importance of "prediction" to the worthiness and the accountancy of any scientific theory. In other words, the vehicle of scientific methodology is: "*Prediction*". If a theory's methodology failed to "predict" future consequences of present variables and / or actions related to its field of expertise, then this methodology -and usually the theory it is derived from- would be rejected as a valid scientific theory.

Furthermore, if a theory's assertions and assumptions are not in accordance with observations, evidence and scientific experiment, or if its "predictions" are not testable; it will be dismissed as a valid science, as well. The same argument could also be applied to hypotheses. If future events or consequences did not happen according to a certain hypotheses' assumption; then it will surely be denied. Thus, the value of any scientific theory or hypotheses is generally determined by two factors. Firstly, by the larger and the more precisely accurate number of "predictions" they could make from the fewer information or data they can receive. And secondly, by the principles and the tools they provide in order to facilitate these "predictions".

Early scientists like John Stewart Mill and Francis Bacon, thought that "prediction" is easy; since history repeats itself. In other words, it was safe

to induct that the future would be certainly like its past; because they have - apparently- discovered laws of nature that were invariable in time and space. Pierre S. de Laplace sums well this concept, suggesting that: "*We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces that animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this intellect were vast enough to submit the data to analysis, could condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom; for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.*"¹⁸

However, as sciences developed; scientists realized that the inductive method was not always accurate. Therefore, a new "predictive" methodology was formed, which is the hypothetical-deductive model of science. In this methodology an experiment is conducted in order to verify the outcomes of a situation. The more often the outcome occurs; the greater

¹⁸ Larry Bradley. "The Butterfly Effect" (a seminar from the series: Chaos and Fractals). The Department of Physics and Astronomy at John Hopkins University, accessed April 7, 2007, <http://www.pha.jhu.edu/~ldb/seminar/butterfly.html>

would be the degree of certainty it would actually happen in the future. Furthermore, the covering law model of explanation was developed, suggesting that explanation occurs through "*the reduction of the unfamiliar to the familiar*"; insofar as 'the familiar' is a general or universal term, faith in the explanation is strengthened".¹⁹

Nonetheless, although most natural scientists think "prediction" to be easy, many scientists of other fields of science do not agree with them. For example, Human Sciences and Social Sciences; like Politics and International Relations- as seen in the first chapter of this research- are known for their improbability of achieving accurate "predictions". Therefore, the ability of the Theory of International Relations, as a branch of Social Sciences, to predict future events in International Politics or in the International System has been questioned constantly in a form of a controversial debate, since the early days of its formation as a theory. For

18 Keith Webb, "Prediction Uncertainty and Control in International Relations". This article was prepared for the ECPR Workshop on 'Prediction in International Relations' Joint Sessions, Bordeaux, May 1995,
<http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/research/kentpapers/webb1.html>

19 Cited by Michael McCarthy, "Prospects for predictive power: what have We Learned from the End of the Cold War? ", *The Electronic Review of World Politics*, November 2000, no page number available since it is an electronic copy).
<http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/research/erwp/mcarthy.htm>

example, Burton adamantly thinks that: " *It is prediction, and not wisdom after the event which is of value, and which is the ultimate test of science*"²⁰.

Wallerstein on another angle, argued that "prediction" is "*man's great game, his true hybris, the most convincing argument for the dogma of original sin*"²¹ . Nevertheless, by the time the IR academics thought that they have come closer to proving their theory's credibility, the fall of the Soviet Union came to undermine their efforts, and to raise skepticism about their tools and their methodology of "prediction".

Hence, although Political Science as a broader field of science has more tools and more rigorous theories than the IR theory, its theories in general and their "predictions" in particular, turn out to be wrong most of the time as well. Why is that? Well, some academics argue that neither Political Science nor International Relations could ever "predict" the future of given variables or incidents, at least in the normal sense of the word. This failure is due to the fact that the social world is logically untenable, resulting in the

Ibid. McCarthy: 200, 20

development of theories that are always surprised by the events. ²² However, the further problem is that in the social world -in general- the generator of reality cannot be seen, only its outcome. Hence, past outcomes may be a guide to future events. However, in many cases this assumption may be deadly! ²³

Consequently, a large aspect of this "prediction" inability problem lies in the assumption -which nearly all Political and International Relations Scientists develop regarding the nature of the International System we live in- that is the "probability distributions" of likely events. The real probability distributions the International System faces are actually different from what they assume them to be. Thus, in order to avoid this problem, the Economist Keynes suggested that Political and IR Science

²¹ Mark Blyth, "Prediction, Probability, and Propensity in Political Science", (Submitted but not yet published in the American Political Science Review), accessed April 5, 2005, <http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/Paper-Blyth.pdf>

²² Keith Webb, "Prediction Uncertainty and Control in International Relations". This article was prepared for the ECPR Workshop on 'Prediction in International Relations' Õ Joint Sessions, Bordeaux, May 1995, <http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/research/kentpapers/webb1.html>

Webb: 1995. Ibid. ²³

theories ought to embrace a "non- Euclidian geometry", so that they can deal with the world as is, not as these theories tell us it should be.

1.2- Several Social Science Related Academic Prediction Attempts Regarding the fall of the USSR

As shown earlier in the "puzzle, hypotheses and methodology" section of this thesis, not a single International Relations theory nor a Political one was able, during the Cold War era, to "predict" the peaceful disintegration of the USSR. And though there were many attempts to "predict" the outcome of the Cold War and the destiny of the two rivals the USA and the USSR, there weren't more than some economic, imperial expansion in an era of the nation-state, and development analysis of a potentially declined Soviet economy; whose authors even asserted that the occurrence of this possibility was a remote one rather than a high level probability. Evermore, there were other "prediction" attempts that where merely hunches of political leaders and journalists about that economical Soviet decline. However, all of these "prediction" attempts, whether formed by IR scientists or journalists and political leaders, were generally discounted by the majority of that era's Western academia and specialists in Political Science and IR. Thus, they had little effect on the field of Sovietology.

For example, the Development researcher Johan Galtung, depending on his fellow colleagues' previous studies, especially Paul Kennedy's in his famous book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*- first published in 1987- was able to develop a theory called "De –Development" which is a negative version of development. The relationship is quite simple: since development, that is positive in its nature, carries ideas and measures on how to achieve progress, De – Development -for it is its negative version- can by contrast form measures and ideas that can achieve regression. Using this theoretical approach; Galtung argued that it is possible to transform the life circle of major Empires, i.e. the USSR -from the early historical days till the present day into a mathematical formula. This formula could measure the decline elements that effect the existence of an empire; hence knowing at least minimally what might be useful to know, how and why things went wrong with a specific empire. This helps to draw some conclusions about what strategies or policies policy makers needn't do; in order to keep their country powerfully existing. That is precisely done by especially focusing on negative outcomes of a certain policy. This means paying attention to what should not be done, and not come about, backed by data and theory; since falsification of a certain policy is easier than its verification. ²⁴

²⁴ John Galtung, "*The Decline and Fall of Empires: A Theory of De-Development*"

Consequently, if the development formula is: (Development = Education/skills + Infrastructure), the De- Development occurs when there is a regression in: education, skills and infrastructure.

However, Galtung's mathematical formula about the life circles of empires –based on the de-development theory- couldn't be regarded as a successful "prediction" of the fall of the Soviet Union, for two clear reasons. Firstly, it depends on elements like: education, skills and infrastructure that could only anticipate a potential decline in an empire's economy, but could not anticipate signs of decline in other elements and sectors that form an empire's powerful existence, i.e. the political, ideological, social and technological sectors...etc. Secondly, this de-development formula can only explain an empire's decline after it has already occurred, or at best notice it after it has already begun, but cannot "predict" this decline before commencing.

On the same level, as early as 1950 Zbigniew Brzezinski – a pioneer in the theory of Totalitarianism, and the National Security Advisor of the former American President Jimmy Carter - counted much (in an unpublished master's thesis of his about the intensified degeneration of the USSR) on the

development aspect of expansion. He noted that the Soviet Union might eventually break up; because it has expanded too much, to an extent that it contained multinational peoples that would eventually seek independence in that age of rising nationalism; which could promote disunity in the Soviet Bloc.²⁵ In other words, he stressed out that the Soviet Union was pretending to be a single state; while it -actually- was a multi- national empire in an age of Nation-States. Moreover, in his publication:" The Grand Failure: The Birth and Decay of Communism in the Twentieth Century" that was published in 1989, Brzezinski argued that the ideological belief of the USSR- that is "Marxism- Leninism"- would not last much in the extended Soviet Bloc; since it is an alien doctrine imposed forcefully- by an imperial power – on the variety of nationalities forming this Bloc, whom would eventually reject it. Finally, he stated that the Soviet Economic system was incapable of moving forward from the industrial phase into a technological one.

32 “Cold War Groups Which Predicted the Collapse of the USSR: Predictions of Soviet Collapse”. *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*, accessed July 8, 2004, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold-War_groups_which_predicted_the_collapse_of_the_USSR

However, as seen here from his analysis, Brzezinski cannot be credited for "predicting" the total peaceful fall of the USSR; because it is clear that he only anticipated some aspects of this decline, only in some sectors that formed the Soviet entity's powerful existence as a superpower, such as: economically, ideologically and structurally (expansion). However, he anticipated this decline to cause violent national turmoil and conflict, initiated by the majority of nations that form the Soviet block; who would want to form their nation –states. Thus, he argued that the Soviet Union would disintegrate through war, and this couldn't be further from the reality where the USSR declined peacefully not through war nor armed conflict.

Differently, Emmanuel Todd - a Historian and an anthropologist, specialized in Demographic Research at the French National Institute of Demographic Studies-claims that he had "predicted" the deterioration of the Soviet's economical and demographical status; by "forecasting" deep trends of decline in its demographical and economical sectors. In his book *La Chute Final: Essais sur la Décomposition de la Sphère Soviétique* (The Final Fall: An Essay on the Disintegration of the Soviet Sphere), published in 1976, he stated that indicators like increasing infant mortality rates in the USSR puts it on the road of deterioration. However, it is clear that he didn't "predict" the peaceful total fall of the USSR.


Politically, it was the former conservative American President Ronald Reagan who considered the possibility of the deterioration of the Soviet Union.²⁶ However, this was just according to his hunch and mainly propaganda for the democratic way of governance rather than a scientific observation.²⁷ For example, in his address to the British Parliament in June 1982, Regan stated that: *"in an ironic sense, Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis - a crisis where the demands of the economic order are colliding directly with those of the political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union. What we see here is a political structure that no longer corresponds to its economic base, a society where productive forces are hampered by political ones. It is the*

²⁶ Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "Reagan and Russia," *Foreign Affairs* vol. 61, no. 2, Winter 1982/3, p. 256.

²⁷ Edwin Meese III, *With Reagan: the Inside Story*, (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 1992), 163. Accessed from:
http://books.google.co.il/books?id=wU4go_hAB60C&pg=PA163&lpg=PA163&dq=John+Kenneth+Galbraith+cold+war+1984&source=bl&ots=YnS60VndCp&sig=miK12W4X0uCFvkUoSUM78R4WrnY&hl=iw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result#PPR15,M1

*Soviet Union that runs against the tide of history by denying freedom and human dignity to its citizens. A march of freedom and democracy will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history."*²⁸ Nevertheless, it is evident that Regan was "predicting" only the deterioration of the Soviet Economy, not the whole Soviet Union as a superpower. Furthermore, he was criticizing the Marxist- Leninism ideology and praising the American Democratic way of governance.

Another Academic, Andrei Amarlik –who is a Soviet dissident- explained in his book "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?", which was published in 1969, that "any state forced to devote so much of its energies to physically and psychologically controlling millions of its own subjects could



²⁸ Ronald Regan's address to the British Parliament in June 1982.

not survive indefinitely".²⁹ In addition, he argued that the Soviet regime has put both itself and its society in isolation from the rest of the world, creating an unrealistic perception of the outside world in their heads, and the longer this Soviet state continues to hide the real status quo of the rest of the world from its people, the more rapid and catastrophic its collapse would be when they inevitably confront at one point the real world. However, his book was welcomed no more than a piece of brilliant literature or fiction; for no one considered it seriously as a piece of accurate political "prediction"; since up to the 1980's the power of the USSR was over estimated by both policy makers and academics as well. Evermore, Amarlik was only criticizing the Soviet Marxism-Leninism ideology and way of governance, and the Soviet Regime's isolation of its citizens from the rest of the world. Furthermore, from his analysis, it is evident that he thought that if the collapse of the Soviet Union -as a superpower- would happen, it would be in a catastrophic manner; i.e. through a domestic revolution against the Soviet Regime, coupe d'état, turmoil, arms conflict or war, not through a peaceful collapse as it happened in the reality in 1989.

²⁹ Andrei Amarlik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 35.

Moreover, the American National Intelligence confidential estimates during the Cold War, that have been recently unfolded to the public, reveal and confirm- for the first time ever- that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had in several occasions "predicted" the sequel of events that accelerated the decline of the Communist Economy; which consequently brought the Cold War to an end. Their estimates, though lacking timetable precision, (which when firstly sent to the Bush senior's Administration, seemed ridiculous and pessimistic), have proven their credibility at the end. In addition, they have clearly stated that the Soviet Union's regime itself – for that matter- had been noticing these economical difficulties for some time as well. These CIA estimates suggested that the Soviet Union's economy needed a drastic reformation to alter its existing bad situation during the Cold War; in order to get back on its feet, "*particularly since the Soviet Union at that time seemed to be moving further and further from the course taken by most of the other countries of the industrialized world*".³⁰

For Example, in September 1989, a classified analysis conducted by Grey Hodnett from the Office of Soviet Analysis, a branch of the CIA, entitled :

28 Marshall I. Goldman, *U.S.S.R. in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System*, (New York: Norton, 1983),xi . <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=14759633>.

Gorbachev's Domestic Gambles and Instability in the USSR", showed that Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders were concerned in that year about serious potential future breakdowns of public order in the USSR; assuming that this situation unrest is not a transient phenomena, because " conditions are likely to lead in the foreseeable future to a continuing crises and instability on an even larger scale – in the form of mass demonstrations , strikes, violence, and perhaps even the localized emergence of parallel centers of power"³¹, leading to an overlapping crises and a linking together of centers of unrest.

Moreover, this analysis stressed out on the great part Gorbachev's domestic policies would have in these unrests in the Soviet house, arguing that– at that time- current budget deficit and consumption crisis were largely due to his pursued policies since 1985, asserting that they were to expand in the future because he was gambling on several dimensions. First on the nationality arena, by defusing the ethnic differences in the Soviet Empire into a one federative union by unrestrained dialogue. Second, in the economic arena, by pursuing a short –term stabilization program, and postponing "Marketization" and price reform. Third, in the political arena,

29 Goldman, Ibid p5.

by hoping to effectively integrate the Soviet Society and handling its rising tension, through transforming the Communist party from an instrument of "*universal political, social, and economic management into a brain trust and authoritative steering organ*"³²; mainly by empowering popular elected soviets.

In addition, in another analysis in November 1989, the CIA had issued a prospectus for the following two years; assessing that the crisis the Soviet System is facing is deepening and that the expectancy of improvement is unlikely; providing a good possibility of decline in economic performance as well as an increase in domestic turmoil, probably according to two scenarios. First, the most possible one, is that the Soviet regime will maintain in its same recourse, while performing more reforms and making some retreats.

39 "Gorbachev's Domestic Gambles and Instability in the USSR", *Office of Soviet Analysis (The Central Intelligence Agency)*, September 1989, 3.

Figure 5
USSR: Average Annual Growth of
Per Capita Consumption, 1956-87




Figure # (2): Estimated Distribution of Soviet GNP by End
use in 1988.

Second, the remote possibility scenario, (which actually happened a year later); was that the both: economic turmoil and economic decline would become unmanageable, leading to a repressive crackdown , effectively ending any serious reform efforts by the Soviet Regime's administration.³³

However, from the above two CIA estimates and the other unfolded ones, it is clear that though their insights were precise and accurate; they only "predicted" the deterioration of the Soviet Economy. They asserted that it needed reformation, or it would cause domestic violent unrest amongst the Soviet citizens; who would protest Gorbachev's domestic economic, national and political policies. Nonetheless, as late as the year 1989, the CIA never assumed that the whole Soviet Union – as a superpower entity- would collapse, nonetheless "peacefully". This was never a future scenario for the USSR, according to their estimates; which outweighed the scenario where the Soviet Union would maintain its status quo as a superpower through conducting reformation of Gorbachev's domestic policies. Thus, it is clear that any future peaceful fall of the USSR was out of the picture -at that time.

35 " The Soviet System in Crisis: prospects for the next two years", *The Central Intelligence Agency*, November 1989, 3.

Overall, according to the authors of one of the most important Cold war revising books: Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, Kenneth A. Oye, Michael W. Doyle, Jack Snyder, Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Janice Gross Stein and Richard K. Herrmann - the real basis and the cause of struggle between the two rivals- the USSR and the USA- in the Cold War era is still unclear today. It is unclear to them, as well as it was unclear to the majority of both: The Cold War and the post Cold War era's IR literature –simply- what was the Cold War? And what were its real characteristics? And most importantly, what were its causes and motivations? To which an answer Traditional Realists and other major Sovietologists and IR scholars avoided; not because it was unimportant to them but because they tried to sidestep it; since they thought it was impossible to answer. Moreover, the Structural Realists' assumptions have also helped to push this question further into other fields of science interested in ideological studies, turning it into a matter of national motivation³⁴. This is because "*in foreign affairs, a particular motive may*

³⁴ Richard K. Herrmann, "Conclusions: The End of the Cold War--What Have We Learned", from the book *International Relations theory and the End of the Cold war*, edited by Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse Kappen, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 19.

*produce many different types of behavior, depending on the circumstances, just as the same action can be caused by various motives"*³⁵.

Furthermore, according to Hans Morgenthau, one of the pioneers of the Traditional Realist School of International Relations, the Cold war rivalry - in reality- was a struggle between two ideologically active states; promoting and advocating their own different ideological code of ethics, i.e. a "moral code" (Richard K. Herrmann, 1995) which each of them saw to be universally applicable to the entire International System. Meanwhile, they did so in a manner that violated the principles of the balance-of-power in the International System. That is, since both of them "*were willing to invest heavily in geostrategically insignificant theaters in the name of the ideological crusade. Realpolitik considerations were set aside, and the struggle pursued at high costs in Third World areas that, because of the psychological basis of the crusade, had symbolic value, though marginal intrinsic strategic importance*"³⁶. Accordingly, this ideological or "way of

³⁵ Lebow and Kappen: Ibid pp20-25.

³⁶ Richard K. Herrmann. "Conclusions: The End of the Cold War--What Have We Learned" from the book *International Relations theory and the End of the Cold war* edited by Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse Kappen, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p:158.

life" battle; which was almost a battle over the economical life style, meant that the two pillar norms of Realpolitik: 1-compromise, and 2- *modus vivendi* weren't applicable on that struggle, and the only choice was the elimination of one of these two major players from the International System at that time³⁷. This type of struggle is called a "zero sum" game according to the Game theory; were only one player can win in a particular struggle.

Moreover, based on their Cold War era literature -mainly in the seventies- IR Theory, Political and Security Studies couldn't figure out –at that time- whether Moscow was "*either destructionist, interested in destroying the values and social system embodied in the United States and Western Europe; expansionist, seeking to expand its control through the achievement of specific political goals; or consolidationist, interested in*

³⁷ Robert Jervis. "Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and The Study of International Politics - Sixtieth Anniversary, 1934-1994: The Legacy of Our Past". *Social Research*, Winter, 1994. P.p.: 1-5, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_n4_v61/ai_15955163

Also note: Richard Little. "Rethinking the dynamics of the balance of power: A Reconsideration of Hans J. Morgenthau". Prepared for Presentation at the International Studies Association Convention, Hawaii, March 2005.

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/9/3/4/pages69346/p69346-1.php

maintaining the status quo"³⁸. Such confusion could be seen in writings of Security Study researchers, such as: William Gamson , Andre Modigliani (based on their strategy for testing rival theories of the Cold War), and William Welch (who built a comparison scale, on which he studied the competing and diverse multiple American academic views regarding the course of change of the Soviet foreign policy ³⁹).

Consequently, since the Cold War era till the present day (the Post-Cold war era) there has been no consensus between IR, Political and Security Studies scholars-whatsoever- on the motivations and the mechanisms of change that were dynamic and vital to the course of the Cold War, and affecting its outcome. This could be one of the reasons that prevented those scholars from "predicting" the course of the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union. Thus, this issue remains controversial and opened to further discussion.

Moreover, this issue was highly controversial especially in the midst of many Political scholars, policy analyzers as well as policy advisors

³⁸ William Gamson and Andre Modigliani, *Untangling the Cold War; a Strategy for Testing Rival Theories*, (Boston: Little Brown and Co, 1971), 32-33.

³⁹ William Welch and Jan F. Triska, "Soviet Foreign Policy studies and Foreign Policy models", *World Politics*, July 1971, 11.

Also see *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy* , (New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970).

specifically in the USA, mainly in the Cold War era, to an extent that some scholars tried to get around that controversial issue by focusing on studying the behaviour of the Soviet policy makers; to decide whether their behavior was either: confrontational, competitive, opportunistic or cooperative.⁴⁰ This focus on Behavioral quantitative research was also affected by the newly trends followed by many Political scientists –at that time- of using the "behavioral methodology" in observing and studying a political phenomena instead of using deductive, descriptive and qualitative methodology in Political research. That is mainly because Behavioural studies were funded by American institutions such as the Ford foundation; that were frustrated by the continuous failures of Political theories in "predicting" the Political behavior and the courses of change of many Political phenomena. Therefore, they wanted to fund Political studies that

⁴⁰ Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, *The World in their minds: Information Processing, cognition, and perception in Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 122-28,

http://books.google.co.il/books?id=x1kUV_40xvIC&dq=Vertzberger,+The+World+in+Their+Minds&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=w64YUonvbX&sig=a8EEz5kjeeepwho8havFfNUUvnsE&hl=iw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA2,M1

used Social Science methodology which implemented –specifically- the Behavioral methodology on their research.⁴¹

However, although they sometimes used the Behavioral Methodology in their research, no school of the Theory of International Relations or Political Science was able to figure out what were the motivations and the mechanisms of change that fueled the behavior of the decision makers and policy setters in the Soviet Regime, during the Cold War era. Thus, they returned to "the point zero" of asking the same research questions all over again. This return – consequently- was one of the main reasons that prevented the International Relations and the Political scholars from seeing the – otherwise- declining symptoms of the USSR's status as a superpower, which were clear in front of their eyes, but needed better understanding; by being non bias to their theories' concepts and core assumptions. This would have been achieved by mainly using them as some of other tools of analysis in their studies of the Soviet Regime's behavior, rather than the sole tools of analysis. Thus, many scholars mainly in the West -and specifically in the

⁴¹ Talal Dahi and others, *Muqaddima fil Tahleel As-Siyasi Al- Qiyasi (An Introduction to Standard Political Analysis)*, (S.A.: Riyadh: King Saud University Press, 2004), 10-11.

USA- failed to advise their governments on how to deal with the Soviet Union and its Eastern Camp's course of behavior⁴².

Therefore, what this thesis humbly tries to achieve is simply address a pressing demand in both: The Political and the International Relations literature of the post Cold War era. It tries to answer the following important question, which fueled the Cold War's academic debate amongst the schools of the Theory of International Relations, that is: *How far have we as International Relations scholars, and writers of post Cold War literature come in figuring out the real causes and mechanisms (i.e. motivations) that ruled the actions of the two major players, the USA and the USSR, in the Cold war era?* Thus, it is important to point out that this debate revolved –mainly- around three major dilemmas, which are:

Was the Cold War – according to the Structural Realists- affected by the balance of power; which fueled the dynamics that formed the International System's structure in the era of the Cold War? Or was it far from a power struggle and thus; not affected by the "stability- transition- change" triad

⁴² Richard K. Herrmann. "Conclusions: The End of the Cold War--What Have We Learned" from the book *International Relations theory and the End of the Cold war* edited by Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse Kappen, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995),155.

mechanism of "the balance of power", but rather it was an ideological struggle between two ideologically stubborn superpowers, as the Traditional –classical- Realist Morgenthau described?

Or was it a period of active American expansion versus Soviet response, according to Security Studies scholars? Or on the contrary, was it - according to Defensive Realists- an era of the International System characterized by USSR challenge and USA defense?

And what was each of the two rivals thus defending: their security or their ideologies, i.e.: Liberalism versus Marxism-Leninism? Or their economical and financial interests under the cover of their ideological thoughts? In other words: was the USA –according to the Liberalist Theory of International Relations- defending its capital interests from the radical Communist flow, or were the two rivals defending their economic self-interest, and mode of production (Capitalism versus Communism)?


Or maybe these two superpowers were trying to maintain their current status quo, and preserving their status and "grandeur" among other great powers in the International System, as assumed by Realists.

All in all, these questions and others are challenging theoretically and empirically, and need further exploration; which this thesis tries to achieve in the next chapters; since "despite the labor-intensive efforts of many

scholars, little consensus was ever achieved on the subject, and not much more is likely in the post-Cold War period"⁴³.

⁴³ Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse Kappen (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold war*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 157.

Chapter Three



**A literature Assessing Overview
Of The Cold War Literature
by The Schools of
the Theory of International Relations (IR)
Active between 1979-1991:
Where the Theories Succeeded and
Where they Failed in “Predicting”
the Peaceful Fall of the Soviet Union**

1. Reasons of the fall of the Soviet Union as Explained by International Relations Post Cold War Era literature

Nowadays, there is a major agreement between most of the world's politicians and political– International Relations scientists as well, that the Soviet Union, The USSR, or "the Evil Empire" as formerly named by American Leaders faced certain domestic and outer crisis that accelerated its peaceful demise. And as it is understood, by reading the Cold War's history in general and The Russian history in particular, "*Gorbachev's domestic reforms ran into serious trouble, and the economy went into a tailspin*"⁴⁴, forming a fertile soil for a domestic conflict between him, on one hand, and: the old Soviet imperial elite in the communist party, the armed forces and the military-industrial complex, on the other hand. This conflict accumulated into the "*August 1991 coup, which, when it failed, finished off the USSR--and Gorbachev himself. On Christmas Day 1991, at 7:35 p.m., the Soviet flag flying over the Kremlin was lowered and replaced*

53 "Consequences of Soviet Decline: a Flattering Economy and a strong military could be a Volatile Mix", *The Futurist*, January- February 1989, 39

by the new Russian banner. The USSR officially ceased to exist on 31 December. The Cold War was over" ⁴⁵.

Thus, since the peaceful collapse of the USSR is our concern in this thesis; it is necessary to further demonstrate the factors that led to this major event. Many IR and Political theorists believe that the collapse of Communism⁴⁶, which led to the fall of the U.S.S.R. and the termination of almost forty years of East and West Camps rivalry, was due to a sequel of events that took place mainly between the years of 1989 and 1991.

The first event, on one hand, was the qualitative shift of the Soviet foreign policy from a tight closed to a wider opened one, by its new leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who came to power in 1985. He was far more opened to Western ideas than were any of his Communist predecessors; so that when he realized the urgent need for a real Soviet economy reform, he started to show a more optimistic attitude and acts of good will towards Western Europe in general, and the United states in particular. His attitude led subsequently to a cooperative dialogue between the two super powers –the

⁵⁴ "Consequences of Soviet Decline: a Flattering Economy and a strong military could be a Volatile Mix", *The Futurist*, January- February 1989, 40.

⁴⁶ That is the ideological belief of the U.S.S.R.

USA and the USSR- that costed the later a high price.⁴⁷ This new open policy included: the acceptance of arms control, the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan, the reduction of the Soviet ground forces by a half million, and the application of a more human valued foreign policy, rather than a warfare one. Nonetheless, he was interested in receiving data flow from domestic entities, such as: the KGB, the Gosplan, as well as foreign estimates of the Soviet economic conditions, to an extent in which he benefited from the new ideas of some Soviet economists, who were dubious or underestimated by his predecessors.

The second incident, on the other hand, was the disintegration of the Soviet's Outer Empire-as a result of the peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe beginning in the year 1989, which were fueled by ideas, such as: the "Nation- State", "self - governance", "independence" and "sovereignty". This disintegration has –tremendously- contributed in its turn, to the informal disengagement of the Warsaw Pact, and the further

1 5 “At Cold War's End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991”, *Central Intelligence Agency/ Center for the Study of Intelligence*, 1999, (no page numbers because it is a digital copy). <http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19335/art-1.html>

weakening of the –already- fragile and unstable Soviet Union beginning from the late 1980's.

The third event was the signing of the "Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty" on the 19th of November 1990, by both the Soviet Union and the USA. This treaty partially reduced the superiority of the Soviet Army in Europe, to the benefit of the Western Alliance, led by the United States, that grew even more powerful to an extent that the USA felt safe to move part of its forces from Europe and place them in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, for use against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991.

The fourth event was the Soviet Union's loss of its most valuable ally, gained during the Second World War, that is East Germany after its reunification with West Germany on the 3rd of October 1990, becoming a full member of the NATO.

Consequently, all previous events contributed to the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, encouraging and accelerating the calls of sovereignty and afterwards independence from the central government in Moscow, launched by the former Soviet Republics within the USSR.

However, at this particular stage of this study, since one of this Thesis' goals is to assess the Cold War literature during the last decade before the fall of the Soviet Union, it is necessary, hence, to demonstrate what major

Political and IR theories and academics have written in this period of time, in order to make sure that none of them has "predicted" the peaceful demise of the USSR.

2. Overview of the Cold War's Literature by Realism, Radicalism and Liberalism between 1979-1991: where these Theories succeeded and where they failed in "Predicting" the Peaceful fall of the Soviet Union

As an observer of the Cold War literature, especially in its last decade, one would realize that there have been three major schools of the Theory of International Relations dominating the political thought at that time, which are: Realism (that dominated most of the Cold War Literature in relativity to the other dominating schools of IR at that time), Liberalism and Radicalism. However, when reading their literature product, one should keep in mind that the major source of the Cold War's literature was Western, for Soviet archives and data sources were inaccessible –then- to Western scholars.⁴⁸

31 Joseph Noguee and John Spanier, *Peace Impossible- War Unlikely: The Cold War between The United States and The Soviet Union*, (Glenview / Illinois, USA: Scott Foresman and Company, 1988),1.

2.1- The Realism Cold War Literature between 1979-1991

Before investigating the Realist Cold War Literature between 1979 and 1991, and identifying where this theory and its branches have succeeded or failed in "predicting" the peaceful disintegration of the former Soviet Union, it is crucial to have a look at what Realism is as a theory, and what are its major core assumptions and explanation models of change in the International System. This is important since such models are necessary in any scientific attempt to "predict" any changes in this system.

"Realism" is a theoretical approach of the Theory of International Relations that was the dominant theory of this branch of International Politics until the end of the Cold War. And as most International Relations (IR) theoretical approaches; its theorists claim that it has the essential core assumptions, conceptions and modules to explain both: the change in the International System, as well as the factors that affect inter- state relations in it. And like most theories, Realism has its divisions. First, there is "Classical Realism" or "Traditional Realism", which is also called "Biological Realism"; since it claims that power maximizing is related to the desires of humans and consequently to the desires of the states in the International System. This division is associated with theorists such as: E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr and George

Schwarzenberger. Second, there is “Neo Realism” or “Structural Realism” – which is tied to Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Krasner, Arthur Stein, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, Robert Keohane, Evans and Newnham. Third, there is “Offensive Realism” that is associated with John Mearsheimer and Eric Labs, although one could find competitive –offensive- state motives in the writings of "Traditional Realists" such as: Thucydides and Machiavelli. And fourth, there is "Defensive Realism" which finds its foundation in the writings of Kenneth Waltz, mainly in his book : "The theory of International Politics"; where he explains that the anarchy of the International System drives its states to adopt moderate and reserved policies in order to achieve and maintain security ⁴⁹ . And though these divisions of "Realism" have their differences, yet most of them agree on - besides that the "state" is the major player in the International System- one major concept that "power"; mainly the state's desire to obtain, attain and maintain its power and hegemony in the International System, is the dominant factor and the major law regulating most of the inter- state relations, the inputs and the outputs of the International System, as well as its structure, were it be: a unipolar, a bipolar or a multi-polar one. Realism believes that in an anarchic International System, where rational great

⁵⁷ Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: McGraw Hill,1979), 44-47.

powers are uncertain of the motives of the other great powers (superpowers) in the system, each one of them tries to maximize its power resources and hegemony, to maintain its security and status as a superpower in it. Therefore, the Realist Theory is called "Power Politics", "Machtpolitik", "Raison D'etat", or "Realpolitik"⁵⁰. However, the differences between Classical and Neo-Realism are the ultimate causations for this proximate cause which is the "desire for power".

On one hand, Classical Realists such as: Hans Morgenthau and Niebuhr suggest that the states' "desire of power" is originated from the individuals (mainly the leaders) of which the states are composed of. These individuals "*are egoistic and strive to dominate others*".⁵¹ This is because of two reasons. Firstly, according to Hobbes and Morgenthau, humans are evil.

⁵⁰ Hussein Solomon, "In Defense of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", *African Security Review*, Vol. 5 No 2, 1996, Pp10-12.

⁵¹ Bradley A. Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 62.

http://books.google.co.il/books?id=likssKjrQm0C&dq=Bradley+A.+Thayer.+Darwin+and+International+Relations:+On+the+Evolutionary+Origins+of+War+and+Ethnic+Conflict&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=iw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result

This evilness means – according to these Classic Realists- that humans refuse to accept the fact that their minds are limited and finite. Thus, they taint their activities with a narcissistic self love or pride; that causes some of them to seek power to ensure the security, significance, respect and fear of their egos by their peers. This is done by a process in which each one of them submits other humans' lives to his/her individual or collective will; to enhance their position (status) in their: environment , community and society... etc. ⁵². Evermore, this process of narcissistic self love, pride and subordination applies not only to the individuals but also to the states; which is even considered more dangerous according to Classical Realists themselves. This is because "national pride" causes even more evil in the world; since it drives states to try to dominate each others; in order to ensure their prominent status amongst other states in the International System. This power struggle especially applies to the position of the states in the "power dividing" mechanism that rules this system, that is called "the balance of power", which is the major Classical Realist mechanism of maintaining stability in the system. This stability mechanism is essential –

⁵² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 4-15.

according to Classical Realists- in ensuring justice in both: the political arena and in the International System. This is because other prominent IR theories – i.e. Liberalism- are not capable of realizing the danger a state's "animus dominandi" (intention to rule) can have on the International System.

Secondly, there is an inherent tendency in individuals to place ones interest before the interests of others; i.e. one's and his/her family's interests before those of more distant relatives, and those of one's distant relatives before the interests of their community, state and so go on in a concentric cycle⁵³ . Therefore, the leaders of states have this same tendency to place the interests of their states before those of the other states in the International System. According to Classic Realists, each state's interests are -usually- to dominate and rule (animus dominandi) other states in the International System; through obtaining and maximizing its power mainly: politically

⁵³ Bradley A. Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 63.

http://books.google.co.il/books?id=likssKjrQm0C&dq=Bradley+A.+Thayer.+Darwin+and+International+Relations:+On+the+Evolutionary+Origins+of+War+and+Ethnic+Conflict&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=iw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result

and militarily. This power enables them to either: attack and conquer other states and –consequently- obtain further power (as suggested by Offensive Realism), or helps them to deter attacks by other states (as suggested by Defensive Realism)⁵⁴.

However, the "ultimate causations" of the proximate cause of the states' "desire for power", which are: the humans' evilness and the humans' preference of one's interests over the others' interests, do not have any solid scientific foundations whatsoever. This means that they cannot be tested for their accuracy because they are noumenal; or in other words: they are outside what science can investigate, demonstrate or test; since they are not something tangible. Therefore, it is almost impossible to test the accuracy or the credibility of concepts such as: evilness, or an "animus dominandi" drive / motivation.

Neo- Realism on the other hand, or as some scientists prefer to name it "Structural Realism", follows a more scientific approach than Classic Realism in its explanation modules. It provides relatively testable "ultimate causations" for the states' "desire of power"; which are "anarchy and the

⁵⁴ This Defensive argument, i.e. "Deterrence Policy", is also a proximate cause of Defensive Realists, such as: Mearsheimer, although the ultimate cause of it is: the anarchical status of the International System and not the egoistic Animus Dominandi of the individuals; that states are composed of.

balance of power". This theory -mostly developed by Kenneth Waltz- asserts that in an anarchical world; where there is no "authority" or "sovereignty" that regulates the inter- state relations in the International System, each state fears for its: survival, security, interests and status among other states in the system. This fear, according to Waltz, causes states to ensure their survival -in this anarchical system- through the mechanism of the "balance of power"⁵⁵. This mechanism is considered by Waltz as a state's survival tool and a product of the goal to survive⁵⁶. Hence, *"the acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of*

⁵⁵ Bradley A. Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 65.

http://books.google.co.il/books?id=likssKjrQm0C&dq=Bradley+A.+Thayer.+Darwin+and+International+Relations:+On+the+Evolutionary+Origins+of+War+and+Ethnic+Conflict&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=iw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result

⁵⁶ Stephen M. Walt. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories". *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, Spring 1998, Pp20-24.

Also note: Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models*, (UK, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),18.

http://books.google.co.il/books?id=AHPH_IPH4KkC&dq=richard+little+the+balance+of+power&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=fA_bjcfKib&sig=IzAkBRSww8GYXM13xd8PrprYIZY&hl=iw&ei=0-SsSYOfHMyE_gaDnLDIBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=3&ct=result

foreign policy (where) International Politics can then be defined as a struggle between power-maximizing states in an anarchical environment ⁵⁷, and where states desire to attain more power – mainly politically, militarily and economically- and strive to maximize it, in order to guarantee "hegemony"; that is a powerful position (status) among other states in the anarchical International System.

In addition, Waltz uses a Structural analytical method to explain the essentiality of using "power distribution" and –thus- the "balance of power" among the states in the International System, as tools in "predicting" whether war is probable or not in this System, in a given time or situation. This Structuralist method looks at the International System as being consisted of units interacting with each other in a series of input and output to the system they interact in, rather than studying each unit alone – as Classical Realism does. And like Defensive Realism, Structural Realism perceives bipolarity as the most stable structure of the International System than either: multi-polarity or uni-polarity. This is because in a bipolar

⁵⁷ Hussein Solomon, "In Defense of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist". *African Security Review*. Vol. 5 No 2, 1996, p2.

International System power is equally distributed between the two poles of the system; as in the Cold War era, instead of being further divided between three or more poles; as in multi-polarity, such as in Europe before WWI and WWII consecutively.

Moreover, both Realist schools (Structural Realism and Defensive Realism) argue that security is easier to be achieved and maintained by the –rivalry- between the two poles in a bipolar International System; and thus stability will become more durable in this structure. Therefore, since there are only two superpower rivals (AKA two poles) in the system, each pole has only one threat to balance against instead of balancing against multiple threats; which means less resources to spend and –hence- further acquired power. These advantages accumulate – according to Structural and Defensive Realists- to the stability of the International System. Hence, unlike Morgenthau and Niebuhr's Classical Realism, Neo Realism has a more scientific approach to observing and understanding the International System; since it does not rely on noumenal ultimate causations in its explanation modules. Rather than that, it uses Structuralism as a methodology in both: explaining the current status quo of the International System, and in "predicting" the probability of superpower wars in it.

Furthermore, since the International System is anarchical, where states "self- help" themselves to survive by maximizing their power; Waltz suggests that strong states are the ones that draw the International Political scene; setting any course of actions for themselves and for the other states in the system. This process enables these superpowers to become poles in the International System (or even in their region – a subsystem), which forms to be either: unipolar, bipolar or multipolar; depending on the number of equally powerful superpowers that set the actions of the states in this system.

In addition, post Cold War Neo-Realist literature clarifies that Realism - though it was the dominant tradition throughout the Cold War era; for it provided a convenient explanation of the competition between the states in the International System and their consistent struggle over power (that could be clearly tied to the central features of the American – Soviet rivalry) - had a pessimistic view regarding the potentials and the prospects of eliminating conflict and hence; war between the states of this System. Thus, the Realist Cold War literature claimed, that in their struggle to survive; the major super powers in the International anarchical System would- usually- surround themselves with strong alliances with weaker states; to balance against their powerful rivals; forming as a result, a bipolarity system –consisting of two camps- that is more stable than a

multi-polarity or a uni-polarity one.⁵⁸ And since the Soviet – American conflict model -AKA the era of the long peace- was the perfect proof of this theory's core assumptions; of stability that is produced by bipolarity, the Cold War era's Realism literature did not even bother-nor found it necessary- to engage in a debate that would slightly foresee the decline of one of the poles of the Cold War era's bipolar International System, i.e. the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, Kenneth Waltz -in his book "*The Theory of International Politics*"- has identified three basic elements to explain war. First, the individual and the human behaviour, or specifically the individual behaviour of political leaders of the states and the policy makers. Second, the internal structure of the states; which determine the foreign policies that they are going to obtain according to this structure. And thirdly, the anarchy of the International environment; which affects the behavior of the states towards each other. This means; that the behavior of each state influences the behaviour of other states, or more precisely, the actions of great powers determine the actions and the foreign policies of each other.

64 Stephen M. Walt. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories". *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, Spring 1998, p 31.

Other academics, mainly the "Defensive Realists", did not "predict" the decline of either pole of the International System in the Cold War era: The United States nor the Soviet Union; because the rivalry between the two poles and, hence, the formation of balancing alliances and –consequently– the two poles' choice to obtain defensive military postures, such as retaliatory nuclear forces, were not perceived by Defensive Realists to weaken these two superpowers, but rather to strengthen them. As a result, many Defensive Realism pioneers, such as: Robert Jervis , Stephen Van Evera and George Quester were sure to consider the hypothesis that both superpowers were most secure throughout the entire period of the Cold War era⁵⁹ Thus, one of them declining was out of question.

Offensive Realism, particularly its founder John Mearsheimer, also shared this same hypothesis. Thus, they failed to "predict" the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union, followed by the end of the Cold War. However, they based this hypothesis on two arguments –aiming at helping them to "predict" the likelihood of war in the International System. Firstly, that the root causes of war and peace are both in: the distribution and in the

⁶⁷ Stephen M. Walt. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories". *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, Spring 1998. p 33.

character of the military power among the states in the International System⁶⁰. Adding that stability is more likely in a bipolar power distribution; setting peace in Europe since the end of WWII in 1945 as an example, especially in the Cold War era. This era was most stable – in their opinion- because of the bipolar military power distribution in the region, which was roughly equal between the two poles: the USA and the USSR. And the deterrence ability of each pole, especially that they each had nuclear arsenals⁶¹. Secondly, an argument that is deduced from the first one, stating that the potentials of peace in the International System are not to a great deal affected by the domestic political character of each state (mainly great powers) of this System; but rather by the character of the entire International System, asserting that this is the factor that drives states to either war or peace. This system characteristic is either: unipolar, bipolar

⁶⁰ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 12.

⁶¹ Bradley Thayer. *Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict University*, (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 67.
http://books.google.co.il/books?id=likssKjrQm0C&dq=DARWIN+AND+INTERNATIONAL+RELATIONS&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=iw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result

or multipolar; which brings us back to the same Neo Realism and Defensive Realism arguments of the two causes of stability in the International System; which are: "the balance of power" and "the power distribution" between the superpowers in the International System. However, after observing each sub- school of the Realist Cold War literature; it is safe to conclude that the difference between each one of them is that Neo Realists give a definition of power that includes: economical, political and military strengths. Whereas, Defensive and Offensive Realists only focus on the military aspects of power.

Evermore, Offensive Realists share most of the core assumptions of Structural Realism, mainly regarding the stability of the Bipolar International System; asserting that Bipolarity is the most stable power distribution setting of this system. The founder of Defensive Realism, John Mearsheimer (1998), asserts that the world will soon regret the passing of the Cold War, "*the era that we may someday look back upon not as the Cold War but as the Long Peace, in John Lewis Gaddis's phrase*"⁶². He defends his argument by stating that peace is wonderful, and no one will

⁶² John Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War ", teaching American history.org, August 1998, P 4.

ever miss the by-products of the cold war such as: The Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, the Cuban missile crisis, the U-2 affair, the building of the Berlin wall, neither the domestic Cold War with *"its purges and loyalty oaths, its xenophobia and stifling of dissent...We may, however, wake up one day lamenting the loss of the order that the Cold War gave to the anarchy of international relations ...* For untamed anarchy is what Europe knew in the forty-five years of this century before the Cold War, and untamed anarchy--Hobbes's war of all against all--is a prime cause of armed conflict. "⁶³ Moreover, Mearsheimer (1998) added that during the multipolarity eras of the International System, especially in Europe mainly from 1900 to 1945, killing rates -due to wars and armed conflicts- were too high; about 50 million Europeans, in comparison to the armed conflict death rates during the Cold War era of 15 thousand Europeans: 10 thousand of which were Hungarians and Russians in the Russo- Hungarian war of October and November 1956, and from 1,500 to 5 thousand deaths from Greeks and Turks in the 1974 war on Cyprus. Therefore, Europe along with the whole International System will face -according to Offensive Realists- an upcoming World War style conflict; since the current structure of the international system is multi-polar, which is the same characteristic of the

⁶³ John Mearsheimer Ibid, p2.

International System in the years from 1648 till 1945 (i.e. before the Cold War).

Moreover, a major pillar of Offensive Realism is the process of “state power maximizing”. This means –according to Mearsheimer in his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*- that each state in an anarchical world- with no central authority; where each state fears for its security from other states and questions their intentions- must strive to maximize its offensive power to be secure and keep rivals from gaining more power than its own⁶⁴. This desire in states –says Mearsheimer in his article *Better to be Godzilla than Bambi*- is so influential on the foreign politics of the states of the International System; that each one of them will become hegemonic if they could. This incentive is driven by competition in the International System. Eric Labs (1997) asserts and adds that: *"a strategy that seeks to maximize security through a maximum of relative power is the rational response to anarchy."*⁶⁵

⁶⁴ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), 56

⁶⁵ Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims ". *Security Studies*, Volume 6, Issue 4 Summer 1997 , p 12.

This core assumption- however- is contradicted by Neo Realists – mainly Waltzians- who stress out that too much power for a state in general, and a superpower in particular will specifically tip the power balance against it in favor of other powers in the International System; thus threatening its security (Thayer 2004). Or at least – according to Paul Kennedy (who is actually a historian)- too much military funding and arms race will tire the domestic economy of a pole, and thus decline its power; for it puts it in an economical crisis ⁶⁶.

To wrap up, it is clear from the Realism Cold War literature analysis, that the Realist Theory of International Relations, and most of its sub-theories are -predominatingly- pessimistic towards both: cooperation and pacifism

Also see: Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 30-41.

<http://books.google.co.il/books?id=baGI7O3wd5kC&pg=PA212&lpg=PA212&dq=%22a+strategy+that+seeks+to+maximize+security+through+a+maximum+of+relative+power+is+the+rational+response+to+anarchy&source=bl&ots=Sir27iIsbd&sig=bDCtgOCWANT2SCScJkjJvjK112o&hl=iw&ei=R->

[GsSZXZG52W1QWa4cHNbQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=3&ct=result#PPT1,M1](http://books.google.co.il/books?id=GsSZXZG52W1QWa4cHNbQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=3&ct=result#PPT1,M1)

⁶⁶ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500—2000*, (New York: Random House, 1987), 120.

as efficient mechanisms to alter the structure of the International System (i.e. ending war between states and maintaining stability in the International System). And this was their dominant view of the international politics – specifically- in the era of the Cold War. This bias to their theory's change mechanisms – mainly the balance of power- was a major reason of Realism's failure to "predict" the swift peaceful ending of the Cold War, as well as the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union. Consequently, in the Cold War era, Realists focused on interpreting the Cold War bipolarity status quo as is- by using the "Balance of Power" mechanism as an explanation tool to elaborate their hypothesis of its longevity and stability; that they missed on any possibility of its fall; asserting that if the Soviet Union's fall would ever take place it would be through war not peace. Thus, Realists were surprised by the peaceful ending of the Cold War and the quiet pacific disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, Realists wrongly assumed that "power balancing" is the best mechanism to achieve stability in the anarchical International System; that they clearly refrained from examining its shortcomings, nor being opened to other possibilities of other more efficient and less costly ways in maintaining the International System's stability, such as: cooperation and collective security; (i.e. the European experience in cooperation through collective institutions, such as: the European Union that ended long decades

of war in that continent and achieved economical growth in it). I mean less costly since the "Balance of power mechanism" uses struggle (war) as a road to achieve peace (periodic stability) and that is: humanly, economically and politically costly. Moreover, it is a distorted and unethical means to achieve stability (peace) through war. On this issue, Singer (1996) stresses out that during and post cold war era *"the cost to the non-aligned societies was monumental, even though the compradors were well rewarded by the Soviets and Americans. Both superpowers interfered in the ex-colonial regions, making and breaking governments, looking for reliable allies or denying access to the other, loading them down with weapons, and in such dramatic cases as Vietnam and Afghanistan actually intervening massively and destructively in their civil wars"*⁶⁷.

Consequently, it is safe to conclude that along their fascination and bias to their theory's and paradigm's core assumptions, concepts and change mechanisms, Realists ignored other variables and factors that contribute both to: the shape of the structure of the International System, and to a

⁶⁷ For more information, about the tragedy caused by the Cold War's Arms Race, read: David Singer. "Prediction, Explanation, and the Soviet Exit from the Cold War". *The International Journal of Peace Studies*. July 1999. Vol. 4:2.

pole's longevity, such as – in the Soviet Union's case: domestic and international economical crisis, and implemented domestic and foreign policies.

Therefore, because of its vital contribution to Realism's failure to "predict" the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union; the next section will elaborate on "change mechanisms" in the "anarchical" International System, as previewed by the Realist Theory of International Relations.

2.1-2) Realism's view on Transition and Transformation Paradigms of the International System: The Dialectics of: War, Stability, Transformation and Peace in the International Political System, a Focus on the Cold War era between 1979-1991

According to most of the schools of the Theory of the International Relations, the political players, which enter together in an interactive mutual relationship, in a certain pattern or a “systemology”, typically form the International System. In other words; this system consists of a sum of elements and units that are lined with one another, in an "exchanging" relationship; where each element or unit does not "erase" the characteristics of the other. Moreover, political players vary from one political entity to

another, or whether they are: countries or organizations, small powers or superpowers, weak or strong, effective and active in the International System or ineffective and passive in it.

However, throughout history, and regardless of the relationship between the units of the International System, "change and transformation" have been - and still are- established facts, and primary characteristics of this system. Furthermore, "struggle", regardless of its shape and nature, is considered- according to Realism- to be the ignition key of "change and transformation". It is- unfortunately- usually used to cross from one phase to another and vice versa in the International System; that is from peace to war and from war to peace, and from stability to turbulence and from turbulence to stability. And according to the "Realism" Theory of International Relations, specifically in Paul Kennedy's book " the appearance and decline of great powers", power *is not* a natural oligopoly of a certain player in the International System; but rather a continuous, total and lasting struggle for dominance.⁶⁸

⁶⁸*The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and* Paul Kennedy, ⁶⁸
Military Conflict from 1500—2000, (New York: Random House, 1987), 92.

Moreover, in general, it is difficult to specify which phase- peace or war- precedes the other; for both of them are involved in a cyclic motional pattern in the International political arena. For example, in modern history, the International System has witnessed major "correspondent transformations" between its major superpowers, such as in: The Westphalia Convention in 1648; which established the concept of "state sovereignty". And the Vienna Convention in 1815; which was signed after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte, and resulted in the dominance of the principle of the "balance of power" in the International Relations, among the players of the International System. As well as the Treaty of Versailles, after the World War One, and the establishment of the Nations league. And the Yalta Treaty signed by the victorious superpowers in the Second World War, and the establishment of the United Nations Organization.

And with the numerous players and the many strategies of policy making in the International System, came multiple theories which aimed at explaining: international events and international phenomena, as well as trying to foresee and to "predict" the future consequences, and the effects those past and present variables have on the International System. One of these dominant theories -in the Cold War era- was the Realism Theory; which provided its own explanation of the: transformation, change, movement and stability mechanisms of the International System. Realism based this

explanation on its own principles and core assumptions of: power, alliances and "balance of power"; which is sometimes named "the balance of terror". All of these change mechanisms result- according to Realism- in either: unipolarity, bipolarity or multi-polarity of the dominant most effective state players of the International System; and what their interactive relations project on the shape and on the state of the International System. As a result, the International System enters in a new cycle of: struggle, transformation and change, and finally stability; in a series of continuous dynamic international changes and transformations. ⁶⁹

Thus, Realism sees the International System as a collection of general rules of international conduct, in both of its: Struggle and Cooperative phases, as set by the super powers of the system. These rules are then imposed by those superpowers on the less powerful states of the system. ⁷⁰ Furthermore, one of the best international eras that could be used as an example to explain "transformation and change" in the International System- and what numerous different structural implications it had on it- is

⁶⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 50-56.

⁷⁰ Muhammad Sayyid Saleem. *Tatauwor Assiyasa Addawliya Fil Qarnain Attase' A'shar Wal Ishreen*, (Cairo: M.S. Saleem, 2002), 25.


the era of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the USA, in between the years 1947 and 1990.

Moreover, according to Saiyyed Salim, one of the major hypothesis of Realism –generally- assumes that : 1- turbulences in the balance of power, 2- conflict of interest, and 3- alliances between the states in a multi-polar International System- especially if it is accompanied by an arms race, and an increase in military expenses- will accordingly result in a state of international , or at least regional , war in order to resume the balance of power between the super powers of the system; in a manner that retains its stability once again. ⁷¹

However, to accurately understand this Realism's hypothesis, (i.e. the explanation of the dynamics of the structure of the International System, dominantly in the Cold War era), it is crucial to explore and to elaborate on some of the major phases of the world's modern political history; which have produced critical changes and transitions in the International System. In those phases the International System continuously bounced in a fluctuating line – or in other words; in a roller coaster pattern- in between phases of: instability, war, then stability and peace- regardless of how long

⁷¹ Saleem. Ibid. P:27.

each phase lasted. Moreover, one of the most important phases was the Cold War era, which Realists, Neo Realists and Defensive Realists- like Lewis Gaddis- like to address as the " era of the Long Peace".⁷²



Figure# 4: Realism's Explanation of the hypothesis of "the fluctuation" of the structure of the International System in between phases of: instability, stability, and war.

⁷² Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500—2000*, (New York: Random House, 1987), 27.

For further elaboration on this perception of the dynamics of the structure of the International System, it is easy to think of the inter- state relations and dynamics, under the umbrella of the International System, as a chemical reaction between different elements and factors; where each war / struggle acts as a *polarization* process of the International System's pre-war (pre- struggle) superpowers. This results in the demise of some superpowers and the rise of others in the post war (struggle) era.⁷³ Amongst those superpowers, two or more superpowers appear to be the most powerful and thus, dominate the International System; and become hegemony in their regions. Consequently, they form allies with the less powerful states, to reinforce their polar state; by the accepted post war resolutions, as well as inter- state understandings between the ending wars' rivals.⁷⁴(i.e. the post WWI era and the Cold War era). This new structure of the International System, or in other words, this war byproduct results in a more stable International System (i.e. the 20 years of cautious stability between WWI and WWII); where post war states have accepted the resolutions and the arrangements resulting from the struggle phase.

⁷³ Paul Kennedy : 1987. Ibid, p30.

⁷⁴John Mearsheimer. "Better to be Godzilla than Bambi". *Foreign Policy*, No. 146 .Jan. - Feb., 2005, pp. 47-48.

However, when the balance of power between the states tips and imbalances- as a result of some powers' disapproval of the post war structure; resolutions and / or byproducts- chaos, problems and struggles build up between the International System's powers (i.e. the allies and the axis powers post WWI). This built up tension between these states turns into an unstable phase in the system; that waits for a sparkle (i.e. an incident) to start a war (i.e. the invasion of Poland by Germany that started the WWII). This new state of war, as its predecessor, results in the falling and the rising of new powers in the International System, (in this case the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.), along with what effects this change would have on the international scene's power arrangement as well as power distribution between its major powers, and whether this power concentrates between two or more poles. This procedure enters the International System in an era of stability, (i.e. the Cold War that was particularly named the "long peace" era; since it consisted of about 50 years of stability in the International System; as a result of the "balance of terror" between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.). This Cold War lasted that long because of the fear of the starting of a worldwide nuclear war, that caused the west and the east camps to fall into the trap of an arms race, and excessive military expenses; which damaged many vital sectors in those bipolar states, mainly those of the USSR's. As a result, this damage caused the USSR's

systematical gradual dissolution that was completed in 1991. Thus, the fact that the Cold War lasted for such a long period of time; has blinded many International Relations theorists, mainly the Realism theorists, to a great degree so as not to consider the possibility that it might end soon, and peacefully without war. This is since according to Realism; the bipolar structure of the international system is the most stable structure of the system; so it needs major reasons to end. This made the peaceful dissolution of both: The Soviet Union and the Cold War surprising to Realism theorists. This is because these events happened suddenly, and without any major events and struggles leading up to them; in relativity to the Cold War's long lasting period⁷⁵.

Moreover, according to Realism, and for further explaining this issue (the Peace- War, War- Peace Transformation and Transitional Paradigm – dynamics – of the international system); regardless of the structure of the current international system - either unipolar, bipolar or multi-polar-, it will certainly transude differences between the major powers in the system, as a result of some rising differences in interests between these powers. This will accordingly affect the current international alliances between these

⁷⁵ Realist reference, the book in which the author says that no one expected the Cold War to end that soon.

powers (poles) in the system, thus, creating a state of instability, fueled by a desire to change the system's structure and its power distribution between its super powers. In other words, a goal to change the international system's balance of power. However, this transformation never takes place, at least in the opinion of Realism, unless the old structure of the international system is destructed in the sake of the developing new system's structure; which is formed in this phase of instability. And the best way to do so- according to Realism- is through an armed struggle, i.e. war. This means transiting from a "passive struggle", i.e. from a state of a Cold War, into an active struggle state; since –according to Realism- the previous structure of the international system would no longer be capable of fulfilling the interests, goals and ambitions of the great powers in the system. Thus, change is crucial to secure the fulfillment of those interests. Therefore, none of the Realists even think of a different mechanism for change in the International System. This narrows the change dynamics only through one way, that could never change; which is War (struggle). This Realism change mechanism could be explained by the Traditional Realism's ultimate causation -mainly formed by Hans Morgenthau and Thomas Hobbes- which assumes that humans, and thus the states tend to be evil (Stanley, Darwin and IR, 2001). Moreover, it could be derived from the Neo Realists assumptions -mainly: those of Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer – that both: the humans and the states (that exist in a chaotic international system)

tend to be dominating and power seeking (Stanley, Darwin and IR, 2001). Hence, sticking only to the concept of war, and ignoring the concept of peace; as an effective methodology to change the structure of the International System, has made both: The Classical Realists as well as the Neo- Realists, fail to “predict” the rather Peaceful: domestic and foreign policy change of the Soviet Union’s political regime, preceding its peaceful decline and its quiet disintegration which started in 1989 and was done in 1991. (Ned Lebow, “International Relations and the End of the Cold War”. 2003).

Consequently, this war phase transudes new realities in the International System, and new data are created to support and to dedicate the new developing structure of the international system- which has already started to jell in the phase of instability (the desire to change the arrangements of the precedent structure of the international system, i.e. Europe before World War One and World War Two). In this case, the international system's resources and power start to be redistributed by the rising superpowers of the system; in order to recreate the balance of power in between the war winning states. This is done in a manner that guarantees the fulfillment of those winning states’ interests, not those of the defeated super powers’, who agree on these arrangements, at least until they have the power to change this situation and these arrangements, once again. This phase is

characterized by a state of cautious stability; which could be either short, as in the era in between the two world wars, or long as in the era after the Second World War, which was called the "Cold War", or "the era of the Long Peace" as Realists prefer to name it⁷⁶.

In such periods, rival states – specifically defeated states in the previous war, re-gather and re-build their strength; aiming at enhancing their power politically and military; in order to regain back their infringed interests. Thus, this re-gathering poses – according to: Traditional Realists, Neo Realists and Defensive Realists (especially in the realm of security studies) a “threat” to the stability of the current arrangements, and to the current structure of the International System. This is because these states start demanding the change of the current structure of this system, and its current status quo; to another one in which they can actualize their ambitions – or at least fulfill their interests. "The Power Transition Theory"; a division of Realism, clearly explains this "structural change demand" by defeated – less powerful states. A.F.K. Organski explains in his book, *World politics* (1960), that War is most likely, and will have the longest duration and the greatest significance when a challenger(s) to the dominant power(s) of the

⁷⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War", *The Atlantic*, August 1990, Pp. 37.

international system parts with the dominant state(s) because the challenger (s) is dissatisfied with the current International System's structure.⁷⁷

However, since the major "predictive" powers (predicting tools) of the Power Transition Theory in particular, and Realism in general are both: the Likelihood of war and the stability of alliances⁷⁸; it is –thus- clear why such theories of International Relations failed to "predict" the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union. They failed to do so for two connected factors. Firstly, they thought any collapse of a superpower (hegemony) in the international system would be most likely through a war, not peacefully; while in reality the USSR disintegrated peacefully. Secondly, is a factor that originates from the first one, which is the peaceful – not the aggressive collapse of the USSR. Hereby, Realism theorists thought that the "alliance mechanism" brings stability to the international system. Hence, the Cold War era and the structure of "power distribution" it brought about the international system – which was constructed on the basis of two major alliances (western and eastern camps) – was thought –accordingly- to be the most durable "balance of power" of the system. This is because it was

⁷⁷ A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), 50-51.

⁷⁸ Ronald L. Tammen and others, *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century*, (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000), 22.

bipolar, and therefore it was “predicted” to survive for a long period of time, at least until a war dismantles it. However, these alliances' status quo was weakened by: financial problems, a collection of minor struggles, and proxy wars between these two camps. And for a surprise to those theories ended not through a major war but disintegrated peacefully, leading to the collapse of the USSR and, thus, the end of the Cold War.

Moreover, according to Paul Kennedy in his book "the Rise and Fall of Great Powers", often this "threat of war" is accompanied by an arms race between the rival states; since this threat is used as a justification -by political leaders- to increase their countries' military funding and -probably- be forced to engage in a war against its rival(s). Moreover, according to Kennedy and Sayyid Salim, all wars have been preceded by an increase in military spending.⁷⁹ However, this escalated arms race and military funding will become - according to Kennedy and Salim- the leading reason of the collapse of the superpowers of the International System; because this

⁷⁹ Muhammad Saiyyed Saleem, *Tatauwor Assiyasa Addawliya Fil Qarnain Attase' A'shar Wal Ishreen*. (Cairo: M.S. Saleem, 2002), 25.

Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000*, (New York: Random House, 1987), 32.

spending will become the superpowers' most pressuring, exhausting and costing international action.

Consequently, the International System –according to Realism- will enter a new state of instability, that becomes more effective in changing the current structure and "power balance" of this system; if the defeated states that rebelled on the system's current status quo, succeed in attracting alliances of other states in the system (for example, Nazi Germany that regained its power after WWI and was able to enter WWII by forming a new alliance; in which it was its core state). However, the previous war winning states start to feel that their interests are threatened by this new polarization action which the defeated state(s) is (are) doing. Thus, they – in return- start their own antagonistic polarization process; attracting states that are in favour of keeping the current system's status quo as is. As a result, antagonistic alliances rise to the seen (i.e. alliances before WWI and WWII consequently). This polarization process creates a state of disturbance where each state (alliance) engages in actions against the rival state (s) (alliance). And where struggle escalates until an incident sparks war between those rival states (rival camps).

Moreover, the number of each alliance's members could fluctuate and change in the phase of war. The number of members in a certain alliance

could increase or decrease, and some neutral states could enter the war, and war engaging states could step out from war (i.e. the USA that entered WWI in 1917 after three years of its start). Major powers fall, and other states rise to the rank of superpowers in the International System, i.e. the aftermath of WWI where some influential European empires declined, like: The Hapsburg empire in favour of the rising of: the UK, France, Italy and Germany. And in WWII where France, the UK and Germany fell from the rank of superpowers; to be replaced by the Soviet Union and the USA; because they –both- possessed important industrial capabilities and other major economic resources.

In addition, this status of war in the International System –generally- ends by the winning of the most powerful state (s); with the strongest allies, and the best war strategies and tactics. This makes it easier for the winning state (s) to impose its (their) conditions and new arrangements on the defeated parties (i.e.: previous superpowers, allies and states). Thus, they dictate the new world order – that is the new international system's structure- with its different structure of power distribution than the previous pre-war one. This leap into a new world order, puts the international system in a phase of stability – peace- whose longevity depends on two factors. Firstly, on the strength of these agreements and compromises, upon which the war phase has ended. In other words, the strength of the new structure of the "balance

of power" – (or power distribution between the states of the international system) - were it be: unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. Secondly, the degree of endorsement of this current structure of the international system by all the system's players; especially those that were engaged in the ending of the state of war; whether they were rivals or allies. However, if the current arrangements are breached by one or more parties, whose interests are unattended to by the current post war arrangements (mainly: power distribution, i.e. balance of Power, and the international system's structure)-the international system will, according to Realism, go again through a state of war. This war will be followed by a state of stability and so forth, in a cycle of: war, peace, instability and war, that form the dynamicity of change in the international system; as suggested by the Realist theory of international relations.

Furthermore, according to Realism, the international system can have different structures in different circumstances. First, is **Unipolarity**; where one state has the most power amongst other states. Thus, it becomes the system's hegemony, as in the post-cold war era, where the USA became the single pole in the system. Second, **Bipolarity**; where there are two poles (superpowers) in the international system, that become hegemonies in the alliance which each of them forms, as in the era of the cold war; where both the USA and the Soviet Union became the two poles of the system. And

third, **Multipolarity**; where three or more superpowers dominate power in the international system, as in the international system after WWI, where Britain, France, Italy and Germany became the system's dominating superpowers. And as it is in the present status quo where: Russia, Germany, France, China, Japan and India are becoming rising poles in the system⁸⁰. This is because the unipolarity term – (which some experts used to describe the structure of the international system after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, that ended the cold war, and thus, the international system's bipolarity structure)- will not survive for a long period of time, because: 1- it is not a stable structure of the system- according to the Defensive Realist Mearsheimer. And because 2- history resents "super power" –as Paul Kennedy suggests; since superpowers will gradually- in the long run- lose both of: their power and their ability to contemplate between their expansionist military ambitions and their available economical resources. Hence, sooner or later other powers will rise to compete with the existing superpowers in the international system. As a result, this competition will turn the international system from a unipolar into a multipolar one. All in all, a state's relative power – as explained by Paul Kennedy (1987)- is

⁸⁰ John Mearsheimer. "Better to be Godzilla than Bambi". *Foreign Policy*, No. 146. Jan. - Feb., 2005, pp. 47-48. <https://www.scribd.com/document/115209039/Mearsheimer-Better-to-Be-Godzilla-Than-Bambi>

affected by factors such as: urbanization versus population count, as well as steel production and power consumption versus arms production, and Gross National Product (GNP).

Moreover, to further elaborate on the theoretical issues tied to the inter reciprocal affect between change and movement in the international system, the following paragraphs will explain the most important real power transitions of this system, since the Westphalia treaty in 1648, till the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. This long political period, which had enormous effects on the current structure of the international system – at least according to the Realist Theorists, will be divided into four phases: the first between the years 1648 and 1789. The second from 1815 till 1914. The third from 1914 till 1945, and the last between 1945 and 1991.

The First phase, from 1648 till 1789:

This phase started with the agreement of Westphalia in 1648; which has put an end to an era of so called "religion related" wars in Europe (i.e. the 100 years' war and the 30 years' war); by an agreement stating that: each nation follows the religion of its king. Thus, establishing the idea of the "balance of power" as an effective way to maintain stability in the international

system, in which the "nation state" has risen to be a major player. However, this phase has ended in the start of the French revolution in 1789; which has emerged rather different concepts into the international system generally, and the European political system particularly, such as: liberty, equality, and brotherhood (Liberté, égalité et fraternité).

The Second Phase between 1815 and 1914:

This phase started by the assembly of the Vienna convention in 1815 in Europe, after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in the Napoleon wars. And according to this ally; Britain rose to be the major– hegemony- in the European continent – its region- and the major superpower in the international system. Hence, Britain controlled the international system in the nineteenth century. In contrast, the power of other –previous- superpowers (previous poles of the international system) declined, especially France and the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the international system's structure changed –accordingly- from a multipolar to a unipolar one; where the sole pole Britain, had –according to Realism's proximate causation- a domination urge; i.e. the urge to expand over other territories, implemented on ground by Imperialism. Consequently, Imperialism – fueled by the states' urges to: seek more power and to dominate other states- lead to both: power and interest (none ideological) struggles between this uni-pole and

other superpowers in the international system. Those struggles lead to the ignition of World War One in 1914, which was affected by the Realist Theory's conceptions- which then framed the system's structure - such as: expansion (domination / Imperialism) and the states' military power. Consequently, these struggles – characterized in WWI- have led to the rise of new superpowers in the system, such as: The United States (which has gone out of its self-put isolation); changing another time the system's structure from a unipolar –unstable structure- into a multi polar; more stable one.

The Third Phase: from 1914 till 1945

In this phase, a new International system structure was built on the remains of its precedent, as a consequence of the results of the First World War. And on the basis of the arrangements which were set by the 1919 Convention in Paris. War winning states- the allies; mainly France and Britain and the new rising power -the United States- rose as new Hegemons in the international system. Moreover, strains were put on the war defeated states, which are: Germany, Austria and the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Old Empires fell especially in Europe and Asia, and the Nation states rose as main players in the international system; especially after the establishment of the Nations League, on the fourteen principles of the

American President Woodrow Wilson. These principles included the right of the nations to decide their fates; which was the basis on which many European states- that were part of both the Austrian and the Ottoman empires- got their independence.

However, these post WWI arrangements seized to exist for two main reasons. First, this new international system's structure was multipolar, which is less stable and less durable than the bipolar system – according to Realism. Second, either the strains put on Germany were too loose; allowing it to regain its strength when Hitler took over the governance- and establishing a Nazi regime with dominating expansion ambition on the entire European continent- or these strains should not have been put at all; for they have resulted in the rise of aggressive and frustration feelings among some Germans. That is because both Germany and Italy thought their national pride was hurt; which resulted in the establishment of the Nazi and the Fascist regimes. Nonetheless, whatever the correct explanation is, one thing is a fact: Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy formed an ally that entered World War Two in 1945. This war has tipped the “power balance” of the international system, changing its structure from a multipolar – unstable- form into a bipolar –more- stable one, especially after the rise of two superpowers in the system: The United States and the Soviet Union, as two hegemonies in it.

The Fourth Phase: from 1945 till 1991

This phase was characterized by a Bipolar International System, which incubated both: a continuous arms race and an ideological (Capital-Communist) struggle between the two polar rivals of the international system at that time: The Western Camp lead by the USA, and the Eastern Camp lead by the Soviet Union. This struggle ignited-in that era-: mini wars, Proxy wars and some political crisis (such as: The Cuban Missile Crisis).

Nonetheless, this phase was in all means the most stable phase -in the modern history- of the international system. This is since it revolved around a long period of cautious stability that was later referred to as the Cold War, which many Political Scientists prefer to name: " the Era of the Long Peace"; to an extent that the Neo- Realist John Mearsheimer is certain that " we will soon miss the Cold War"⁸¹ in an article of his, that has the same title; especially the phase of peaceful coexistence and international détente.

⁸⁹ John Mearsheimer. "Better to be Godzilla than Bambi". *Foreign Policy*, No. 146. Jan. - Feb., 2005, P 49, <https://www.scribd.com/document/115209039/Mearsheimer-Better-to-Be-Godzilla-Than-Bambi>

Furthermore, many changes in the structure of the international system has taken place in this era, such as: the achievement of independence of many of the third world countries, the rising of many non-state political blocks in the international system (i.e.: regional and international organizations; such as the United Nations in 1945, that took the place of the League of the Nations), and the appearance of international and multi-national companies, liberation movements, and the expansion of the international system and power centers in the international system; to cover the outside of the European continent, mainly the north American continent).

Consequently, according to the Realist theory, the political history is nothing but a continuing egoistic and dominating struggle for continuous power and domination between the players of the international system. This broad conclusion has several ultimate and proximate causations that differ between Traditional Realists and Neo-Realists.

On one hand, Traditional Realists- such as: Hans Morgenthau, Thomas Hobbes and Niebuhr, explain that states seek power and expansion, or in other words states have an egoistic and dominating behaviour, because humans in particular, and therefore states, possess an *animus dominandi*. This means they seek power and get involve in struggles and wars because

human nature is fundamentally egoistic, and malignant and bad.⁸² For examples Hobbes thinks in his book *Leviathan* that it is a general inclination of all mankind to have a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, making a state of war; where humans live in continuous fear of violent death, a state where peace is staggered⁸³. Moreover, Hans Morgenthau believes that this inherent *animus dominandi* manifests itself in the desire to dominate others, i.e. other people and other states. The reasons for this *animus dominandi* is driven by the person's concerns of survival as well as the person's concern of achieving a controlling position among his/her fellows after his/her security and survival are secured,⁸⁴ and this lust for power would be satisfied only if the last became an object of his (her)

⁸² Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse Kappen (eds.), *International Relations theory and the End of the Cold war.*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995),161-167.

See also: Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1978), 4-15.

<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm>

⁸³ Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan Or the Matter, Forme and Power and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*, (UK, London: Andrew Crooke, 1651), 24.

<http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html> (digitalized book).

⁸⁴ Robert Jervis. "Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Study of International Politics - Sixtieth Anniversary, 1934-1994: The Legacy of Our Past". *Social Research*, Winter 1994. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_n4_v61/ai_15955163

domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that is, if he (she) became like God".⁸⁵ However, Morgenthau doesn't narrow this desire of power only to the individual, he like his fellow Traditional Realists, widen this concept to apply to all associations beginning from the family and continuing way up to the state.

Moreover, the other ultimate cause for the states' power seeking and dominating behaviour is a metaphysical one, expressed by the Traditional Realist Niebuhr, who suggests that Humans are *evil*, that's why -according to him- they seek to dominate others. And this demonic behavior manifests itself in a narcissistic self-love or *pride* that causes humans to seek more power to be secure or to enhance any previously obtained security , followed by a tendency to enhance one's position in nature or society; driven by a feeling of inferiority , insufficient self-significance, mixed with a feeling of one self's insufficient respect or insufficient fear among one's peers (i.e. family, society, state ...etc.)⁸⁶ . Moreover, this behaviour, according to Traditional Realists, such as Hans Morgenthau is fueled by the

⁸⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 4-15.

<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm>

⁸⁶ Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse Kappen (eds.), *International Relations theory and the End of the Cold war*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995),155.

states' "animus dominandi", that is they seek power because human nature is fundamentally egoistic and malignant. Thus, according to the Traditional Realists, conflict and war occur because human nature is bad.

Consequently, according to the Realist school of international relations, the human history in general, manifests that the struggle between the powers of the international system is continuous, and that these powers always seek domination and control over the system; in a manner that the balance of power is only possible but through periodical struggles; mainly "War". Thus, when a current structure of the international system fails to achieve stability- especially if this structure was either unipolar or multipolar- it loses one of the most important justifications of its continuity, making it essential – as a result- to disintegrate and / or destroy it putting it in a "recycling" process; in which a main component is a superpower war or at least a war with an international dimension.

To sum up, The Realism School of International Relations believes that the human history is but a continuous domination struggle between the powers of the international system; in a manner that change and transition- in this system- are only possible through: periodical struggles (wars) to affect and to rearrange the "balance of power" of this system. Thus, when a current structure of the system is unable to achieve stability nor realize the interests

of the most powerful players in it – these players start demanding its change through a “recycling mechanism”; which consists of: a phase of an international war, followed by a phase of international stability; resulting from the power redistribution in the international system, in a manner that satisfies the war winning states. This mechanism explains the occurrence of international wars, such as: WWI, WWII and the Cold War (which was international due to the multiple international players involved in it, and due to its international consequences and effects; mainly in every structure of the international system that preceded its occurrence). Hence, the International System’s structure and its “Balance of Power” –both- change every time there is a need to rearrange the International Relations’ current status quo; through an equation that answers to the rising: needs, ambitions and interests of the most powerful International Players of the International System; that results from: political, economic and military developments in the international political arena. For example, the current structure of the international system in the 21st century is a cumulative result of the changes and transitions that historical critical incidents has had on the system since the Westphalia Treaty in 1648, followed by WWI in 1914, WWII in 1945 and the Cold War (which has seen the rise of two major poles in the system, which are: the USA and the Soviet Union, that ended in 1990 after the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union). Consequently, according to The Realism School of International Relations, the only mechanism of

change in the International System is: the "balance of power"; that fuels the cycle of: war, transition and stability. Moreover, it is worth noting that - according to this school- stability does not necessarily mean peace but it could be widening to include it.




Figure # 4: The International System's Dynamics and Change Mechanism according to The Realism School of International Relations.

2.2- The Liberalism Cold War Literature between: 1979-1991

Liberalism is a political theory that is established on the natural goodness of human beings. It raises the importance and the autonomy of the individual. Thus, Liberalism concentrates on the empowerment of the individual by advocating for civil and political liberties, as well as through promoting the "by law governance" (the social contract); to ensure the individual's safety from arbitral authority.

However, Liberalism -as an International Relations Theory- grasps the basic Liberal philosophy; and adds to it a wide variety of political thoughts; ranging from: the "Wilsonian Idealism", to the thoughts of Neo- liberalism and the "Democratic Peace". Nonetheless, the basic core assumptions of most liberal schools of politics remain mostly the same, which are: firstly, that the states are – unlike Realism- one of various players in the International System; mainly "International Institutions", such as: The United Nations' Transnational Corporations and the IMF...etc. These institutions, according to Liberalism, have a prominent role in the stability mechanism of the International System. This role is conducted by: preventing cheating between states, along with granting and regulating cooperation between them in this System.

Neo- Liberalism (or Neo- liberal Institutionalism) goes further by giving a greater importance to the role of "International Institutions" in granting the *stability* of the International System; through: coordinating "international cooperation", applying certain institutional mechanisms and bargaining. These institutionally applied mechanisms help greatly in undermining the foundations of the military interests of the states of the International System, and in enhancing their eagerness towards absolute gains; through the prospects of cooperation. This is unlike Realism that focuses on the relative gains of the states of the International system; through the potential of inter- state conflict. Robert Keohane- the mostly identified scholar with Neo-liberal Institutionalism- describes International Institutions as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations"⁸⁷. In addition, Neo liberals undermine "conflict" (i.e. struggle, war) as sole means of movement and change in the International System; stating that there are more efficient ways and more countervailing forces that regulate inputs and outputs of the International System, such as: repeated interactions that draw states into cooperation. Therefore, unlike Realism, the International System –according to Liberalism- does not live in chaos; but rather in regulated

⁸⁷ Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse Kappen (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 161.

interactions between the players of the international system. These regulated interactions help in preventing cheating; since International Institutions enforce rules against the players of the International System who cheat.

On another level, they were the "Liberal Forecasters" who had already opened- during the era of the Cold War- a debate about the long-term prognosis of the Soviet Union's superpower status; stating that its "*continued economic stagnation has generated considerable speculation about a Soviet decline from superpower status*".⁸⁸ Nonetheless, Harvard scholar Kurt M. Campbell suggested that although there has been a debate about this issue in the liberal stream, during that era, the discussions of the potential results of such a Soviet decline remained unelaborated.⁸⁹ Moreover, a potential Soviet decline, according to Liberalism's literature during the Cold War era, would not have increased American security nor would it have reduced risks of a nuclear war⁹⁰.

⁸⁸ "Consequences of Soviet Decline: A Flattering Economy and a strong military could be a Volatile Mix". *The Futurist*, January - February 1989, 39.

36 "Consequences of Soviet Decline", *The Futurist*, Ibid, p 39.

⁹⁰ Security Studies and The Fall of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, what is interesting is that the Liberal school of International Relations, has succeeded to state possible causes of a Soviet power deterioration, which were: firstly, its reluctant and weakening domestic economy; which made the USSR more and more dependent on foreign food supplies; as a result of the shortage of many of its natural resources⁹¹. Secondly, ethnic conflicts within the Soviet's rim land; since the USSR had extended to a level that it contained under its wing many ethnic groups, as well as little former republics, that opposed to the Soviet rule⁹². Hence, these groups refused to surrender under the flag of communism; especially in Eastern and Central Europe.

In addition, Campbell suggested that if Gorbachev's plan was to "enhance his country's domestic economy", he will have no choice but to cut back his country's commitment towards the Third World; because these allies, in that part of the world- according to Campbell- are already poor and suffer from

⁹¹ Teodor Shanin. "Soviet Economic Crisis: The Most Immediate Stumbling Block and the Next Step." *Monthly Review*, October 1989, 20.
<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002150050>.

⁹². "Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe Under Gorbachev". *Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Center for the Study of Intelligence*, May 1988.

conflicts with their regional rivals as well. Therefore, they could be simply abandoned⁹³.

Moreover, Campbell did not forget to stress upon the necessity and the significance of the reduction of the Soviet arsenal; as the most convenient way to ensure a safe and a manageable transition from a bipolar world to a one with the Soviets in decline. This is because – according to Campbell- a domestically failed Soviet Union might launch a sudden nuclear attack on its rival the United States. Thus, he concludes that "*The larger the gap between Soviet military power and domestic economic failure, the more American security will be jeopardized by the possibility of a Soviet-initiated conflict.*"⁹⁴

Moreover, by observing the Liberal school literature of the Cold War, it is crucial to *stress* upon the fact, that although liberal scholars suggested a

⁹³ "Comrade Gorbachev's Leap in the Dark." *National Review*, April 21, 1989, 15.

<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002145073>.

⁹⁴ Teodor Shanin. "Soviet Economic Crisis: The Most Immediate Stumbling Block and the Next Step." *Monthly Review*, October 1989, 21.

<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002150050>.

decline in the Soviet Union's economy⁹⁵; due to the exaggerated Soviet military expenses and because of its aid to the USSR's allies in the Third World, yet the liberal school- especially its branch of security studies- was stuck with the deductive notion that any real collapse of the USSR will not happen peacefully, but through a nuclear war; targeted towards its rival the USA ⁹⁶.

From the same logic, Sewern Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (1988) noticed an authority crisis in the Soviet Union. They stated that there was speculation in the West that patronage and "Clientelism" were declining; because many interest groups in the USSR were gaining more and more power, that the decision-making in the Soviet politics was becoming consensual. To add to this, the power of the General Secretary was in decline since the leadership of Brezhnev.

⁹⁵ Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse Kappen (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 161.

⁹⁶ Sharanski, Natan and Ron Deamer. "A lowering of Arms: Few in the West Expected the Soviet Union to Collapse". *National Review*, December 7, 2004. (no page numbers available since the article is digitalized)

<http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/sharansky200412070832.asp>

In addition, Bialer and Mandelbaum (1988) thought that Gorbachev's political strategy; implemented after his arrival to power in 1985, was of no use, or in other words; it did not come up with anything new and beneficial to the USSR, but rather to his own personal interests. This is because it aimed at: the strengthening of Gorbachev's leadership by weakening his opponents' power, the creation of a strong constituency; so that his program would be irreversible, and both the revival and the increase of the regime's legitimacy. Moreover, they believed this Soviet General Secretary's policy was inconsistent and full of contradictions, most important of which, are:

Firstly, that Gorbachev was forced to use the old decision making tools used in the Soviet regime to create new ones. Therefore, his program was in constant danger of collapse. For example, the "Glasnost" was carried out by the old centralized media institutions; which were in support of Gorbachev's decisions and policies, no matter how wrong they were.

Secondly, that the new objectives pursued by the Perestroika had to co-exist with the old ones; making them no different than each other. This proved that this new strategy is not at all new, nor innovative.

Thirdly, although Gorbachev's program was to enable the Soviet political authority listen better to the moods and to the will of the Soviet peoples, and to communicate more efficiently with them, he did not really intend to

divide the political authority's power; but rather to regain that which his predecessors have already lost.

As a result, although one might give Bialer and Mandelbaum the credit for "predicting" the fall of the Soviet Union, in their book that was published back in 1988, or at least some aspects of its collapse; yet it is important to assert that in it they only aimed at defining and forming some sort of critique to Gorbachev's reform policies, and elaborating how these policies did not have elements and aspects of consistency in them. In other words, they were only "predicting" the failure, or "the collapse" of Gorbachev's policies in particular (mainly his reform policies), and they were not "predicting" the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union as a whole political entity, nor were they foreseeing its fall from the rank of a super power status- in a bipolar International Political System. However, Bailer and Mandelbaum should – to be fair- credited for helping the post Cold War International Relations analysts better explain the multiple-complex causes of the sudden – yet explainable- disintegration and fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This was by foreseeing and explaining the failure of Gorbachev's reform policies of the USSR; due to the reasons discussed above, mainly: his use of old policies to implement new -"supposedly" USSR political regime- reforming ones.

Nonetheless, though the Soviet Union had some economical crisis, during the Cold War Era; due to the criticized Gorbachev's reform policies, yet most liberal scholars thought that this crisis was minimal and would not affect the status quo of the Soviet Union -as a pole- in the International System. Kimball (2004) notes that although Liberal Post-Cold War literature explained that the "the Soviet Union was doomed to crumble", and insisted that the Soviet Communist Regime suffered from "chronic economic problems and predictably collapsed", yet none of them thought - at the time of the Cold War era- that this Soviet economical crisis would be a cause of a peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Communist regime as a whole. Even Seweryn Bialer -himself- stressed out, in an article of his own in the journal of Foreign Affairs, in 1982, that: "*The Soviet Union is not now nor will it be during the next decade in the throes of a true systemic crisis, for it boasts enormous unused reserves of political and social stability*". Zbigniew Brzezinski -however- suggested- during the Cold War- that there were five possible scenarios facing the future of the USSR: either a successful "pluralization", or a protracted crisis, or a renewed stagnation, or a coupe, or finally the explicit "collapse" of the Soviet regime. Yet, he assured that the Soviet regime's collapse was a much remote possibility than the possibility of a renewed stagnation of the regime. Moreover, he added that some sort of a Communist regime will endure in the Soviet Union until the year 2017. And most importantly, he stated that any future

USSR collapse would not be peaceful, but rather turbulent. Again, this brings us back to the conclusion that: no theorists, scholars or researchers from the Liberal School of International Relations "predicted" the peaceful collapse of the USSR, as a whole political entity, nor as a superpower pole of the International System. Evermore, the only deterioration they suspected to occur was to the USSR 's economy; which this regime would be able to overcome, revive and re-build later on, according to the Liberalism literature of the era of the Cold War.⁹⁷.

Furthermore, any upcoming economic or social collapse of the Soviet regime was excluded by the Liberal theorists in the Cold War era. For example, the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted that he "*found more goods in the shops, more food in the markets, more cars on the street ... those in the United States who think the Soviet Union is on the verge of economic and social collapse" are "wishful thinkers who are only kidding themselves."*⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), 107-110.

⁹⁸ Quoted by: Roger Kimball. "What is an 'intelligent' person?". *The New Criterion*, June 13, 2004. <http://www.newcriterion.com/posts.cfm/what-is-intelligent-person-3470>

Evermore, many liberalists assured that the Soviet system is succeeding economically; even making a great material progress in the mid-eighties. This statement is evident, according to the distinguished liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith; who wrote -in 1984- that this could be seen "*from both the statistics and from the general urban scene, ... one could see it in the appearance of solid well-being of the people on the streets, and the general aspect of restaurants, theaters, and shops. Partly, the Russian system succeeds because, in contrast with the Western industrial economies, it makes full use of its manpower.*"⁹⁹

From the same Liberalism optimistic point of view about the Cold War status quo of the Soviet Union, Paul Samuelson (1985)- a liberal Nobel laureate in economics- praised the Soviet command and control

⁹⁹ Edwin Meese III, *With Reagan: the Inside Story*, (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 1992), 165-166. Accessed from:
http://books.google.co.il/books?id=wU4go_hAB60C&pg=PA163&lpg=PA163&dq=John+Kenneth+Galbraith+cold+war+1984&source=bl&ots=YnS60VndCp&sig=miK12W4X0uCFvkUoSUM78R4WrnY&hl=iw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result#PPR15,M1

economy¹⁰⁰, and had no doubt in the efficacy of the Soviet planning system; stating that “*what counts is results, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet planning system has been a powerful engine for economic growth... The Soviet model has surely demonstrated that a command economy is capable of mobilizing resources for rapid growth.*”¹⁰¹

In his column, in the New York Times in June 1985, James Reston dismissed the possibility of the demise of Communism; on the basis that both: The Soviet problems and its various crisis were no different than those of the United States'. And he stated that clearly "*the ideologies of Communism, Socialism and Capitalism are all in trouble.*"¹⁰²

Evermore, liberal economists -as late as 1989; when the Soviet Union's economical crisis was at its peek- thought that the Soviet economy was in good shape, and that it was heading towards a good future. Furthermore,

¹⁰⁰ Natan Sheranski and Ron Demer, *The Case for Democracy : the Power of Freedom to overcome Tyranny and Terror*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). (digitalized book ; AKA online book version; page number not available).

¹⁰¹ John Derbyshire, “Unpleasant Truths”, National Review Online, August 2 , 2002.

¹⁰² Edwin Meese III. 1992. Ibid. P: 167.

they asserted that the Soviet economical growth was accelerating and increasing. Lester Thurow (1989), an MIT liberal economist, stressed out - in the last year of the existence of the Soviet regime - that the remarkable Soviet experience suggests that a "command economy" can accelerate the process of economic growth; adding that the achievements of the Soviet Economy are comparable to those of the United States'. And from a same perspective, Strobe Talbott, ridiculed the Regan administration's policy of "rolling Back" the Soviet domination of eastern Europe; for it was misguided and unrealistic. 103

To sum up, liberal scholars in the era of the Cold War, failed to "predict" the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union for several important reasons:

Firstly, they were biased, as well as blinded by their field's branch of Security Studies; which stressed upon the great military power and armament; especially the nuclear armament of the Soviet Union¹⁰⁴, which- according to Liberalism- stated an undeniable threat to the security of the

¹⁰³ Edwin Meese III. 1992. Ibid. P: 168.

¹⁰⁴ "The Soviets Weapon Industry: An Overview, and Intelligence Report" . *The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/ Center for the Study of Intelligence* , September 1986.

United States¹⁰⁵. And although the Economical branch of Liberalism suggested a decline in the Soviet economy -under Gorbachev's leadership; which could be mainly seen in the CIA's declassified 1977-1989 intelligence analysis¹⁰⁶- this Liberalism Security Studies' hypothesis suggested that the Soviet Union will endure its economical crisis, and would not fall; at least not in the near future¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰⁵ Most Liberalism Research in the Cold War era was conducted by American scholars, especially funded by the Ford foundation and the CIA. Thus, it is important to understand that this focus on the security of the USA might also have come from feelings of national pride, and fear of threat to national security.

¹⁰⁶ "Gorbachev: Steering the USSR into the 1990s, an Intelligence Assessment", *Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/ Center for the Study of Intelligence*, July 1987.

"Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects". *Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/ Center for the Study of Intelligence*, July 1977.

"Organization and Management in the Soviet Economy: The Ceaseless Search Panaceas", *Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/ Center for the Study of Intelligence*, December 1977.

¹⁰⁷ "Gorbachev: Steering the USSR into the 1990s, an Intelligence Assessment", *Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/ Center for the Study of Intelligence*, July 1987.

Secondly, however, the Liberalism Cold War Literature elaborated that if the USSR would eventually collapse; its fall would have roots in the Soviet economical and expansion crisis. And most importantly, this fall would not be realized but through a military conflict with the USA; that could expand into a nuclear World War Three; in a "Star Wars Style"¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁹. This is because the Soviet regime- according to this IR school- would find itself cornered by its economical crisis; to an extent that it initiates a war on its rival the USA¹¹⁰. Moreover, what further established the notion of war -in Liberalism literature during the Cold War era, as the only manner through which the Soviet Union would ever fall- is that the rather cooperative and peaceful concepts of Institutional Liberalism; mainly its concept of

¹⁰⁸ Tom Lovell, "The Fall of the Soviet Union: Whys and Wherefores". *A Personal prologue presented to The Raleigh Tavern Philosophical Society*.

¹⁰⁹ Edward Rhodes. *Power and Madness: The Logic of Nuclear Coercion*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 51
<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=26089477>.

¹¹⁰ " The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends Since 1965 and Prospects for the 1980s, an Intelligence Assessment", *Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/ Center for the Study of Intelligence*, April 1981.

Collective Security, were narrowed to be –solely- applied on to the interactions between each rival and its ally camp¹¹¹, not on to the interactions between the states of the International System as a whole. This made it rather improbable to achieve peace between the two rival camps, and their leading poles: the USA and the USSR. This lack of cooperation between the two rivals; further asserted on the notion of war rather than on the notions of peace and inter states cooperation- as a tool of change towards a more pacific and a further stable structure of the International System¹¹².

Thirdly, although some Liberalists debated a potential decline in the economical status of the Soviet Union, during the Cold War era, yet this debate was mostly originated from the Liberalists' fascination with their Liberal theory of International Relations, and with its core assumptions such as: freedom, individualism and democracy; that they thought of their theory as the only universal theory of International Relations which could

¹¹¹ Brian Crozier. "The Unpacified Pacific." *National Review*, January 27, 1989, 23.
<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002142793>.

¹¹² John Mearsheimer. "The False Promise of International Institutions". *International Security*. March 13, 1994.

be applicable to all: phenomena, situations and observations in the International System¹¹³. Thus, most Liberalists -during the Cold War era- thought that any other theory or school of International Relations -and consequently any other player, i.e. the USSR and its communist thought, that adopts any other International Relations Theory- would eventually either: weaken, decline, cease to exist or not have any major impact on the main aspects of the International System, mainly politically.

However, this "universal implementation" concept, adopted –widely- by most International Relations scholars- was critiqued by the behavioural scholars of International Politics; who see that the exportation and the implementation of each theory's thought and fields¹¹⁴ such as: administration and politics, on all of the states of the International System,

¹¹³ this behaviour of the Liberalism scholars mimics the behaviour of the Radicalism scholars, as well as the Realism scholars; mainly in their biased behaviour towards each theory's core assumptions and conceptions; making it hard for them to “predict” any change, nor credit any change mechanism outside of their own theories': concepts, hypothesis, core assumptions and “prediction” methodologies.

¹¹⁴ i.e. the Liberal Theory of International Relations, that was widely adopted by the USA administration in the Cold War era , was accordingly named the American School of International Relations.

that adopt different political thoughts, has faced and will face major setbacks; mainly that: the International System constitutes of many different players with many different theories and thoughts. Thus, having a universal theory to explain the behaviour of each player, or at least be applicable on the phenomena and on the outcomes of each International interaction is impossible. Hence, from here, rises the urgent need of cooperation between all of the schools within the Theory of International Relations in the process of: observing, analyzing, understanding and "predicting" the outcomes of any future behaviours and / or interactions between the states of the International System. Moreover, this reason – along with other reasons like: the rising of new research tools and new methodology in other Social Sciences and the fear of Political Science's failure to follow up with these developments, along with the failure of the traditional descriptive methodology in Political Science in "predicting" future outcomes and outputs of the International System, such as: the prognosis of political movements, for example: Fascism and Communism...etc. As well as the gap between theory and on ground practice of politics -were the main factors that lead to the establishment of the "Cross Cultural Studies" or "Holocultural Studies" after World War Two, as well as the directing of more research resources, (i.e. from the Ford

Foundation), towards research that uses Behaviouralism as its methodology¹¹⁵.

Therefore, it is safe to state that the researchers of the Liberalism school of International Relations -like their fellow Realism scholars- were biased to their theories' false assumption that: war is the only methodology of change in the structure of the International System.

And the case of the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union - without war and without a wide Eastern Europe, democracy demanding, revolution against the Soviet Communist regime- has clearly proven this fact which is that: both Realism's and Liberalism's core assumptions – especially their literature during the Cold War era- was nearsighted; and consequently blinded them from realizing the fact that change could happen peacefully, and as a result of other complex reasons than just simple military ones. That is because the International System in general and states in particular; consist of complex social and political regimes that contain diverse: social, political, economical, psychological and anthropological aspects that affect their stability; especially a state's long term viability and longevity.

¹¹⁵ Talal Dahi and others, *Muqaddima fil Tahleel As-Siyasi Al- Qiyasi :An Introduction to Standard Political Analysis*, (S.A.: Riyadh: King Saud University Press, 2004), 5-7

Consequently, all of the reasons above urge upon the cooperation between the Liberal school of International Relations and other sciences, mainly: Social Sciences, Anthropology, Psychology and Biology (since both of the International System and its states resemble -in a way or another- the human being in their development and life cycle¹¹⁶) for the further understanding of those complex sectors that the International System as well as its states consist of.

2.3- The Radicalism Cold War Literature between: 1979-1991

The Radical theory of International Relations, particularly in this thesis, refers to Communism; or as other scholars like to call it: the "Revolutionary Proletarian Socialism" or "Marxism"; which is a combination of a political and a socio- economical philosophy, that is based on the concept of historical dialectics. Its origins are founded in the writings of Friederich Engles and Karl Marx; particularly in the Communist Manifesto published in 1848 by Marx, and in the principles of Communism by Engels. In its analysis of history and politics, Communism greatly depends on class

¹¹⁶ Talal Dahi and others, *Muqaddima fil Tahleel As-Siyasi Al- Qiyasi : An Introduction to Standard Political Analysis*, (S.A.: Riyadh: King Saud University Press, 2004), 10-12.

analysis and economic and material forces. Thus, Communism asserts that change in the International System (the change mechanism) occurs from the inherent contradictions in each historical era; that will consequently lead to the rise of a new dominant class (i.e. new dominant state / pole).

The main goals of *The Communist Manifesto* were to focus on *class struggle* and to motivate the common people to riot. The Communist government (i.e. the state) -according to this manifesto- is to control every vital aspect of a Communist state; aiming at destroying the upper class. Thus, freeing the lower class from its tyranny; which is a classical act of rebellion against extreme poverty of the lower class. Therefore, the state controls many fields and sectors of the country, such as: property; and forbids its privatization, and dismisses the rights of inheritance. Moreover, it controls: education, industry, agriculture, communication, transportation and the press.¹¹⁷

However, the Radicalism's Cold War theorists – like their fellow Realism and Liberalism theorists- also failed to "predict" the peaceful fall of the USSR. Nonetheless, there is –apparently- a wide consensus midst most of the Radicalism post Cold War literature –

¹¹⁷ "Communism - Marxism & The Communist Manifesto". All about Philosophy.com, accessed October 22, 2006, <http://www.allaboutphilosophy.org/communism.htm>

mainly post Structural Marxists- on the explanation of the reasons, or in other words, the process that might have affected the position of the Soviet Union, as a pole, in the International System, in the late eighties of the twentieth century; and finally disintegrating it in 1991; an act which they call the coupe.

Most of this post Cold War Radicalism literature is convinced that the process of both: economic and political decline of the Soviet Union started in the Cold War years, even while huge gains and achievements still seemed possible for the USSR. The main causes for this economic-political decline lies – according to this literature- in two factors. Firstly, the continuing process of the marginalization of the weakening Communist parties, in the leading imperialist states. This happened because these parties have lost their authoritative position amongst the working movements and finally split, and were –consequently- overtaken by new social movements; turning their back on the Soviet Union and –overall- on Communism. This marginalization process started from the western countries and passed through Eastern Europe, to the western republics under the USSR governance, until “the *mighty Soviet Red Army fell in a heap before a small band of disparate oppositionists*

gathered outside the Russian Parliament." ¹¹⁸ Secondly, economical decline because of the Capitalist Imperialist overflow to the USSR, from the western countries.

Radicalists like Orthodox Marxists, Neo- Marxists, as well as "dependency" theorists, were too busy fighting: Liberal, Capital and Imperialist thoughts, and too self confident about Communism's core assumptions, to consider anti- radical forces that might drag them down. However, a recent Trotsky book critique by Alan Woods, shows that Leon Trotsky had already warned early -in 1936- in his work " The Revolution Betrayed", (after providing a well elaborated analysis of Stalinism from a Marxist point of view), that "*the Bureaucracy was placing the nationalized planned economy and the Soviet Union in danger*" ¹¹⁹. And though his fellow Marxists ridiculed him at that time; while praising the Stalinism teachings, none of them were even

¹¹⁸ Andy Blunden, *Stalinism: its Origin and Future*, Electronically full text published book on the Marxists Internet Archive Collective, 1993),
<http://www.marxists.org/subject/stalinism/origins-future/index.htm>

³⁴ Alan Woods, " A Revolution Betrayed: A Marxist Masterpiece", June 06, 2001. *Trotsky.net*. http://www.trotsky.net/revolution_betrayed.html

Ted Grant, *Russia :From Revolution to Counter-Revolution*, (UK: London: Wellred Books), Publishing date not available, since the book is digitalized, accessed 13 October 2007,
<http://www.marxist.com/russiabook.htm>

able to provide a Marxist analysis of the collapse of the USSR, nonetheless "predict" its happening. Trotsky stressed out that the Soviet Union was stuck in a transitional phase between Socialism on one hand, and Capitalism on the other. He was not either in favor of Stalin's views of "Socialism in a one country", nor of the Soviet model of state. Nonetheless, he put two possible scenarios of the future of the USSR: either Communism succeeds and spreads to the rest of the world; converting all states into Socialism, or Communism will not succeed further than the USSR; isolating the Soviet state in a Capitalist world. And because it will be unable to challenge the entire Capitalist world; it will convert itself to Capitalism¹²⁰. Nonetheless, Trotsky never "predicted" this reversion to occur peacefully.

However, to be fair, some Radicalists warned -before and during the Cold War era- about the declining of Communism; as a result of the Capitalist influence from the West. Nonetheless, none of them even considered that some of these declining factors might origin from the Soviet Communist regime itself. Andy Blunden (1993), states in his book: "Stalinism: its

¹²⁰ Alan Woods, " A Revolution Betrayed: A Marxist Masterpiece", June 06, 2001.

Trotsky.net. http://www.trotsky.net/revolution_betrayed.html

Origin and Future", a typical summary of the Radicalist explanation of the coup of the Soviet Union; which took place because:

The twin forces of the counter-revolutionary, anti-communist warfare waged by imperialism against the Soviet Union and its supporters and allies, together with the conservative and bureaucratic leadership of the Communist International, brought about the gradual diminution of the influence of the Communist Parties and the Soviet Union itself, and the decline of the Soviet economy which not only failed to "catch up and overtake" imperialism, but gradually fell further and further behind.

Furthermore, Vladimir Lenin - (unlike Joseph Stalin, who asserted that Socialism would be successful in Russia without the help of a more advanced state)- tied the fate of the Soviet Communist regime, since the early days of the Russian Revolution, with the success of Communism in Western Europe; particularly in Germany. This is because –according to him- Communism needed an industrial power to support it, for Marxism is the ideology of an "industrial republic (communism)"; while Russia in the revolution days was too agricultural to act as a pillar of a Socialist economy on its own. According to Lenin, Soviet Russia would be- without a Socialist

West- full of "red flags everywhere, but no real socialism."¹²¹ From the same point of view, some Marxists warned that "the isolation of the revolution led to its internal degeneration, the phenomenon we call Stalinism"¹²². While others, warned from the Soviet economic crisis. However, *none* of them thought it would continue for the long run. This common assumption was popular not only amongst Radicalists, but also amongst CIA analysts, as well as amongst Realist and Liberal scholars, during the Cold War era.

Nonetheless, according to some Sovietologists who tried to explain the failure of Communism to notice the Soviet coupe (i.e. Ballen), data and statistics regarding the Soviet economy during the Cold War, especially in the mid eighties of the twentieth century, did not -at that time- reflect well the real worsening situation of the Soviet economy. This is since this data was: firstly, an "aggregate economic" data, and secondly, the bureaucratic

¹²¹ Lenin's *Collected Works*, 4th Edition, Volume 3, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 21-608. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1899/devel/index.htm>

¹²² Andy Blunden, *Stalinism: its Origin and Future*, (an electronically full text published book on the Marxists Internet Archive Collective, 1993), <http://www.marxists.org/subject/stalinism/origins-future/index.htm>

planning methodologies were deductive and directed, as well as mainly focused on the quantity of the economical crisis. This means that this economical data focused –solely- on quantitative statistics of: growth figure and GNP of the Soviet Union, which seemed fine at that time. Moreover, those statistics showed that–except for WWII years- the Soviet Union's economy grew faster than its rival the USA's economy; at least till the mid seventies, according to *The Left business observer*.

Table # 7: The Soviet Union's growth figures (per cent per annum) from 1929-1988 according to "the Left Observer":

period	USSR	US
1929 – 1940:	4.5	2.2
1941 – 1944:	-2.4	16.0
1945 – 1960:	6.5	1.5
1961 – 1965:	5.0	4.5
1966 – 1975:	4.0	1.5
1976 – 1988:	2.0	6.7

Meanwhile, in reality, the real Soviet Union's economical crisis was qualitative in its nature, in both: the stagnation afflicting it- in comparison to an expansion in major Capitalist economies- and in

the imbalance between quantities rather than in the aggregate.¹²³ Furthermore, those quantitative statistics did not take into account the fact that the USSR's industry absorbed -at that time- a greater part of its economical output in its domestic production process; consuming more energy and further raw material -per unit from that same output- in comparison to its equivalent in the advanced Capitalist countries (i.e. the USA)¹²⁴. Thus, by the mid of the nineteen eighties of the last century, conducted statistics clearly showed that the Soviet economy was dooming. Meanwhile, no scientific research in the fields of: Radicalism, or even: Realism, Liberalism- or any other school of the Theory of International Relations- in the Cold War era- gave great importance to the declining Soviet economy. On the contrary, all of those schools' Cold War Era research was focused on analyzing the statistics- in hand- as just an economical crisis that will not take long to resolve, or at least would not be the reason of any future peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union. Hence, as their peer International Relations

¹²³ Andy Blunden, *Stalinism: its Origin and Future*, (an electronically full text published book on the Marxists Internet Archive Collective, 1993), <http://www.marxists.org/subject/stalinism/origins-future/index.htm>

¹²⁴ Andy Blunden: 1993, Ibid.

theorists, Communists made the same biased mistake; which is not the lack of data or statistics in hand, but rather analyzing and interpreting this data in hand in a: wrong, insufficient and a biased manner. This is mostly because they were blinded by their school's wrong core assumptions of the mechanisms of future changes in the International System. Thus, all International Relations theories mistakenly assumed - in the Cold war era, and the majority of them, still assume till recent date- that any future change in the International System would be solely through "war" (struggle), ignoring the efficient change mechanism through "pacifism" and "cooperation".

Thus, it is important for all of the schools of the Theory of International Relations to greatly account for "Peace and Cooperation" as more efficient and ethical mechanisms of change and transition in the International System, rather than "war" (struggle). This is especially true since Pacifism is far less costly than struggle: humanly, economically, financially, military and socially...etc.

Table # 8: The growth rate (per cent per annum) of labour productivity, according to official Soviet data, in comparison with CIA figures for labour productivity and per capita GNP at real prices:

period	labour productivity	per capita GNP
1966 – 1970	6.8 [3.2]	3.0
1971 – 1975	4.6 [2.0]	4.0
1976 – 1980	3.3 [1.4]	3.0
1981 – 1983	3.3 [1.7]	2.0

To sum up, it is crucial to note that, like other schools of the Theory of International Relations, although Radicalism scholars -during the Cold War- noticed and warned from the capital flow into Eastern Europe, as well as from the dangers the economical crisis brought upon the USSR, none of them anticipated that a decline of the USSR would be *peaceful*. They- on the contrary- stated two scenarios that would occur as an answer to the Capitalist flow. Firstly, either the revolution would revive itself and spread Communism all over the world; specifically, all over Europe. Or secondly,

there would be a superpower rival armed clash between the USSR and the USA; as a result of the rising tension between the two hegemonies. However, most of them were sure that both: "the Communist effect" and "the revolutionary thoughts" would sooner or later survive the "Capitalist flow". And that the working class would rise and thrive again¹²⁵. That is because they believed -as Lenin clearly stated in his speech to the Russian congress- that: *"In Russia the immense majority of the peasants have said enough of this game with the capitalists. We shall march with the workers. They will understand that their salvation is with the workers. We shall set up workers control of industry. We are going to build the socialist society."*¹²⁶ Accordingly, any decline of the Soviet Communist regime - Radicalism asserted- would only be in the failure of Gorbachev to maintain the thoughts: of Leninism, Stalinism and Marxism; the thoughts that

¹²⁵ Tom Lovell, "The Reasons of the fall of U.S.S.R. by The Fall of the Soviet Union: Whys and Wherefores", (A paper presented to the Raleigh Tavern Philosophical Society: A Personal Prologue. Publishing date not available).
<http://www.raleightavern.org/lovell.htm>


¹²⁶ Chris Gaffney, "Prologue: From Independence to Power: The Workers Movement from 1848 to 1917", *an electronically full text published article on the Marxists Internet Archive Collective*, 1993.
<http://www.marxists.org/subject/stalinism/origins-future/index.htm>

contributed in the rising of the USSR as a superpower, and afterwards as a pole in a bipolar International System.

Consequently, as stated at the beginning of this section, Radicalists - during the Cold War Era - were fascinated by the Communist ideology and by its ability to rejuvenate itself; asserting that it was the best ideology to dominate the International System, to a great extent that they never considered its "peaceful" decline in the near future.

Chapter Four

Conclusions and Recommendations



The continuous change and transition of the structure of the International System in general, and this system's unnoticed change –by the schools of the International Relation's Theory- in the era of the Cold War- in particular, presents continuous challenges to both: The Political Science and the Theory of International Relations; questioning their reliability as real sciences. This is because a major component of any science is its ability to "predict" *change* in a given phenomenon, or at least to discern a change course and / or a change trend from given variables of a certain phenomena. And in reality, the IR's as well as the Political Science's failure to notice the changing course of the policies of the Soviet regime, as well as their failure to observe the falling course of the Soviet Union, and its final peaceful disintegration in 1991, was a slap on the face of these branches of Social Science.

Hence, this thesis' hypothesis proving methodology has benefited from the literature assessing method, which is the study of all of the Cold War International Relations' Literature between the years 1979 and 1991; to prove that none of the schools of the Theory of International Relations were able to "predict" the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union. Thus, a brief "state of art" in this thesis has demonstrated that the major branches of the Theory of International Relations, in the Cold War, mainly: Realism, Liberalism and Radicalism, were unable to anticipate nor "predict" the peaceful collapse of

the USSR, although it had certain ideological, political, developmental and economical dilemmas threatening its existence. Nonetheless, it was clear that some branches of the IR Theory -that use Natural Sciences', i.e. mathematical, related hypotheses and methodology in their "predictions' process"- were able, to a degree, to "predict" the decline of the Soviet Economy.

Furthermore, a thorough literature assessing of the Cold War's literature in the fields of: International Relations, Politics, Socio-Economics, Forecasting and Intelligence; prevailed two major factors which are the causations of this literature's failure to "predict" the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union; bearing in mind that many forecasters admit that intelligence and prediction failures are observed almost in all fields of forecasting whenever 'big' or 'unusual' events occur"; particularly when such events occur infrequently¹²⁷. Thus, these major factors could be categorized by: model inadequacy, and non- model failures that include: theoretical (forecaster) bias, data interpreting process and forecaster preferences (Stekler, 2003).

¹²⁷ H. O. Stekler, "Improving our Ability to Predict the Unusual Event". *Department of Economics, the George Washington University*, 11 March 2003.

1) Model Inadequacy

Various empirical cases and incidents have proven International Relations Theory, and its sub theories, to be inadequate and incapable of "predicting" future events nor anticipating any future changes, in a given situation, related to the International System. If we refer to the expertise of economical forecasters, they suggest that – generally- "prediction" failures of unusual events are caused by inadequate forecasting models of a given theory. Moreover, precisely, Stekler (2003) asserts that if we want to "predict" an infrequent or an unusual event, we must have a "prediction model" specifically designed to "predict" that kind of events. "Unless models are specifically designed to predict infrequent events, they cannot be relied upon." Stekler (2003). This is true; since widely used and formal models are designed to "predict" average events; by deducting: trends, patterns and relationships from average situations, not events that lie outside these standard and normal experiences. And since any **unusual event** need to be regarded or labeled as an "unusual event" in the first place; to be qualified to have a specific model developed for it, it is to a great extent affected by various factors. Firstly, the views of the forecaster and his/her behavior. Secondly, the forecaster's objectivity (or bias) towards: their theory, their prejudgments, and their evaluation of a given event or situation, to regard as unusual, in order to develop models of "prediction"

specifically for it, and finally, the forecaster's preferences. Consequently, a forecaster's judgment is required to "predict" these infrequent events. The "failures of prediction" may, thus, be caused by the actions of individual forecasters.

2) Wrong Implemented Methodology in the Midst of Theoretical Bias: The Role of the Theorists' Behaviour

This Thesis' aim was to prove that: the "prediction" of international incidents is connected to the approach or to the theory which the researcher is implementing; in order to understand a certain phenomenon, or incident, in the International System, and thus, be able to "predict" its future outcome(s). However, after a long time observing and analyzing the International Relations Theory's literature of the Cold War era, specifically its last decade's literature, from 1979 to 1991, new findings rose up to the surface, that supported the hypothesis of this thesis. Those findings proved that they were mainly the: conceptions, pre- judgments and core assumptions of the schools of the Theory of International Relations (mainly: Realism, Liberalism and Radicalism) that lead them to fail to "predict" the continuous and the -otherwise- foreseeable peaceful decline of the Soviet Union. In other words, it was the International Relations theorists' bias to their theories' ultimate and proximate causations,

conceptions and core assumptions, as well as their fascination with their theories that blinded them from noticing the inevitable declining course of the USSR. David J. Singer (1999) precisely agrees with these findings; asserting that *"it is little wonder that scholars, analysts, and practitioners in the west -- especially in the US --so dismally failed to anticipate these dramatic events. Our models were corrupted, our methods too primitive, and our incentives distorted -- and little is happening now to suggest that we will do much better in the far more complicated and equally dangerous post-Soviet epoch"*.¹²⁸

Evermore, IR theorists were misled by their theoretical bias in different ways; to an extent that all their research resources -during the era of the Cold War- were directed towards the study of the continuation and of the permanence of this bipolar structure of the International System, and apropos the threats the rival camps' (the USA's and the USSR's) arms race might bring about, rather than directing them towards the clear possibilities of the Soviet Regime's peaceful decline; especially that those changing trends- mainly: economical and social ones- were clear, and –thus- were

¹²⁸ J. David Singer, "Prediction, Explanation, and the Soviet Exit from the Cold War". *The International Journal of Peace Studies*. July 1999. Vol. 4:2. Pp:10-11.

studied, at that time, by other Social Sciences, such as: Economy and Sociology.

Moreover, various IR researchers from the various schools of this theory - i.e. Realism, Liberalism and Radicalism- were biased towards their theories' core assumptions for different reasons. On one hand, Realism researchers were fascinated by the long duration of the bipolarity status quo of the International System, in the era of the Cold War, and impressed by the cautious stability that it brought about the structure of this system. Whilst Liberalist researchers, on the other hand, specifically the Security Studies' theorists, were fearing the consequences of the Soviet –American rivalry. And they mainly focused on the probable possibility of a nuclear war between the USA and the USSR to a great extent; that they were blinded of the possibility of a peaceful decline of the USSR; asserting that the status quo of the Soviet Union as a superpower was stronger than ever- at that time- and any possible fall of this pole would only be through war. Furthermore, all IR theorists were fascinated by each of their paradigm's core assumptions and concepts, (i.e. freedom, individualism and democracy of Liberalism, Communism of Radicalism and the "balance of power" of Realism), that while the Cold War persisted; they were all- in their own different ways- forced to take sides. (Cox:2007).

However, to say the truth, declassified documents of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) noted a clear decline and a crisis in the economy of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the agency's analysts -along with other peer IR theorists- thought that this decline was restricted only to the economy of the Soviet Union¹²⁹, and that a near peaceful decline of the whole Soviet regime- from a pole to a weaker power in the International System- was not applicable¹³⁰, at least not to the near future.

¹²⁹ "Gorbachev's Economic Programs: The Challenges Ahead", *Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/ Center for the Study of Intelligence*, December 1988, Pp2-4.

¹³⁰ "Gorbachev's Domestic Challenge: The Looming Problems, an Intelligence Assessment, *Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/ Center for the Study of Intelligence*, February 1987.

Also check: "Gorbachev: Steering the USSR into the 1990s, an Intelligence Assessment", *Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/ Center for the Study of Intelligence*, July 1987, Pp:4-5.

3) Lack of Data versus Data Misinterpretation: A Conceptual Dilemma

Some post Cold War observers, mainly from the fields of: Security Studies and Structuralism, explained that the IR theory's failure to "predict" the USSR's peaceful fall was due to the lack or to the scarcity of available data at hand of the IR researchers,¹³¹ which is related to the real status quo of the Soviet Union, in the era of the Cold War, economically, politically and socially...etc. Other analysts, however, said that it was the wrong interpretation of data at hand that was the reason of this failure. However, from the Cold War Literature analysis of this thesis; it was clear that this misinterpretation of available data was due to three factors. Firstly, the bias of the theorists, analysts and scholars of the schools of thought of the Theory of International Relations- mainly: Realism, Liberalism and Radicalism- towards their theories' fundamental tenets, conceptions, "change and stability mechanisms" of the International System and "prediction" models and methodologies. Secondly, those theories'

¹³¹ Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), *Security Studies and the Cold War / International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

"prediction" methodologies and "prediction" models were: weak, incapable, insufficient, selective and non-specific for "predicting" major events and / or phenomena in the International System (as discussed in the early chapters of this thesis). For example, the Realism scholars were biased to their theory's "*stability mechanism*" of the structure of the International System; which is the "balance of power"; as well as biased towards their theory's "*change mechanism*", in other words, "*power transition*" of the structure of this system; which is struggle (i.e. war). Hence, Realism theorists, at that time, were convinced that the current structural arrangements of the International System- in the Cold War era- were stable to a great degree; that any change in this structure is a long shot; and if change were to happen it would be through a superpower war not through a peaceful gradual process. This is because according to Realism, the most stable structure of the International System is bipolarity¹³².

Institutionalists, however, believed that if change could occur -in the International System- it would be radical, acute and aggressive rather than gradual and peaceful; in a manner that the defeated (declined) hegemony

¹³² John Mearsheimer, "Why we will soon miss the cold war?". *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 266, No. 2. August 1990. Pp 36-37.

<http://www.irchina.org/en/xueren/foreign/view.asp?id=48>

(i.e. superpower) becomes aggressive towards the other superpowers in the International System. Evermore, some **Peace researchers** "predicted" that relative shifts in power were likely to prompt a more aggressive behavior - on the part of the disadvantaged hegemony. Thus, "everybody was surprised when the Soviet Union changed course, retreated from Eastern Europe, and allowed constituent republics to secede-and did all this peacefully".¹³³

Thirdly, some IR Theorists had distorted incentives, during the Cold war era. Thus, they were selective of the data they chose to interpret, in order to get "predictions" that were tailored to favor their agendas; which prompted directing governmental resources towards the fulfillment of those specific agendas or incentives. For example, some **Security and Intelligence Studies researchers** had incentives towards establishing a basis to directing more governmental resources towards more armament. This incentive was driven by both: the Realism's and the Security Studies' conceptual fear for the security of the USA from its rivalry with the USSR, as well as from their conviction that this mutual armament race is crucial

¹³³ Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

for maintaining the International System's stability; through maintaining this System's bipolarity and its current status quo of the "balance of power".

In addition, Michael Cox (2007) exquisitely sums this conceptual failure of the IR theory to "predict" the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union by elaborating that the: "*failure to anticipate the end of the Cold War was the result of a generally flawed understanding of the Soviet Union. (mainly) the body of work popularly known as Sovietology, Kremlinology or more plainly, Soviet Studies...they were blind to the fact that the system was in crisis. But what the vast majority of commentators would not accept (and did not foresee) was that these defects and problems would finally lead to the end of Soviet power. Nor were they likely to draw this conclusion given their own intellectual conceptions. Their ways of seeing Soviet reality in effect precluded them from anticipating Soviet collapse*".¹³⁴ In other words, both Kremlinology and Sovietology failed to anticipate the Soviet regime's peaceful fall because their analysts simply operated in a scholarly environment that encouraged failure. This is because these scholars were given incentives to "data picking". This means to focus on certain data

¹³⁴ Michael Cox (ed.), *Twentieth Century International Relations*, (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2007), 541-542. <http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/research/erwp/cox.htm>

while disregarding others. In other words, they were *not* allowed to question conventional wisdom regarding the current status quo of the International System or the way this system works. Therefore, György Bence asserts that "*most of the Sovietologists, were left-liberal in their politics, an orientation that undermined their capacity to accept the view that economic statism, planning, socialist incentives, would not work. They were also for the most part ignorant of, or ignored, the basic Marxist thought*"¹³⁵.

However, in order to make sense of the confusing International System- and of its players' interactions between each other- one needs: an efficient theory, paradigm, methodology or model to efficiently: observe, interpret and "predict" incidents in this system.¹³⁶ Nonetheless, theory –itself- according to Realism for example, mainly Neo Realists, such as Kenneth Waltz; is an intellectual construction by which we select facts and interpret

¹³⁵ Ferenc Laczó, "Review of the book: Political-Philosophical Studies 1990-2006 by György Bence's ", *Institute of Historical Studies*, July 2007.

<http://www.ece.ceu.hu/?q=node/77>

¹³⁶ Hussein Solomon, "In Defense of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", *African Security Review*, 1996, Vol 5 No 2.

them."¹³⁷ Thus, it is clear that Realism theorists use a selective methodology to analyze incidents and phenomena in the International System. However, fact selectivity is *never* an objective scientific methodology of studying a phenomena or an incident. And it is affected greatly by the judgments and by the interpretations, experiences and personalities of the individual scholars. This finding supports to a great extent the hypothesis of this thesis; that is the "misprediction" of the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union was affected by the IR theorists' bias to their theories' conceptions and core assumptions to a great degree; that they were unable to consider other potential changes or turns in the course of the Cold War, nor another prospect, prognosis or outcome of its continuity other than war.

Hence, the Theory of International Relations' failure to "predict" the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, revolves around two main factors. First, a conceptual failure rather than a lack of both: research and intelligence data, that was available to the International Relations scholars and theorists. Second, the International System is rather a complex social

¹³⁷ J. George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Reintroduction to International Relations*, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 126.

environment that cannot be put -or its various variables (i.e. players)- under controlled scientific experiments; in order to study its phenomena and be able to -correctly- "predict" their outcomes.

4) Wrong Research Questions Equals: Wrong Conclusions and False “Predictions”

Another main reason Political scientists in general, and International Relations theorists in particular, had missed the clear signs of the peaceful disintegration process of the USSR was that they explored wrong research questions. In other words, they focused on each of the factors that constituted that disintegration process individually; rather than concentrating their analysis on the process as a whole. Hence, they mainly studied the economical crisis that devastated the Soviet economy, in the mid eighties, until the Soviet Union fell -peacefully.

Furthermore, International Relations theorists did not ever consider the prospect of the ending of the Cold War, nor did they think of a possible peaceful fall of the Soviet Union. Thus, they never directed their research questions towards this possibility. For example, Realism scholars were fascinated by the bipolarity of the International System, and reassured by the stability it brought to it; that they never considered that any change in the system's structure -or its status quo- would occur but through struggle

(war) not peacefully as it happened in 1991. Liberalists and Radicalists – however- were busy focusing their scholar efforts on disproving each other's core assumptions, (i.e. the Liberal Democracy, Capitalism and Individualism of Liberalism versus Communism, Social Justice, and Society of Radicalism), rather than directing their research questions onto the status quo of the Soviet Union, as a superpower, in the Cold War era. Stekler (2003) stressed out that: "*While in principle the behaviorists had the methodological advantage and thus should have been the first to identify the signs, the fact is that few of us were concentrating on the USSR and its foreign policy at the time*", and adds that he suspects that "*a count of the articles in the more rigorous journals (Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly, Conflict Management and Peace Science, and International Interactions) would show that most of that research was focused on the search for general regularities embracing many states and regions over a century or more of diplomatic and military events and conditions, rather than on this single relationship*". Hence, post Cold War analysts suggest that while the methodology was right; especially that of Behaviouralism, the questions scientists explored were wrong.

Reflection: Is the Theory of International Relations a Real Science?

Most post-Cold War IR literature revolved around explaining the insufficiency of the Theory of International Relations regarding the "prediction" of important events, throughout the modern history; specifically, its failure to anticipate the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union, as well as the end of both: The International System's Bipolarity and the Cold War. Yet, this literature forgot- and still does forget- to address the root causes of this continuous failure. In other words, this literature continues to ignore to conduct a complete *critique* of the fundamentals of this theory: its core assumptions as well as its ultimate and proximate causations. Overall, it forgets to explore its degree of *scientifity*; in order to prove whether the IR theory is worth to be called a *real* science, or just a collection of hypothesis and scholarly work.

Moreover, most of the scientific research conducted by the schools of The Theory of International Relations have a tendency ***not*** to be focused on "prediction" of future events and future developments in the International System; but rather on explaining past and / or present events –related to this system- in a very accountable method. In other words, those theorists have become masters in explaining the past and analyzing the present of the International System; but they were and still are falling back in the

“prediction “of future events and consequences in it. And although this research is exquisite, it would be –best- to start channeling their research efforts on elaborating new ways and new methodology of “prediction” of the future developments of the incidents and the phenomena of the International System, at any given time.

As a result, the main deficiencies in the “prediction” methodology, tools and paradigms of the schools of the International Relations Theory are: first, their inability of having a controlled environment for testing the variables in a particular phenomenon or incident in the International System. Second, their inability to convert incidents or chain of events into variables. Third, not being opened to other theories; especially non openness and non-cooperation in between the existing schools of the IR Theory -themselves. Fourth, non and / or rare cooperation between the schools of the IR Theory and other sciences- both Natural and Social Sciences- and precisely not benefiting from other sciences’ measurement and “prediction” tools and methodology, especially sciences, such as: Mathematics and Physics (particularly those related to “prediction”, such as: Einstein's Relativity Theory, Minokowski's Space- Time Paradigm and Newton's Laws of Gravity, and Newton's First Law of Gravity).

Thus, since Political Science in general, and the Theory of International Relations in particular, are both branches of Social Science, this thesis has proven that it is almost impossible for them to "predict" future events in the International System; but rather explain this system's past events, and analyze its present incidents. This is because there were- and still are- several limitations and constraints on the degree of accuracy and credibility of their "prediction" methodologies and tools.

Consequently, a both important and crucial question arises: "*What makes a given Science, a real one?*". A unified answer to this question is difficult; yet most scientists agree that a credible science is a science which has efficient and reliable methodologies and paradigms to: observe a phenomenon, experiment on it - in a controlled study (i.e. controlled environment)-, explain it, as well as explain the past events that led to it. And as a result, being able to "predict" the future events and /or the developments (i.e. the prognosis) of this certain phenomenon. This "prediction" is -usually- done using this science's tools of measurement – particularly- the tools that measure variables related to and / or forming the present status quo of this phenomenon.

Hence, since none of the schools of the Theory of International Relations is capable of "prediction" due- as explained in this thesis- to deficiencies and

shortcomings in their: core assumptions, ultimate and proximate causations, "prediction" methodologies and variables' measurement tools; they are simply not eligible to be called "sciences", unless they address these deficiencies. This is realized through several ways; most important of which are:

First, by modifying and altering their core assumptions, or just dismissing them as a strong basis of valuable "predictions". For example, one of Realism's core assumptions and its sole –endorsed- mechanism of change in the International System, particularly changing the “Balance of Power”, is struggle (War). This school of the IR Theory dismisses any other mechanisms or methods of change, such as: Peace and Inter States' Cooperation. However, many empirical evidence has proven – over and over again- specifically in the case of the Peaceful end of the Cold War; that change in the International System is achieved by other – even more effective- mechanisms and tools, such as: Peace and Cooperation. Therefore, it is about time that the schools of the IR Theory be opened to other change mechanisms and tools, in order to apply them to the International System; to be more accurate in their “Prediction” efforts of any future changes in any given phenomenon and / or incident related to this system.

Second, through simply cooperating with other sciences; with more efficient and further accountable variables' measurement tools, such as: Economics, Demographics and Mathematics ...etc.

Third, by developing a new school of the Theory of International Relations, that I suggest calling "*Internationalism*". This new school of thought would be the merge of the best and most credible parts of the core assumptions, methodologies and "prediction" tools of all of the schools of the IR theory. Furthermore, it would serve several purposes and would have several goals. Firstly, to assemble every core assumption of each school of the Theory of International Relations; in order to categorize and test them for: accuracy, credibility and ability to contributing to accurate "predictions" of the outcomes of future events and /or phenomena in the International System. Consequently, this process would be followed by pointing out the best core assumptions of these IR schools, which –ideally– would be the ones that are flexible enough to cooperate with the core assumptions, "prediction" tools and methodologies of other Social as well as Natural Sciences, in a scientific manner; in order to be able to measure or at least have a broader view of the future change possibilities in each present phenomenon -or event- in the International system. This cooperation and interaction process is valuable since the International system is a dynamic environment that is hard to test in a controlled study.

Thus, ideally, "Internationalism" would merge in it both: the most credible scientific methodologies of the existing schools of the Theory of International Relations, along with the testing tools and "prediction" methodologies of both: Natural Sciences, such as: mathematics and Physics, along with those of other related Social Sciences, such as: Economy, Finance, and Demographics... etc. This is particularly important since empirical evidence has shown -and has proven- that these Social Sciences were better able to foresee -at least- one aspect of the peaceful fall of the USSR; which is the economical one.

Fourth, by using some of the Natural Sciences': observation, testing and "prediction" methodologies and tools, such as those of sciences like: Mathematics, Physics and Statistics in the IR's "prediction" paradigms and tools. Fortunately, there has been a good step in adapting the Game theory; and using it by many of the schools of the Theory of International Relations to both: "explain" the present events, and to "predict" the future outcomes of present events in the Post-Cold War era. This is especially true in schools like: Neo Realism, Neo Liberalism and Neo Marxism.

Thus, if none of the above steps were implemented to address the "prediction" deficiencies and shortcomings of the Theory of International Relations, then I would strongly assume that the IR theory -with all of its

schools- would be more eligible to be called "immature paradigms and hypothesis" and not credible sciences. Then, there would be no scientific value in using them to "predict" future outcomes of certain events in the International System.

To sum up, it is *theoretically* and *practically* impossible for Social Sciences in general, and both: Political Science and IR theory in particular, to "predict" the future of the International System -as a whole dynamic system of outputs and inputs- nor to "predict" the future of each of its states as individual players. **The cause of this failure can be categorized into eight factors.** **First, the limitations of the Extrapolation method,** (that is the extrapolation of a trend from the past to the future), which most I.R. theorists use to foresee the future. This methodology is not always accurate; since the future doesn't always resemble the past; because many circumstantial and unpredictable factors could alter this resemblance. **Second, time precision limitations,** or limitations on "the scope" of "prediction", which refer to the time over which an event is supposed to occur. Hence, "*the further into the future we attempt to predict the less it becomes possible to estimate the influence of additional and necessarily unconsidered factors*".¹³⁸ **Third, the magnification of error argument;**

which is the accuracy of the observations made on past events. For example, if a scientist measures or assesses observed trends wrongly, then his /her expectations regarding the future would be accordingly wrong.

Fourth, the self – limiting tendencies of a trend itself. Fifth, the "high probability degree" claimed by the schools of the Theory of International Relations; for although –theoretically- a probability of the happening of an event might be high, it is not usually possible to foresee when it will precisely occur. **Sixth, the lack of comparative cases** upon which generalizations might be based. **Seventh, "the Oedipus effect"**, or the self- fulfilling or self- defeating prophecy. Robert Merton, who has completely formulated this "factor", argues that since human beings are conscious and reactive creatures; they will probably either attempt to prevent a “predicted” future state (outcome) from happening or try to alter it, if they get to know what a certain state (outcome) would be in the future. Hence, in this case, “prediction” becomes a factor in the creation or prevention of a certain futuristic event. Finally, the problems of: **contingency, attention and multiple lines of explanation in International Relations;** meaning that the past is shaped by contingent or accidental events which cannot be part of any generalized models whose application might “predict” the future. An interesting example is that if Cleopatra's nose had been a centimeter longer than it originally was, then

Mark Anthony might not have fallen in love with her. Thus, the future of the Roman Empire wouldn't have been the same.

Furthermore, scientists generally were convinced that "small initial perturbations lead to small changes in behavior"¹³⁹, however, the Lorenz model of the weather or the "Lorenz factor" has proven the contrary; that any small initial change (i.e. perturbation, variable) leads to relatively big changes in behaviour. That is true only if the equations used in this model were nonlinear equations. Nonetheless, one might wonder about the connection between a "weather predicting model" and "prediction" in the international system. Nonetheless, there is a clear connection which is: firstly, the international system is a nonlinear system, thus nonlinear equations are best suitable in the study of its phenomena and complex variables, Secondly, "while are difficult to solve, nonlinear systems are central to chaos theory and often exhibit fantastically complex and chaotic

¹³⁹ Larry Bradley. "The Butterfly Effect", a seminar from the series: Chaos and Fractals, *The Department of Physics and Astronomy at John Hopkins University*, accessed 31 October 2006, <http://www.pha.jhu.edu/~ldb/seminar/butterfly.html>

behavior"¹⁴⁰ ; that is to a great extent similar to the complexity of the international system.

Nevertheless, it is difficult and –practically- impossible to anticipate or have a collection of all of the possible variables that could affect a system, and form its future; especially in the International System; where it is practically and theoretically impossible to collect data that contains all of the: decisions and actions of all of the players of the system, especially in a world political system where each state's decision makers make their decisions internally and externally (regarding their international interstate relations); based on classified data which is collected by the state's different agencies (i.e. intelligence agencies) , which are inaccessible- (unless after a long period of time; when they become public record available to the public , i.e. After 30 or 50 years)- to scientists and theorists who want to collect enough data to be able to “predict” the future of the system. This is especially true in a chaotic International System; where initial conditions carry the "Butterfly Effect", a system that is: "*sensitive to initial conditions, where chaos causes the transformation of the system into an unstable*

¹⁴⁰ Bradley, Ibid.

state".¹⁴¹ , bearing in mind that chaos is persistent to the complexity of both: nature and knowledge. Thus, this requires the cooperation between all natural sciences , “*while social sciences process the knowledge side of chaos*”¹⁴².

Therefore, this challenge of accurate “prediction” in the IR theory can only be solved –theoretically- by: constantly providing the schools of the IR theory with a constant stream of data containing all of the available information regarding a given present phenomenon in the International System. And since this process is –practically and circumstantially- impossible to perfect to a high degree of accuracy; because of the dynamic and constant changing variables and events in the International System- it is crucial for these schools to -at least- cooperate with Natural Sciences and other Social Sciences, in order to bypass this dilemma. This is done by adapting to, developing or -at least- enhancing more efficient methods for:

¹⁴¹ Edward N. Lorenz. "Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow." *Journal of Atmospheric Science* 20 (1963): 130-141.

Also check: Barry Parker, *Chaos in the Cosmos: The Stunning Complexity of the Universe*, (New York: Plenum Press, 1996).

¹⁴² A.B. Campbel, *Applied Chaos Theory: A Paradigm for Complexity*, (Cambridge / Massachusetts: Academic Press Inc., 1993).

1- observing, studying and investigating of any given phenomenon, as well as 2- collecting more accurate, valuable, valid and sufficient variables and data on any studied phenomenon, 3- and being flexible enough to add into the "prediction" process any new studied phenomenon's variables and data that might-unexpectedly appear. This is done by creating a "mathematical system" that can constantly update data and variables and integrate them into the "prediction" equation and / or "prediction process". A sufficient way to do so is by forming an "algorithm equation" that –constantly- takes into consideration any new rising variables. Thus, it is both: unrealistic and unbeneficial to try to 100% accurately "predict" future outcomes of any event in the International System; since there is not anything such as 100% "prediction" accuracy; but rather a –relatively- high degree of "prediction" accuracy, or a high degree of probability instead. There will always be a margin of error in any "prediction" process. Nonetheless, it is possible to narrow this margin of error by minimizing the consequences which the "Butterfly Effect" has on any "prediction" process. Thus, involving in a "prediction" process without taking into consideration: the fluctuation, alteration and change of the International System's "Initial Conditions" is a careless act of any IR researcher. Consequently, new research is advised on cooperation between: The Theory of International Relations, Mathematics, Physics, Statistics and the Game Theory on one hand, and Finance, Economics and Demographics on the other. As well as directing more

research towards developing new measurements and better "prediction" methodologies, and -foremost- enhancing existing ones.

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
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Annexes

Annex "A"

Relativistic mechanics and Minokowski's Space- Time Paradigm¹

Relativistic Space-Time

The modification of the usual laws of mechanics may be understood purely in terms of the Lorentz transformation formulas (101) and (102). It was pointed out, however, by the German mathematician Hermann Minkowski in 1908, that the Lorentz transformations have a simple geometric interpretation that is both beautiful and useful. The motion of a particle may be regarded as forming a curve made up of points, called events, in a four-dimensional space whose four coordinates comprise the three spatial coordinates $\mathbf{x} \equiv (x, y, z)$ and the time t .

The four-dimensional space is called Minkowski space-time and the curve a world line. It is frequently useful to represent physical processes by space-time diagrams in which time runs vertically and the spatial coordinates run horizontally. Of course, since space-time is four-dimensional, at least one of the spatial dimensions in the diagram must be suppressed.

Newton's first law can be interpreted in four-dimensional space as the statement that the world lines of particles suffering no external forces are straight lines in space-time. Linear transformations take straight lines to straight lines, and Lorentz transformations have the additional property that they leave invariant the invariant interval τ through two events (t_1, \mathbf{x}_1) and (t_2, \mathbf{x}_2) given by

$$\tau^2 = (t_1 - t_2)^2 - \frac{(\mathbf{x}_1 - \mathbf{x}_2)^2}{c^2}. \quad (103)$$

If the right-hand side of equation (103) is zero, the two events may be joined by a light ray and are said to be on each other's light cones because the light cone of any event (t, \mathbf{x}) in space-time is the set of points reachable from it by light rays (see

¹ "Relativistic mechanics". 2009. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved July 30, 2009, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/496896/relativistic-mechanics>





Figure 1). Thus the set of all events (t_2, \mathbf{x}_2) satisfying equation (103) with zero on the right-hand side is the light cone of the event (t_1, \mathbf{x}_1) . Because Lorentz transformations leave invariant the space-time interval (103), all inertial observers agree on what the light cones are. In space-time diagrams it is customary to adopt a scaling of the time coordinate such that the light cones have a half angle of 45° .

If the right-hand side of equation (103) is strictly positive, in which case one says that the two events are timelike separated, or have a timelike interval, then one can find an inertial frame with respect to which the two events have the same spatial position. The straight world line joining the two events corresponds to the time axis of this inertial frame of reference. The quantity τ is equal to the difference in time between the two events in this inertial frame and is called the proper time between the two events. The proper time would be measured by any clock moving along the straight world line between the two events.

An accelerating body will have a curved world line that may be specified by giving its coordinates t and \mathbf{x} as a function of the proper time τ along the world line. The laws of either may be phrased in terms of the more familiar velocity $\mathbf{v} = d\mathbf{x}/dt$ and acceleration $\mathbf{a} = d^2\mathbf{x}/dt^2$ or in terms of the 4-velocity $(dt/d\tau, d\mathbf{x}/d\tau)$ and 4-acceleration $(d^2t/d\tau^2, d^2\mathbf{x}/d\tau^2)$. Just as an ordinary vector like \mathbf{v} has three components, $v_x, v_y,$ and $v_z,$ a 4-vector has four components. Geometrically the 4-velocity and 4-acceleration correspond, respectively, to the tangent vector and the curvature vector of the world




line (see [Figure 2](#)). If the particle moves slower than light, the tangent, or velocity, vector at each event on the world line points inside the light cone of that event, and the acceleration, or curvature, vector points outside the light cone. If the particle moves with the speed of light, then the tangent vector lies on the light cone at each event on the world line. The proper time τ along a world line moving with a speed less than light is not an independent quantity from t and \mathbf{x} : it satisfies

$$\left(\frac{dt}{d\tau}\right)^2 - \frac{1}{c^2} \left(\frac{d\mathbf{x}}{d\tau}\right)^2 = 1. \quad (104)$$

For a particle moving with exactly the speed of light, one cannot define a proper time τ . One can, however, define a so-called affine parameter that satisfies equation (104) with zero on the right-hand side. For the time being this discussion will be restricted to particles moving with speeds less than light.

Equation (104) does not fix the sign of τ relative to that of t . It is usual to resolve this ambiguity by demanding that the proper time τ increase as the time t increases. This requirement is invariant under Lorentz transformations of the form of equations (101) and (102). The tangent vector then points inside the future light cone and is said to be



future-directed and timelike (see [Figure 3](#)). One may if one wishes attach an arrow to the world line to indicate this fact. One says that the particle moves forward in time. It was pointed out by the Swiss physicist Ernest C.G. Stückelberg de Breidenbach and by the American physicist [Richard Feynman](#) that a meaning can be attached to world lines moving backward in time—i.e., for those for which ordinary time t decreases as proper time τ increases. Since, as shall be shown later, the energy E of a particle is $mc^2 dt/d\tau$, such world lines correspond to the motion of particles with negative energy. It is possible to interpret these world lines in terms of antiparticles, as will be seen when particles moving in a background electromagnetic field are considered.

The fundamental laws of motion for a body of mass m in relativistic mechanics are

$$m \frac{d^2 t}{d\tau^2} = f^0 \quad (105)$$

and

$$m \frac{d^2 \mathbf{x}}{d\tau^2} = \mathbf{f}, \quad (106)$$

where m is the constant so-called rest mass of the body and the quantities (f^0, \mathbf{f}) are the components of the force 4-vector. Equations (105) and (106), which relate the curvature of the world line to the applied forces, are the same in all inertial frames related by Lorentz transformations. The quantities $(mdt/d\tau, m d\mathbf{x}/d\tau)$ make up the 4-momentum of the particle. According to Minkowski's reformulation of special relativity, a Lorentz transformation may be thought of as a generalized rotation of points of Minkowski space-time into themselves. It induces an identical rotation on the 4-acceleration and force 4-vectors. To say that both of these 4-vectors experience the same generalized rotation or Lorentz transformation is simply to say that the fundamental laws of motion (105) and (106) are the same in all inertial frames related by Lorentz transformations. Minkowski's geometric ideas provided a powerful tool for checking the mathematical consistency of special relativity and for calculating its experimental consequences. They also have a natural generalization in the general theory of relativity, which incorporates the effects of gravity.

Annex "B"

Central Intelligence Agency CIA Classified Documents and Analytical Reports Regarding the Political, Social and other Variables Forming and Affecting the Soviet Regime's Policies during the Cold War Era between: 1979 and 1991.

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SYNOPSIS

A new note of Soviet self-confidence in international affairs, seen in Moscow as validating the concept of a progressive historical march, is emerging in the 1970s. Other major powers are not viewed as having changed their basically hostile attitudes toward the USSR, but the Soviets feel greater assurance about their capacity to deal with them and less exaggerated concern for their effects on Soviet security. Since insecurity has been a major factor motivating Soviet policies in the past it is not surprising that new directions in Soviet foreign policy have accompanied the new psychological mood. Moscow perceives a new need today for normalized relations with major states, especially the US, and has learned from experience that working within the existing international system is more likely to serve Soviet interests than frontal challenges to other great powers or to the system itself. Largely for this reason the Soviet leaders have developed an increased stake in international stability and have come to accept the prospect of an indefinite period of coexistence with the West.

Moscow still expects and seeks international change. But the USSR cannot, in a period of detente, be the direct agent for much of the change its leaders still hope will occur. And while a residual belief in the eventual attainment of ultimate Soviet aims in the basic world struggle still exists in the USSR, the Soviets have increasingly adjusted their sights, conceptually and operationally, to short-run and intermediate-range goals. Achievement of even these, the Soviets realize, depends on success in working with forces that often act independently of Soviet sway and in overcoming simultaneous countervailing trends.

Sources of Soviet Perceptions

Soviet ideology supplies the basic conceptual framework used by Soviet observers in analyzing international affairs. The interpretation of world events this ideology provides is dynamic: it posits a fundamental struggle on a global scale, presupposes constant change, and gives impetus to an activist foreign policy. Yet while Marxism-Leninism attunes Soviet observers to the key role that events *within* states play in affecting international behavior, it explains little beyond the general and abstract about relations *among* states. And although the Soviet outlook could be called utopian in terms of its stated goals, most Soviet leaders from 1917 onwards have consciously stressed realism and

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caution in practical policy matters and warned of the dangers of adventurism in the long-term international competition between the emerging new order and the declining old. In this regard, Brezhnev follows the examples of Lenin and Stalin rather than Khrushchev.

The wider Soviet involvement in recent years in world affairs and a belief that internal progress, especially toward economic goals, is increasingly dependent on international relationships have led Soviet leaders to seek a more accurate picture of the world. They have tried to enhance the capabilities of their channels of information about foreign events and, of particular note, to obtain more and better analysis of that information. A larger role has been assigned to the academic institutes in Moscow, especially the Institute of US and Canadian Studies and the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, which are involved in providing policy-makers with estimative judgments about international affairs.

How deeply rooted the newer Soviet perceptions have become cannot be told with certainty. The current leaders lived through the Stalin era, with its articulate and heavily propagandized set of ideas stressing the hostility of the international environment, Soviet insecurity, and the necessity of avoiding foreign contact. This era has left deep and widespread Soviet doubts about the wisdom and orthodoxy of enmeshing the USSR in dealings with the capitalist powers and making compromises with the West. Yet despite the persisting influence of ingrained views, perceptions do not remain static. Doctrinally pure positions are possible only when events are viewed at a distance. Involvement with events requires that dogma make room for pragmatism, lest unrealism drive the Soviet state into an isolationist position. The post-Stalin generation of Soviet leaders has already changed its outlook in significant ways because of international experience, the influence of personal and institutional roles and interests, and newly perceived needs. A new generation of post-Brezhnev leaders could also develop new perceptions of international problems and new ideas of what Soviet national interests require in terms of international behavior.

The New International Situation

The measuring standard and key determinant of the USSR's progress in the worldwide political struggle postulated by the Soviets is the international "correlation of forces." In weighing the strengths of the two sides, the Soviets attach great importance to the power of the principal states, especially their economic and military capabilities and potential. But less tangible social and political factors are also

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considered to be important, hence the continual Soviet assessing of US domestic cohesion and willpower.

In the Soviet view the world since 1917 has been in gradual transition from a purely capitalist system to a socialist one, the most dramatic single advance being the Sovietization of East Europe after World War II. But the 1970s, the Soviets argue, have brought a further significant, even radical favorable change in the international balance. Some Soviet commentary seems to imply a tipping of the balance past a notional midway point, as though "socialism" now possessed more than half of a world power pie. The factor mainly responsible for the new correlation of forces, in Moscow's view, is Soviet strategic nuclear strength, built up over the last ten years to a level roughly equivalent to that of the US. Also contributing to Soviet optimism is the combination of economic, social, and political problems currently plaguing the West, which Moscow views as unprecedented. In Soviet eyes these problems have made the present phase of capitalism's "general crisis" unusually deep and persistent and have thrown the West into its most serious disarray since World War II.

The Soviets are unsure about what developments will flow from this "crisis," however, and realize that any relative advantages they now enjoy rest on an uncertain foundation. More pronounced leftward trends in West European politics (especially Communist participation in coalition governments in France and Italy) seem likely to them, but they also see in the present-day Western condition the seeds of possible civil wars and the specter of revived fascism. The Soviets apparently believe that capitalism cannot escape suffering permanent disabilities as a consequence of its problems and that it is already in a qualitatively new stage of its decline. But at the same time they have respect for the capacity of the capitalist system to devise effective methods for coping with even such serious problems as the oil issue and to bounce back because of the overall size and resiliency of the Western economic system.

The Soviets have also had difficulties in determining the meaning of the Western disarray for their own foreign policy. Some Party elements reportedly feel that not enough is being done to take advantage of the new international situation, and West European Communist parties are receiving conflicting signals from Moscow on just how best to improve their individual political positions. So far, however, in line with the Soviet propensity in the 1970s increasingly to dissociate the world revolutionary struggle from the ordinary conduct of interstate relations and place emphasis on the latter, the most authoritative Soviet expositions of the Western "crisis" have been more

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in the nature of efforts to steer the detente policy over the shoals of this unanticipated situation than justifications for revising course.

In no case has this been more clearly true than for Soviet relations with the US, which remain the key factor affecting the overall Soviet international role. In the 1970s the US moved toward detente with the USSR and accommodated itself to the growth of Soviet strategic forces and a Soviet role in resolving major world problems. Whether this "realistic" US attitude will be sustained is the chief question for Soviet policy-makers. The Soviets believe that the US altered its foreign outlook in the early 1970s largely for pragmatic reasons: the old policy was simply becoming less effective and too expensive. But the new US policy, the Soviets believe, rests on an unconsolidated domestic base; the consensus supporting earlier US policies has broken down, but no agreement has yet been reached on what should take its place. The Soviet reading of the situation in the US throughout the 1975 "pause" in detente has been that the pro-detente forces are still more powerful than their enemies, but that the latter remain strong, still tapping a reservoir of anti-Soviet feelings not yet completely dissipated from the Cold War.

The newfound Soviet confidence is not free from counterbalancing factors, and Moscow does not see the shifts in the international "correlation of forces" wholly one-sidedly. For one thing, the favorable changes that have occurred in the 1970s are not irrevocable. In this critical regard they differ from postwar Soviet gains in East Europe, which are judged to be "irreversible." Even the lengthy and expensive Soviet nuclear missile buildup does not guarantee future strategic stability or even parity.

Moscow is also clearly aware of the storm clouds on its international horizon. Chief among them is China, whose "loss" greatly damaged the USSR's image as the nucleus of an ever-increasing international political movement and whose deep-seated hostility threatens to outlive Mao. But Europe too, the recent collective security agreement notwithstanding, contains a self-assured West Germany and has shown little susceptibility to increases in Soviet influence despite spells of political turmoil and lessened fears of the Soviet military threat. The emergence of several secondary power centers in the world is welcomed by Moscow as representing a decline in US authority among its chief partners, but the Soviets are uneasy about what direction these newly independent political forces will take. While the Soviet perception of the world as enemy is changing, it has not been replaced by one of the world as oyster, ripe with opportunities to be exploited.

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The Soviet International Role

Soviet policy today is informed by a sense of "having arrived" internationally. By successfully weathering critical trials over the years, the Soviets believe that the USSR has demonstrated a capacity to sustain itself and grow in a dangerous and unpredictable international environment. There is also considerable national pride connected with the Soviet international role that is important to a people whose sense of inferiority *vis-à-vis* other great powers and cultures has been great and to a regime in need of evidence of its own competence and legitimacy. The Soviets feel that their international prestige is more solidly based today than was the case under Khrushchev, whose incautious political moves aroused rather than impressed adversaries and bought little influence in other countries. A stronger and more secure USSR does not guarantee success in all foreign undertakings, but it does mean a more active and influential Soviet international presence.

Current Soviet perceptions of world affairs, however, imply a degree of instability for Soviet policy. Although political changes such as those in southern Europe, from Turkey to Portugal, tempt Moscow to see and act on opportunities for Soviet advantage, the Soviet leaders are aware that greater militancy would damage their relations with the West without assuring any expansion of Soviet influence. While the Soviets are prepared to intervene abroad in areas and on occasions when they think the political and military risks are justified—as seems to be the case in Angola—they must continuously reassess the costs involved. In the rest of the 1970s and beyond the USSR may find itself even more subject to the strains inherent in its contradictory international roles: how effectively can it continue to represent itself as revolutionary, progressive, and the patron of the have-nots of this world while seeking expanded friendship with the US, recognition as a rich and advanced country, and stability in certain regimes and regions? There will probably continue to be a strong Soviet attitude in favor of keeping relations with the US and other major powers on a reasonably even keel, despite inevitable ups and downs. But mutuality of interest and viewpoint between East and West has long been anathema in the USSR, and reaching genuine compromises with the West will never be an easy or a natural process for Soviet leaders.

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THE 20th CPSU CONGRESS IN RETROSPECT:
ITS PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Pertinent Background Factors

1. The CPSU is the leading Communist Party in the world. Its ideological leadership has been acknowledged even by the Chinese Communist Party. Being in control of the Soviet state, it controls the political, military and economic power of the USSR, the stronghold of World Communism. Thus its pronouncements on doctrine, strategy, and tactics are of decisive importance to International Communism. Communist courses of action are determined primarily in Moscow; the Chinese "People's Republic", for all its potential strength, is still dependent upon Soviet guidance and assistance. The USSR remains the base of world Communism, and there is no indication that this situation is about to change. If now, at the fountain of Communist wisdom, a new course is set which appears to deviate considerably from that of the Stalin era, repercussions are likely to occur which may be of great moment for both the Communist and the non-Communist world, if not immediately, at least in the foreseeable future.

2. The reasons for the announced changes must be sought far back in the Stalin regime. Long before his death, the men around Stalin must have recognized that he paid only lip service to the doctrine of flexibility. After World War II, when the USSR had become a great power, the rigidity

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of Stalinist thought and action produced a stalemate in Europe, fear of Soviet interference in non-committed nations, and a widening gap between the Party and the Soviet people. It is probable that designs for altering the basis of the regime were pondered - and perhaps to some extent discussed - in the dictator's entourage. When it became obvious that Stalin's days were numbered, immediate plans for a reorganization of government and Party were made, and these were put into action upon his death. The successors to Stalin must have realized that the reorganization and economic incentives, initiated by Malenkov's "new course", could not, by themselves, create the desired political climate at home and abroad. Even the liquidation of Beriya and the sharp limitation of police power were not sufficient to demonstrate that Soviet Communism had embarked on a new, less violent, more gradualistic approach toward its objectives. Only an official break with the symbol of past policies, Stalin, could really impress the Soviet people and the world. The underlying purpose of the leadership was to promote political security and socio-economic incentives internally, to develop the concept of "competitive coexistence" externally, and to achieve global Communist "respectability". These objectives were defined during the three years following Stalin's death; they were confirmed and explained by the 20th CPSU Congress and made explicit through the denigration of Stalin. It is against this background that the 20th Congress must be understood.

The Main Issues of the Congress

3. The institution of Communist Party Congresses cannot be likened

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to democratic conventions. Primarily, these Congresses are used as sounding boards for the justification of past policies and the outlining of new ones. The 20th Congress served these traditional purposes, even though it differed from previous Congresses in both tone and substance. The results did not indicate that Communist fundamentals are to be sacrificed. On the contrary, the Congress emphasized that Communism is, and remains the wave of the future. But it did point out that the successes of International Communism have given the "Socialist camp" a more solid status in world politics and have thereby rendered Stalinist tactics obsolete. The revolution has not been called off, the Congress admitted; revolutionary techniques, however, are being changed. Revolution can become more gradual and respectable. In other words, the policies set forth by the 20th Congress are designed to make the anticipated eventual victory of Communism more easily acceptable and to eliminate at least the more dangerous tensions which have troubled the world throughout the cold war. To put this new approach on a firm ideological basis, some doctrinal "modifications" were announced, primarily with a view to rationalizing the type of successor regime, discarding some of the more obnoxious Stalinist principles, and advertising the so-called "return to Leninism".

4. However, a change from violence to "diplomacy" and from tension to relaxation, no matter how well explained, cannot but have a deep psychological impact on the people inside the Communist orbit and on the Communist parties outside. Even if such "mellowing" process is only superficial, it may set in motion forces extending far beyond the contemplation of the present

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collective leaders of the CPSU. These leaders must be mindful that the Bolshevik regime is a unique historic phenomenon. It has been able to maintain itself in power for almost four decades after its original objective, the victory of the Bolshevik revolution, was achieved. It has achieved this extraordinary feat by what might be called "permanent revolution from above". Tensions had to be kept high in order to prevent a peaceful post-revolutionary development. Totalitarian dictatorship had to be justified by alleging the necessity for an unending struggle against the "class enemy" within and "capitalist imperialism" without, according to Lenin's concept of the "inevitable death struggle between the socialist and capitalist camps". Stalin merely extended and exacerbated this struggle, and, since the significance of nuclear weapons apparently escaped him, he continued it without letup after World War II. Since the new Soviet-Communist platform calls for a general relaxation of tensions, the question naturally arises whether the leaders of the CPSU and other parties can dispense with permanent tension without at the same time undermining their monolithic dictatorship. The 20th Congress refrained from exhorting the people to continue the "relentless struggle against the class enemy"; the bugaboo of internal danger was, for the time being, played down. However, it maintained the theory of hostile camps, albeit in a much milder form. The Party has modified its strategy against the capitalist camp enough to tone down the "struggle against foreign enemies of socialism", thereby weakening the argument that socialist vigilance requires the continuation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is unlikely that the shrewd managers

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of the USSR have not recognized these problems. The fact that they nonetheless decided to launch their new approach, suggests that their reasons must have been weighty indeed, and their confidence great.

Internal Aspects

5. Stalin's successors, generally speaking, have heavily emphasized inducements rather than force. There is apparently less of arbitrary police cruelty; slave labor camps are allegedly being dismantled. Labor laws have been liberalized, and - with few exceptions - economic inducements, first introduced by Malenkov, have been continued by Khrushchev though with changed emphasis. But while Malenkov, still very much under Stalin's spell, counted on the support of the governmental bureaucracy against the Party whose influence had been waning, Party leader Khrushchev re-established Party predominance and turned dictatorial power back to it. At the same time, Khrushchev sought to improve relations between the Party and the people, which in the Stalin era had seriously deteriorated. This method is likely to strengthen Party dictatorship in a time of diminishing tensions. The Soviet leaders are as unwilling now as they have ever been - and will be in the foreseeable future - to democratize their system and to permit public discussion of political problems. This was demonstrated by the lack of discussion during the 20th Congress, as well as by PRAVDA's recent warning not to extend criticism to include the Party and the system.

6. It is clear, therefore, that the "return to Leninism" does not mean the return to "Party democracy". Nor is the substitution of Party dictatorship for one-man rule necessarily an improvement from the viewpoint of US security.

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There is no reason to assume that the modified "Neo"-Leninism, now so heavily propagandized, is more than formally different from the Soviet system as we have known it. It may be recalled that the practice of "Party democracy", or "democratic centralism", was severely limited by Lenin, who warned against "fractionalization" as early as 1921, after the Kronstadt revolt. At the 10th CPSU Congress in the same year, Lenin justified his position by referring to the danger of hostile class interests using the instrument of debate for their own counter-revolutionary purposes. Nevertheless, there still occurred occasional intra-Party discussions, cautiously airing opposing views. So strong was this habit that Stalin, having succeeded Lenin, could not completely eliminate its remnants until 1928 when his position was firmly consolidated. During the remainder of Stalin's regime "party democracy" disappeared under the secret police terror. The collective leaders of the USSR now claim that they are re-instating this principle. However, the mere fact that Khrushchev has called for more frequent plenary meetings of the Central Committee is no proof that genuine "democratic centralism" has been restored. He may permit perfunctory discussions so long as they do not show any deviationist tendency. Generally, however, such meetings probably can and will be used as a means of maintaining better control of this body and of coaxing - or pressuring - it into rubberstamping the edicts of the collective leaders without resort to the overt threat of police action. In truth, the heavily advertised "return to Leninism" consists primarily of a change in methods. The leaders of the CPSU have given up the Byzantine trimmings of the Stalin "cult of personality" without relinquishing any of their powers.

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7. The return to Leninism, we are told, means the return to "collective leadership". There were, indeed, traces of this principle under Lenin, which Stalin managed to eliminate by 1928, prior to forced collectivization. Its highly vaunted renovation does not mean that power will now be distributed with checks and balances; it merely indicates a different method of using power. At best, "collective leadership" might develop into an oligarchy with quasi-"democratic" trappings. It might transform the present despotism into a form of "enlightened absolutism". Collective leadership at present is a euphemism for the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Within this Presidium, predominant power is exercised by the half-dozen active "old Bolsheviks", of whom Khrushchev seems to be primus inter pares. In contrast to Stalin, Khrushchev and his colleagues appear to be willing to listen to arguments and consult with experts. They may be demanding and receiving more objective intelligence reports. As they develop a more realistic attitude toward the facts of international life, they may be able to look beyond the narrow confines of their ideology and formulate more realistic and subtle policies to achieve their goal peacefully. The result of this change can already be seen. The Soviet leaders have recognized both the destructive consequences of war and its futility in the nuclear age. They have therefore resorted to such peaceful methods as economic competition in lieu of military pressure. They are trying to stabilize their own economy by stimulating productivity; and they have introduced measures improving the lot of their own underdogs while at the same time whittling down the incomes of the nouveaux riches.

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8. In order to carry out these policies, the break with Stalin had to be complete. The break itself was not a surprise. Surprising, only, was the violence of Khrushchev's attack against Stalin in his "secret" speech of 25 February. This action may have been designed to perform psychological surgery on the Party. But it was also conceived as a warning to the Communists throughout the world that flexibility had been restored to Soviet policy, which could now employ tactics adequate to cope with the fact that the nature of revolution had changed. The reversal of more than 25 years of Stalinist indoctrination unquestionably will force many communists throughout the world to make difficult adjustments. But such adjustments have been made before and have not impaired the continuing vigor of the International Communist movement. The Soviet leaders must have known that the 20th Congress would produce a period of confusion, particularly among the parties outside the orbit. But they probably calculated that eventually adjustments could and would be made. In any case, the interests of the USSR both as a nation and as the base of world Communism had to take precedence. We suggest that the Soviet leaders earnestly pondered these problems for many months and, having come to their conclusion, felt no hesitation to consummate the break with Stalin. If this assumption is correct, it would appear that they had not been forced to make the violent attack against Stalin on 25 February because of internal or external pressures.

External Aspects

9. It was stated above that the CPSU leaders left the "class enemy"

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within unmentioned. The same cannot be said of the "capitalist imperialists", even though the noise of sabre rattling sounded rather muffled. The Soviet leaders have continued to emphasize the differences between the socialist and imperialist camps; by implication they have retained the thesis of basic irreconcilability. Nevertheless, they did transform their once rude and vitriolic aggressiveness into a politer version of Communist verbiage, which was made more tolerable, if not actually conciliatory, by diplomatic flourishes and by some actual "concessions" such as the withdrawal from Austria. The development of nuclear weapons and jet propulsion, together with the growing belief, especially since the Summit Meeting, that the West does not now harbor aggressive designs, probably contributed decisively to Communist confidence in the future and led to the reinvigoration of what had long been known as "peaceful coexistence". Stalin had used this term in the Twenties but never gave it practical meaning. Malenkov reintroduced the concept, and Khrushchev, applying "creative interpretation", transformed it into "competitive coexistence". This new doctrine harmonizes admirably with the de-emphasis of armed power. At the same time the Soviet leaders may believe that it will stimulate the domestic Soviet economy while at the same time weakening the Western economic system. This, in turn, would stimulate the "contradictions among capitalist states fighting for world markets". Moreover, by inferring that the USSR is no longer isolated but has become the center of a world-wide system of socialist states, the Soviet and Communist leaders have admitted implicitly that at least some of the former "colonial and semi-colonial countries" have become politically independent. Their policy of creating a non-committed

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"peace bloc", of keeping it at least neutral, and perhaps winning it over to the socialist camp, may have led to revisions of their classic colonial doctrine.

10. The break with Stalin signifies that the leaders of the CPSU will no longer insist that they have a monopoly on the "correct" way to "socialism". During Stalin's lifetime the only ex-post-facto blessing of a deviation from this Soviet doctrine was that which he had reluctantly given to Mao. A Canossa trip to Belgrade would have been unthinkable. The Leninist formula that various ways can lead to Socialism - with the end of the road always the conquest by Communist revolution - was not used by Stalin. The reaffirmation of this formula by the 20th Congress has probably quelled some misgivings on the part of the less sophisticated neutrals. It is likely to create increasing demands from the satellites to follow their own path to "socialism". If Moscow denies them this right, it will have proved its insincerity before the world and may lose, thereby, much of the good will it now possesses in some non-committed countries. Nor will it, in the long run, be able to maintain the appearance of respectability, particularly vis-a-vis potential United Front partners. Much less will it be able to impress non-Communist democracies with its claim that it will attempt to gain power legally by parliamentary means, and not by violent overthrow of governments.

11. It should be restated here, and it cannot be emphasized too strongly that recognition by the Soviet leaders of the significance of nuclear weapons is the underlying cause for their policy shift. For the present, at least, atom and jet are the basic deterrents to general war, and probably also

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to local wars. Despite repeated pronouncements that a nuclear war would destroy only Capitalism, the Communists have no real ideological "guide to action" in this field; they surely must realize that the atom knows no ideological preferences. Stalin probably tried hard but in vain to come to grips with this problem since the day of Hiroshima. His successors appear to have found a temporary solution by shifting from dangerous military pressures to less dangerous economic blandishments. Nevertheless, although their policies are designed to avoid war and to let capitalism die "peacefully", there is no prohibition for Communists to divide the capitalist camp and render it harmless. Meanwhile, the "socialist" camp will continue to solicit allies among the imperialists, be they states, groups, or individuals. 20th century changes in capitalist economy are minimized or ridiculed. The Leninist view of the inevitable downfall of capitalism at its highest stage, imperialism, has remained intact. Evolutionary tendencies, which goaded Lenin into writing vitriolic pamphlets, are still outlawed in spite of United Front overtures to socialist "opportunists".

The Meaning of the Congress for International Communism

12. The basic structure of Marxist-Leninist Communism has remained untouched. There is no indication that the present Soviet leaders have renounced the goal of world domination. However, they no longer insist that this conquest can and must come to pass under exclusive Soviet leadership. Nor is there any hint that a Communist world would have to be dominated by the USSR. This means the acceptance of a gradualist approach

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to Communist objectives which not only is considered feasible in view of the strength of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the growth of the uncommitted neutralist "peace camp", but also is made necessary by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and by the great jeopardy to Communism's continued existence in the event of war. The post-Stalinist concept of Communist victory is the achievement of "socialism" in individual countries in a manner suited to national conditions, followed by the joining of such countries in a loose community of "socialist" states. At first, these states would retain their national identities but as time goes by they would gradually merge into a World-Communist community which would rule itself according to ideologically motivated universal laws, having discarded national governments as we know them today. Apparently the Soviet leaders anticipate the completion of the first step, the end of capitalism in individual nations, by the end of the century. It is conceivable that they think in terms of a classless society emerging only in the 21st century, inasmuch as the establishment of such a society is hardly possible so long as politically inimical camps continue to exist.

13. If this view of the Soviet leaders' estimate is correct, it would follow that they can give considerably more leeway to the satellite parties. From the Soviet point of view, the military and economic integration of these countries with the USSR is sufficiently strong to permit a modicum of what Stalinists used to call "nationalist deviation". Communism in the Far East has to be adapted to conditions prevailing in that area, as was already recognized in the Soviet acceptance of Maoism. While there is, and

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probably will continue for some time to be, confusion among the Party rank and file, resulting from the break with the Stalin idol, this confusion is unlikely to provoke many defections. Outside the USSR, it will be easier to achieve socialism by the "national" road than under the Soviet yoke. Soviet control and influence will be maintained, but in a subtler manner. Resistance against Communism will thus be overcome by a process of attrition rather than revolution.

14. The confusion resulting from the break with Stalin will last longer and probably have deeper consequences in the parties outside the Communist orbit. Their doubts will be shared by leaders of international Front organizations. This period of efforts to adjust policies and methods to the new Soviet approach could be lengthened, and confusion could be widened if Western political warfare adequately exploits this unique opportunity. Nevertheless, the climate of political relaxation in non-Communist governments and the prospect of broader interpretation of the Communist objectives will enable the leaders of these parties and fronts to maneuver overtly with a minimum degree of obnoxiousness, while covertly strengthening their cadres for the tasks ahead.

15. It is suggested that the long-range result of the 20th CPSU Congress will turn out to be beneficial from the Communist point of view - provided the lack of tension does not soften the movement's hard core vanguard. The Soviet approach is realistic and ingenious. It takes into account military facts of life. It explores the increased stature of the Communist part of the world and the nationalistic sensitivities of the former "colonial

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and semi-colonial" countries. It feels strong enough to engage the US in an economic popularity contest. It tries hard, and not altogether unsuccessfully, to raise the level of Communist respectability. On the other hand, it does not hesitate to stir up trouble in areas of political vacuum, such as the Middle East, if it can thereby advance its influence to hitherto closed parts of the world. Unless it is stopped, it will do the same in Latin America and Africa. Altogether, Moscow, under Stalin, has learned its lesson. It now uses psychology, taking initiatives designed to put the West on the defense. With this strategy, and appropriate tactics, it appears hopeful of a bloodless victory over a system which, in the Communist belief, is doomed to collapse sooner or later - probably sooner.

16. The question arises whether the new Soviet-Communist line will require more of an organization than is presently at its disposal. Not enough is known about the intricacies of Communist international communications to come to definite conclusions. Overtly at least, the Soviet missions abroad avoid contact with national Party and Front leaders. Covert connections exist to provide personnel guidance, policy directives, and financial assistance. This machinery, however, is expensive, cumbersome, haphazard, and dangerous. Thus the problem may arise how to give comprehensive guidance to the apparatus in different countries whose political, social and economic developments vary. Better means of overall coordination may have to be developed. It is therefore possible that sometime in the future a new device may be put into operation which would take care of

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Communist communication in a more systematic way. This would probably not be an organization as such. Rather, it might be an international Party "conference", possibly under an "innocent" cover, and conceivably with participation of non-Communist Marxists, set up to transmit policy directives and solve operational problems. Such a "conference" would be particularly necessary if the Communist leaders came to the conclusion that the relaxation of tensions had produced a slackening of Party discipline and a deterioration of Communist resourcefulness. This possibility raises certain fundamental questions: Can Communism withstand the changes resulting from the 20th Party Congress without losing its revolutionary zeal? Is there in preparation a "mellowing process" which in time will bring about a metamorphosis of Communism? Or, is the present line merely a gigantic shift of tactics, imposed by the development of nuclear weapons and their jet-propelled delivery and made possible by both the greater strength of the Communist bloc and the emerging independence of former colonial nations?

17. We cannot but assume that the Communist leaders would reject a "mellowing" process. They will try to do all in their power to prevent it from developing. Their only concept of Communist metamorphosis is linked to the shift from socialism to Communism, i. e. from the dictatorship of the proletariat to a classless society. They are likely to seek a period of some years of relaxation during which they can extend their influence with the help of overt respectability while building up and toughening their covert organizations and, what is more important, strengthen-

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ing the overall potential of the USSR. At the same time, they might also consider the usefulness of permitting the Satellites a greater show of independence. As national states, remaining under veiled Soviet control, they would testify to Moscow's good faith. They might assist in the development of relations with Western Europe, possibly through their own liberated socialists who might be put in touch with Free World socialist parties. This would greatly advance the United Front tactic on an international scale. But all these measures would be designed only to further basic Communist objectives. Since violence has characterized Communist actions in the past, subtler methods could be mistaken, even by Party members, as an indication of "mellowing". Nothing would be farther from Soviet-Communist intentions.

18. There is, however, an outside chance that Khrushchev's newer course, deviating as it were from the irreconcilable, aggressive precepts of Lenin and Stalin, may carry the germs of revolutionary paralysis within itself. It is conceivable that a psychological transformation could vitiate the Marxist doctrine of historical materialism. Once freed from the confines of permanent tensions, mental attitudes may develop which could become stronger than Communist faith and discipline. Such a transformation would be slow, at first hardly noticeable, but it might work itself up persistently from the grass roots to the "leading circles". It is impossible to estimate how long such a process would need to become apparent, nor is it possible to foresee its ultimate outcome. Much would depend upon the character of future Soviet leadership.

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19. The premise for a successful Communist holding operation is the continuation in power of the CPSU's Presidium as presently constituted. The shrewd "old Bolsheviks" will ruthlessly (and noiselessly) suppress any evidence of "mellowing". Nor can it be expected that the middle and higher ranks of functionaries and officers have any intention of jeopardizing their position by crowding the present leaders. It is futile to speculate on the character of the regime which will succeed today's collective leaders, but it is possible that the present constellation may last 5-10 years, provided "peaceful coexistence" continues. If antibiotics of transformation have penetrated the Communist body politic, their effect, if any, probably will not show during this period. If transformation is permitted to come to the surface later, it will do so very slowly, almost unnoticeably. It may be a generation or two before tangible changes become apparent. Moreover, any major disruptive event, such as internal upheavals or local wars, would be likely to interrupt the healing process. Thus it cannot be expected that a "mellowing process" could become effective during the next decade. Nor is it overly pessimistic to predict that a healthy transformation of Communism into a movement of constructive social endeavors cannot be expected in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile we shall be compelled to continue warding off a diabolically clever opponent whose ingenuity and resourcefulness, unfortunately, is growing.

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Gorbachev's Domestic Challenge: The Looming Problems (U)

Key Judgments

Information available as of 2 February 1987 was used in this report.

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is off to a strong start. He has consolidated power with unprecedented speed, put in place an ambitious program for economic revitalization that has already achieved some results, set higher standards of accountability for the bureaucracy, and improved the image of the Soviet leadership at home and abroad.

But Gorbachev's greatest challenge lies ahead. He has staked his leadership on radically improving the functioning of the Soviet system while keeping up with the United States abroad. The cautious changes he has sanctioned so far are, in our view, insufficient to achieve these goals. Over the next few years, he is likely to face tough choices between accepting results that will fall well short of his goals--and a resultant erosion of his power--or pushing the Soviet leadership toward far more difficult--and politically controversial--policy measures.

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goals--

Revitalizing the Economy. Gorbachev has made economic revitalization his priority issue, arguing that Soviet national security and influence abroad are dependent on a sharp economic improvement. So far, despite the urgency of his rhetoric, he has relied on traditional methods--discipline, organizational streamlining, new people, refocusing investment to machine building--and some modest reforms to achieve his goals. While these steps are improving things somewhat--and from the Soviet perspective are impressive and significant--they appear likely to fall well short of achieving both the growth and technological progress Gorbachev is seeking over the next five years.

To achieve his goals for improved economic performance, he will have to consider more politically risky and economically disruptive reforms. Moreover, progress on the economy is inextricably linked to developments on a host of other controversial political and social issues. Gorbachev is already facing strong opposition from those who see their jobs, status, and sinecures threatened by his efforts to turn the Soviet economy and society around. His cadre policy--to replace government and party bureaucrats to increase efficiency, imagination, and commitment--is at the focal point of the struggle.

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Mastering the Bureaucracy. To implement successfully even the changes he has announced so far, Gorbachev will have to transform a bureaucracy renowned for its ability to resist leadership direction into a more responsive and efficient instrument of change. Despite his political success to date, he has only begun to accomplish this task. His words and deeds clearly show determination to tame the party and state bureaucracies, but resistance to his initiatives is fierce

unrelenting pressure to get his agenda implemented is already creating a large pool of disgruntled apparatchiki intent on blocking his program, and he may well have to consider even more forceful measures.

Managing the Politburo. From Gorbachev's perspective, the need to address these interrelated problems will seriously complicate his greatest challenge--maintaining a consensus within the Politburo. The independent-minded officials who make up Gorbachev's Politburo appear to agree that there is a need for new policy directions and personnel to carry them out, but they appear to differ over specific approaches. The convergence of the institutional, economic, social, and defense issues Gorbachev must face will make consensus decisionmaking even tougher to accomplish than it has been so far.

Limiting the Defense Burden. Without restricting the defense burden, Gorbachev will find it increasingly difficult to generate the significant increase in resources he needs to devote to civilian industrial investment, particularly machine building. Unless there is a sharp upturn in economic performance--which we think is unlikely--or major reductions in defense spending--which would be very controversial without a significant reduction in the perceived threat--by the end of the decade, demands for investment in the civilian sector will come increasingly into conflict with demands for more investment in the defense industries. The prospect of such a choice has already led Gorbachev to pursue a bold strategy for managing the US relationship that probably is controversial within the Soviet elite and could, in conjunction with economic considerations, eventually lead him to confront fundamental obstacles inhibiting economic progress.

Managing Societal Pressures. Gorbachev may find that the Soviet populace, long accustomed to a paternalistic state that provides job security and basic necessities at low prices, is a major obstacle to achieving the social-economic transformation he wants. The regime has already pressed workers to be more productive while refusing to devote a greater share of resources

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to consumption in order to provide incentives. Many Soviet reformers believe further changes in social policy--reduced subsidies for necessities, a less egalitarian wage structure, and a more tolerant attitude toward unemployment--will be required to produce sustained improvements in economic performance. Although societal problems are unlikely to reach crisis proportions over the next five years, Gorbachev will need to manage popular concerns effectively to improve morale and productivity as well as to prevent increased discontent.

The Soviet leader has considerable advantages and assets for pushing his agenda. Nevertheless, as these problems converge over the next five years, we believe he will face an increasingly clear choice between settling for half measures that fall well short of his demands and perhaps his needs, or forcing the Politburo to make some difficult and divisive decisions. Failure to take on this challenge probably would not cost him his job but would open his administration to charges of Brezhnev-style immobilism that he seems determined to prevent. The leadership style Gorbachev has demonstrated so far, as well as his rhetoric, suggests that he will turn to more radical policy alternatives rather than accept that fate. He will find some advisers eager to push for a harsher neo-Stalinist path as well as those arguing for more radical policy or systemic reforms. We do not know what mix of these options he might choose or even how hard he will push. But the complexities of the issues and absence of easy alternatives guarantee that the struggle will be protracted and the outcome uncertain both for him and the Soviet Union.

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Origins of CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991



Origins of CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union

Author's Comments: Donald Steury

Berlin, the political flashpoint of the early Cold War, was a catalyst for the development of a strategic analysis capability in CIA. The end of World War II found the Allies in an increasingly tenuous quadripartite occupation of the city, which was complicated by its position deep inside the Russian occupation zone. As the wartime alliance fragmented, the continued Western presence in Berlin assumed a growing importance to the stability of the Western alliance: first, as a concrete symbol of the American commitment to defend Western Europe; and, second, as a vital strategic intelligence base from which to monitor the growing Soviet military presence in Germany and Eastern Europe.

The continued division of the city offered no such advantage to the Soviet Bloc. Inevitably, the Kremlin came to regard the Western garrisons in Berlin as a more-or-less permanent challenge to the legitimacy of Soviet rule in Germany and Eastern Europe. Consequently, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin initiated a series of provocations and military demonstrations early in 1948 in an apparent effort to force the Western Allies out of Berlin. By March, the US Military Governor in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, was sufficiently alarmed to warn Washington of "a subtle change in Soviet attitude which...gives me a feeling that (war) may come with dramatic suddenness."¹

Clay apparently had intended only to warn the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of the need for caution in Central Europe, but the telegram caused considerable alarm in Washington. At the behest of JCS Chairman General Omar N. Bradley, the supervisory Intelligence Advisory Committee ordered CIA to chair an ad hoc committee to examine the likelihood of war.² The result was a series of three estimates (documents 1, 2, and 3) that examined and dismissed the possibility of a planned Soviet assault on Western Europe in 1948-1949, despite the escalating Soviet saber-rattling over Berlin. Although the estimates were brief, each reflected a relatively sophisticated and broadly-based understanding of Soviet national power. The analysis contained therein went beyond the military dimensions of the problem to analyze the political and economic implications of the issue. Together, the documents indicated a need for an independent analytical capability in Washington.

A fourth estimate, ORE 58-48 (document 4) provided a comprehensive assessment of the Soviet Union's potential to wage war. A highly controversial estimate at the time, this document nonetheless further validated ORE's role as a source of overarching analyses.

¹ William R. Harris, "The March Crisis of 1948, Act I," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 1966, p.7 (National Archives and Record Administration [NARA] Records Group 263).

² *Ibid.*, p.10.

The Berlin crisis sharply demonstrated the need for regular review of Moscow's war potential. With the reorganization of CIA in 1950-1951, this responsibility was formally given to the newly created Board of National Estimates (see SE-16, document 5).

Throughout much of the 1950s, CIA's analysis of the Soviet Union continued to be hampered by the lack of solid intelligence on Soviet military developments. Until the first remote sensors (such as the U-2 and the CORONA reconnaissance satellites) were deployed, CIA's analysis often was based on fragmentary sources at best. An essential component of the reorganization of CIA's analysis was the comprehensive review of the available intelligence on the Soviet Union completed in 1953 (document 6).

Soviet Society in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 30 November 1982
was used in this report.*

Both Western observers and Soviet officials recognize that the Soviet Union now faces a wide array of social, economic, and political ills including a general social malaise, ethnic tensions, consumer frustrations, and political dissent. Precisely how these internal problems will ultimately challenge and affect the regime, however, is open to debate and considerable uncertainty. Some observers believe that the regime will have little trouble coping with the negative mood among the populace. Others believe that economic mismanagement will aggravate internal problems and ultimately erode the regime's credibility, increasing the long-term prospects for fundamental political change.

Whatever the ultimate prognosis, these problems will pose a challenge for the new Soviet leadership. The Politburo's approach probably will be based on its assessment of the threat posed and the degree to which these issues can be addressed by policy shifts. Three broad categories of problems—the quality of life, ethnic tensions, and dissent—are surveyed in this paper. Of these, popular discontent over a perceived decline in the quality of life represents, in our judgment, the most serious and immediate challenge for the Politburo. According to [] sources, the Soviet people are no longer confident that their standard of living will continue to improve. Popular dissatisfaction and cynicism seem to be growing. This popular mood has a negative impact on economic productivity and could gradually undermine the regime's credibility. Such discontent has already led to some isolated strikes and demonstrations, developments that immediately get the leadership's attention. Other manifestations of discontent—crime, corruption, and alcoholism—are evident as well but pose no direct challenge to the regime. Such ills, nonetheless, have a detrimental effect on Soviet economic goals, are harmful to the social climate in general, and in turn are made worse by the slow rate of economic growth.

Ethnic discontent—rooted in cultural, demographic, and economic problems as well as political suppression—remains primarily a latent but potentially serious vulnerability. Currently, there is no widespread, politically disruptive protest or dissent among the Soviet nationalities. The regime's policies—granting to national minorities some linguistic, territorial, cultural, and administrative autonomy; raising the standard of living; expanding the educational base; and using overwhelming police power when needed—have been largely successful so far. Although the potential for political unrest and sporadic violence in the Baltic republics remains

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high because of economic, demographic, and cultural grievances, Baltic concerns have little impact elsewhere in the USSR and can be suppressed if necessary. With more time (perhaps decades), however, similar problems could become much more consequential in Muslim Central Asia, requiring the regime to manage this problem more adroitly.

Finally, the range of political, religious, and cultural discontent that is expressed in the Soviet dissident movement does not, at present, seriously challenge the regime's political control, but the regime deals with it as if it does. Soviet dissidents cause concern because they have an international audience and their activities embarrass the regime. Moreover, the leadership remains psychologically insecure and is unwilling to allow any hint of challenge to its authority, apparently because it fears such dissidents could appeal to a wider audience by articulating more widely held discontent over food shortages and the like. For these reasons, the regime, particularly of late, has used widespread arrests and imprisonment of dissident leaders, confinement in psychiatric hospitals, and exile to crush the movement. The movement, however, is not likely to die and in the long run could grow if it can capitalize on increasing discontent, cynicism, and alienation among the populace.

The sharp slowdown in economic growth since the mid-1970s is the underlying problem that ties all these issues together and makes them potentially more troublesome for the regime. Unless this trend is reversed, increasing alienation and cynicism, especially among young people, are likely; and other social ills—crime, corruption, alcoholism—could get worse. The regime, to be sure, has impressive resources for trying to deal with particular economic problems—especially in its centralized control over priorities and resources, but a return to the more favorable economic conditions of the 1960s and early 1970s, when there were substantial improvements in the standard of living, is highly unlikely. The pervasive police powers at the Politburo's disposal, when coupled with the Soviet populace's traditional passivity toward deprivation and respect for authority, should, however, continue to provide the regime with the necessary strength to contain and suppress open dissent.

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Difficult decisions regarding resource allocation and new management approaches, nevertheless, will probably be needed to deal with the Politburo's economic problems and to reverse the malaise that has set in. How the new leadership will handle these issues over the long run is uncertain. Its policy options range from undertaking major "reforms" and reallocating resources away from defense to greater reliance on administrative controls and repression. Some mix of policies involving both directions might be attempted. No solutions it is likely to attempt, however, offer any certain cure for its growth problem and the malaise related to it. This situation will likely require the leadership to fall back even more on traditional orthodox methods to control dissent and suppress challenges to its authority while continuing efforts to avoid an overall decline in a "quality of life" that has become the regime's real basis for legitimacy.